Stuart Oxygen Co. v. Josephian

162 F.2d 857, 74 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 117, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3783
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 18, 1947
Docket11445
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 162 F.2d 857 (Stuart Oxygen Co. v. Josephian) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stuart Oxygen Co. v. Josephian, 162 F.2d 857, 74 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 117, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3783 (9th Cir. 1947).

Opinion

BONE, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, Stuart Oxygen Company (defendant below) and appellee, William Jo-sephian (plaintiff below), are engaged as competitors in tile business of producing and supplying oxygen for commercial use. The manufactured oxygen is normally pumped under very high pressure into steel cylindrical tanks so that it may be readily transported to the place of consumption. Because of the high pressures involved these tanks must be very strong and consequently are very heavy, weighing about 140 pounds each.

*858 The increasing use of oxygen, particularly in steel fabrication industries, finally made delivery of single tanks of oxygen economically unfeasible as too much handling was required (due to the small amount of gas contained in a single tank). Other competitors in the business hit upon the solution of delivering the gas-in liquid form, but the equipment required was too expensive to be used by either appellee or appellant. They cast about for some way to deliver a number of tanks manifolded together so that less handling would be required. But to fasten many tanks together made the unit so heavy that it could not be conviently handled — particularly so, since, in many instances, the valve fittings had to connect exactly with the consumer’s pipe lines. Moreover, other considerations made it imperative that the multiple unit, when constructed, could be handled manually by a single man.

APPELLEE'S PATENTED DEVICE

APPELLANT'S DEVICE

Appellee then invented and patented a device whereby a number of tanks were mounted upon a plate (see the illustration) manifolded together so that the gas from all the tanks could be drawn from a single connection, and the entire unit so balanced upon what appellee calls a “track” that it could be handled manually by a single workman. After the patent had been issued, ap-pellee met a representative of the appellant at a trade convention and described his device to him. This representative displayed great interest in the invention and it is clear from the record that appellant was fully aware of the details of the patented device, and of the fact that it had been patented.

Appellee’s original model of the patented device had been constructed under his direction by a mechanic, one Molinari, who later left the employ of appellee under strange circumstances and went to work for appellant. While with appellant he produced for appellant a device similar to that patented by appellee. Appellant produced a large number of these devices and began using them in his business. When appellee learned of this fact he brought this action seeking an injunction against further in *859 fringement and an accounting for profits and damages.

The district court held that the patent was valid, that the device of appellant infringed the palent, and granted an injunction against further infringements although finding that an accounting was not necessary. Appellant appeals from this judgment of the district court.

At no point in the proceedings in the district court or in this court was the validity of the patent seriously challenged. The material and decisive question presented and argued before, this court is whether appellant’s device infringed appellee’s patent.

Appellee relies upon Ralph N. Brodie Co. v. Hydraulic Press Mfg. Co., 9 Cir., 151 F.2d 91, 95, and urges upon us the rule there expressed that questions of infringement are questions of fact, and therefore in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, this court will not set aside the determination of the trial court unless it is “clearly erroneous.” However, an examination of the Brodie case and the cases therein cited discloses that Judge Mathews made an application in the Brodie case of the correct rule earlier enunciated in Nicholl, Inc. v. Schick Dry Shaver, 9 Cir., 98 F.2d 511, 513, (referred to in the Brodie case) where he set forth the rule and exception in the following terms;

“The question of infringement was in this case, as it usually is a question of fact. Reinharts v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 9 Cir., 85 F.2d 628, 630. The case does not, as claimed by appellant, fall within the i ule that, where the facts are undisputed, and the case can be determined by a mere comparison of structures, and extrinsic evidence is not needed for purposes of explanation or to resolve questions of the application of descriptions to subject-matter, the question of infringement may be determined as a question of law'. United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 303 U.S. 26, 30, 58 S.Ct. 412, 82 L.Ed. 625.” [Emphasis supplied]

While as Judge Mathews noted, both the Schick Dry Shaver case and the Brodie case fell outside the rule, the case at bar comes clearly within the rule above quoted.

The testimony before the trial judge revolved around the exhibits (full size commercial units) and embraced a discussion of the meaning of the term “stability” as used in the claims in the patent, the absence or presence of prior art, and appellee’s charge that appellant deliberately copied his device. The terms of the patent and the respective devices of the parties are also before us for our inspection. The facts are clear and undisputed and the question of infringement in this case can be determined by a comparison of structures and is a question of law. Therefore this court will examine for itself the device of appellant and determine as a matter of law whether it infringes the patent of appellee.

The. device patented by appellee, as the patent itself stated, was designed to “provide means for clamping a plurality of tanks into a unit which can be readily moved from place to place by tilting and rolling, together with means for reducing the danger of upset” (see the illustration). As the device was described in the patent seven tanks were to be manifolded together, but it is conceded that the number of tanks is immaterial and that the actual units employed commercially by both appellant and appellee contained only four tanks. Likewise it is conceded by all parties that the slight differences in the means used to clamp the tanks together and to secure them to the plate, are immaterial. The heart of the dispute is the nature of the plate, called the “truck” (see illustration) upon which the tanks rest and to which they are secured.

In appellee’s patented device the “truck” is a circular flat sheet of steel to which is attached a circular ring called the “track” (approximately the same diameter as the bottom of one tank and made of pipe) which is welded coaxially to the flat plate. The tanks rest upon this “truck” assembly. As is apparent from the drawing, this makes it possible to tip the unit sufficiently to balance it upon this ring or “track” and to roll the entire unit along in a straight line. (It is not rolled along on tile outer

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162 F.2d 857, 74 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 117, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3783, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stuart-oxygen-co-v-josephian-ca9-1947.