Stuart Bradley Finch v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 7, 2025
• Docket: 10-23-00238-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-23-00238-CR

Stuart Bradley Finch, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

On appeal from the 278th District Court of Walker County, Texas Senior Judge Albert McCaig, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 30129

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Appellant Stuart Bradley Finch guilty of the third-degree

felony offense of driving while intoxicated and the state jail felony offense of

possession of a controlled substance in an amount less than one gram. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04; TEX. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE ANN. §

481.115. The trial court found the two enhancement paragraphs to be true and

assessed punishment in the driving while intoxicated count at thirty years confinement and in the possession of a controlled substance count at twenty

years confinement. In a single issue, Finch argues that the trial court erred by

denying his motion to suppress evidence. We will affirm.

A. Background

On May 9, 2020, Officer Ashley Walker, with the Huntsville Police

Department, observed Finch driving a white pickup truck with what she

perceived as an unreadable license plate. Officer Walker followed the pickup

truck in an effort to read the license plate. While following the vehicle, Officer

Walker believed that Finch turned without giving a signal 100 feet prior to

making the turn. Officer Walker initiated a traffic stop, and when she made

contact with Finch, she immediately noticed signs of impairment. Finch

admitted that he had had four beers and also that he had a baggy of

methamphetamine in his front pocket. Finch consented to a blood draw that

was subsequently sent for laboratory analysis and returned a positive result

for both alcohol and methamphetamine.

B. Issue One

In his sole issue, Finch argues that the trial court “abused his discretion

by denying [Finch’s] motion to suppress.”

1. Authority

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an

abuse of discretion using a bifurcated standard. See Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d

Finch v. State Page 2 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997). We give “almost total deference” to the trial court’s findings of

historical fact that are supported by the record and to the trial court's rulings

on mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and

demeanor. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. “We conduct a de novo review of

evidence when the resolution of mixed questions of law and fact do not turn on

an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.” St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d

720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89). We also

review the trial court’s legal rulings de novo. State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d

278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial judge is the sole trier of

fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given

their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Furthermore, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial

court’s ruling. State v. Garcia–Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by

the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. State

v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

When explicit findings of fact are not made by the trial court, the

appellate court infers the necessary factual findings that support the trial

court’s ruling if the record evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable

Finch v. State Page 3 to the ruling, supports these implied fact findings. Garcia–Cantu, 253 S.W.3d

at 241. If the trial court could have reasonably denied a motion to suppress

given the record evidence and given the applicable law, the appellate court

must affirm the trial court’s ruling. Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

The Fourth Amendment does not forbid all seizures, just unreasonable

seizures. See Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

The detention of an individual may be justified on less than probable cause if

the individual is reasonably suspected of criminal activity based on specific,

articulable facts. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d

889 (1968); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App 2000). “A

police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable

facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him

reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be

engaged in criminal activity.” Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014) (quoting Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011)). “In determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion

to detain, we look at the totality of the circumstances through an objective lens,

disregarding the officer’s subjective intent.” Matthews, 431 S.W.3d at 603.

Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that:

Finch v. State Page 4 (a) No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.

In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 38.23(a).

2. Discussion

Finch did not file a written motion to suppress evidence. At trial before

opening statements, Finch’s trial counsel notified the trial court that he had “a

constitutional challenge to one of the witnesses.” The trial proceeded with

opening statements and testimony from one witness. When the State called

Officer Walker to testify, there was a hearing outside the presence of the jury

on Finch’s constitutional challenge.

At the hearing, Officer Walker testified that she observed Finch driving

an older pickup with a license plate that was unreadable. As she followed the

vehicle to try to read the license plate, she believed Finch made a turn without

giving a signal more than 100 feet before the turn. According to Officer Walker,

she later reviewed the dash cam video to see where Finch first turned on his

signal. She then went and measured the distance between where Finch turned

Finch v. State Page 5 on his signal and where he made the turn. Officer Walker acknowledged that

she had been mistaken, and that Finch had properly signaled his turn more

than 100 feet before turning. According to her measurement, Finch turned on

his signal at approximately 144 feet before turning. Finch’s counsel presented

evidence that Finch turned on his signal 187 feet before turning.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Finch’s counsel argued that the trial

court should “exclude as a reason to stop anything related to the license plate”

because Officer Walker could not identify anything that was dirty or

obstructing the license plate when she reviewed the dash cam video. Counsel

then argued that there was no objectively reasonable justification for the stop

because Officer Walker admitted that Finch properly signaled before turning.

