Advance Rumley Co. v. John Lauson Mfg. Co.

275 F. 249, 1921 U.S. App. LEXIS 2221
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit·Decided March 15, 1921·No. No. 2815·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

EVAN A. EVANS, Circuit Judge.

The present appeal deals with a patent, No. 812,371, to J. A. Secor, and covers a “special regulator for explosive engines.” In disposing* of the suit, Judge Geiger gave reasons for his conclusions that so satisfactorily present the issues involved that we set them forth in full.1

[250] [1] We agree with the findings and conclusions reached, and adopt the opinion.

While this might well dispose of the appeal, we will, in view of counsel’s argument most earnestly urged in support of certain attacks upon the opinion, briefly refer to two contentions.

The decision, so far as it relates to claims 1, 3, and 5, turns upon tile presence of the three “throttling-valves” as elements in the combination. Appellant’s counsel frankly state in their brief:

“The defense against the charge of infringement rests mainly on the argument that the claims (especially 1 and 3) should be limited to the direct connection of each throttle valve with the governor, and that the valves which throttle the water and oil are not so connected in defendant’s carbure[251] tor. There is no dispute about the fact that; defendant’s throttling-valves are not directly connected with or directly operated by, the governor.”

The query arises: what are “throttling-valves”?

[2] This court has frequently and consistently recognized the patentee’s right to be his own lexicographer, and in the present suit, regardless of the ordinary or the technical meaning of the words “throttling-valve,” we will unhesitatingly accept another definition if ascertainable from the patent, if by doing so we can give better or more accurate effect to Üiis or other claims. However, such definition must be as[252] certained from the use of the words in the specification and claims, and must be in harmony with the asserted advance which the invention represents over the prior art. Examining the specifications as well as the claims, we can find no support for any definition that would ignore the word “throttling.” The use of this word is consistent with its ordinary meaning and no other, and its function in the combination is expressive of the asserted advance over existing structures.

Claim 13 reads:

“In an internal-combustion engine adapted to inhale water for internal cooling, the combination of a piston adapted by its suction movement to in[253] líala eaah ingredient of a comTm»tnie mixture at the same time, the same temperature, under the same pressure, and through the same admission valve and also to atomize and commingle the liquid ingredients with the air supply ; a governor adapted to vary the volume of the fuel mixtures, as well as the relative proportions of the constituent ingredients in said mixtures; a combustion chamber in which the air charge .absorbs and incorporates the vapors evolved from the atomized liquids commingled with, and held in susnension by said air charge; substantially as, and for the purpose sped hod.”

[254] The opinion is attacked because of the meaning or construction given to the phrase “each ingredient of a combustible mixture.” Confessedly this language is uncertain in and of itself. But although doubtful standing alone, it becomes perfectly clear and certain when we examine the entire sentence.

Again, it is hardly necessary to add to the reasons assigned in the opinion. We allude to but one. If we ignored the specifications and the other claims and the generally recognized meaning of a “combustible mixture” in a carburetor, still we could not escape the language of the claim itself, embraced as it is in a single sentence. When patentee as part of the same element spoke of “commingling the liquid ingredients,” he referred to the “liquid ingredients” and to the “air.” “Liquid ingredients” involves two liquids, water and kerosene. Patentee’s use of the plural at this and other places in the claim is significant. We can entertain no doubt that the court was correct in construing “each ingredient of a combustible mixture” to include air, kerosene, and water.

We also agree that the testimony fails to show appellee infringes this claim because its structure is not adapted to inhale such ingredients into the combustion chamber at the same temperature.

Further discussion we consider unnecessary.

The decree is affirmed.

Footnotes

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Advance Rumley Co. v. John Lauson Mfg. Co., 275 F. 249, 1921 U.S. App. LEXIS 2221 (7th Cir. 1921).

275 F. 249 (Advance Rumley Co. v. John Lauson Mfg. Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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