The State responded that Finch’s counsel made an argument for the

inclusion of an instruction to the jury pursuant to Article 38.23 of the Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure. The State noted that Finch’s complaints were

issues for the jury to determine.

The trial court stated:

What you’re essentially asking the Court to do is make factual rulings on issues of law, and because this is not a motion to suppress, the Court is not going to make a factual finding under these facts, but I do find, as a matter of law, that the issue of the license plate, which is a factual issue to be proven, and the distance, make this subject to a Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23 Charge before the jury, so there’s no factual findings in this other than you’re entitled to the Charge and so I will find that [Finch] has met its burden of proof, that you have perfected

Finch v. State Page 6 your challenge, but it is preserved for appeal on their 38.23. (emphasis added)

The trial court further noted that “[w]e’re not dealing with the Fourth

Amendment issue. We’re dealing with whether or not the jury is going to be

allowed to make a factual determination on those issues that you have now

raised properly, and there will be a Charge pertaining to it.”

To preserve error for appellate review, the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure require that the record show that the objection “stated the grounds

for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with

sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the

specific grounds were apparent from the context.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).

The issue on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial. Thomas v.

State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

Where the correct ground for an objection is obvious to the judge and

opposing counsel, no waiver results from a general or imprecise objection.

Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). The objecting

party must “let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is

entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a

time when the judge is in the proper position to do something about it.” Pena

v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Lankston v.

State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). To determine whether a

Finch v. State Page 7 complaint on appeal comports with a complaint made at trial, we look to the

context of the objection and the shared understanding of the parties at the

time. Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

There is nothing in the record to show that Finch made a written or oral

motion to suppress evidence. The trial court determined that Finch’s

complaint related to Article 38.23 and specifically stated that it was not a

motion to suppress. There is nothing to suggest that the parties shared an

understanding that Finch made an oral motion to suppress evidence.

Therefore, because the trial court did not have an opportunity to rule on a

motion to suppress, Finch did not preserve his complaint for appellate review.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

Moreover, even if Finch preserved his complaint for review, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion. Section 545.104 of the Texas Transportation

Code provides:

(a) An operator shall use the signal authorized by Section 545.106 to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position. (b) An operator intending to turn a vehicle right or left shall signal continuously for not less than the last 100 feet of movement of the vehicle before the turn.

TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.104(a)(b).

It is well settled that a traffic violation committed in an officer’s presence

authorizes an initial stop. Armitage v. State, 637 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex. Crim.

Finch v. State Page 8 App. 1982). The State is not required to show that an offense was actually

committed but rather must only show that the officer reasonably believed a

violation was in progress. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159,

163 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).

Officer Walker testified that at the time she made the stop, she believed

that Finch turned on his signal less than 100 feet prior to turning, which would

be a violation of Section 545.104. Although she later determined that Finch

properly signaled his turn, she maintained that at the time of the stop, she

reasonably believed he was in violation of Section 545.104. See Robinson v.

State, 377 S.W.3d 712, 720-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). She stated that she had

stopped vehicles for this offense many times and that her measurement

estimate was based upon her experience.

When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial judge is the sole trier of

fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d

at 24–25. Based on the record, the jury could have reasonably found Officer

Walker to be credible and, therefore, had reasonable suspicion to stop Finch.

Thus, even if Finch preserved his complaint for review, viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying any motion to suppress. We

overrule Finch’s sole issue.

C. Conclusion

Finch v. State Page 9 Having overruled Finch’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

MATT JOHNSON Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: August 7, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed Do not publish CRPM

Finch v. State Page 10