Struthers Scientific & International Corp. v. General Foods Corp.

45 F.R.D. 375, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 565, 12 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 767, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8818
District Court, S.D. Texas·Decided October 1, 1968·No. Civ. A. No. 68-H-374·Published·Cited by 22 cases

Opinion

Memorandum:

INGRAHAM, District Judge.

This patent oriented declaratory judgment action is before the court for consideration of the following matters: (1) Defendant’s objections to plaintiff’s first interrogatories; (2) Defendant’s objections to plaintiff’s second interrogatories; and (3) Plaintiff’s motion for inspection of defendant’s Houston plant. The court’s previous memorandums should be consulted for a detailed statement of the case.

A decision on plaintiff’s motion for leave to file its first amended complaint and on defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss (or, in the alternative, to transfer) will be withheld until the Delaware court has ruled on plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. After such a ruling the parties may, if they so desire, file supplemental memorandums of law in support of their respective motions reflecting the effect of the Delaware .ruling. This memorandum is being entered at this time with the expectation that it will galvanize the parties into pursuing their discovery with greater vigor.

I. Defendant’s objections to plaintiff’s first interrogatories.

A. Interrogatories 2(e), 2(f), 3-7, 13, 14, 18(c), 26-34 and 38 are objected to on the grounds that they are unduly broad and that they improperly seek disclosure of trade secrets. The interrogatories in question are concerned generally with the identification of persons and documents and with the problem of plugging of equipment. The gist of defendant’s objection to the scope of the interrogatories is that while the patent in suit relates only to a minor preparatory step in the overall process for producing freeze dried coffee, the interrogatories are directed toward obtaining information about the entire process.

After carefully reading the abstract of disclosure and the claims contained in United States Patent No. 3,381,-302, the court concludes that the alleged invention pertains only to that step in the process wherein the liquid coffee extract is chilled and filtered so as to precipitate and remove the insoluble waxy substances which might otherwise clog the equipment. The language used in the claims and the abstract of disclosure unequivocally demonstrates that freeze concentration is outside the scope of the patent since by that time the patented process has fulfilled its function.1 Of necessity the drying stage is likewise outside the scope of the patent since drying follows freeze concentration. In [378]*378general terms, then, the court holds that the interrogatories in question should be answered only insofar as they pertain to steps 10-14, inclusive, as these appear in the diagram accompanying the Letters Patent.2

Turning now to the implementation of thus ruling — Interrogatories 18(c), 29 and 38 should be answered in full since they clearly relate to matters within the scope of the patented process. Similarly, interrogatories 26-28 should be answered since they deal with the very problem the process in controversy is said to avoid. The defendant's answers to interrogatories 2(e), 2(f), 3-7, 13 and 14 should be limited to giving information concerning the de-waxing step only, if this is possible. Thus, for example, in answering interrogatory 2(f), the defendant will be required to give the names and addresses of the persons or firms who designed that portion of the plant and the equipment used in the dewaxing process. Finally, the objection to interrogatories 30-34 will be sustained since these pertain wholly to the freeze concentration and subsequent steps, and are hence outside the scope of the patent.

The aforementioned interrogatories have also been objected to on the grounds that they improperly seek disclosure of trade secrets. This objection will be considered only insofar as it relates to those interrogatories to which the objection based on breadth has been overruled either in whole or in part.

The objection based on confidentiality to interrogatories 2(e), 2(f), 3-7, 13 and 14 must be overruled since these interrogatories seek the identification of persons who may or may not know trade secrets, and of documents which may or may not contain such matter. Any objection going to confidentiality is premature until such time as disclosure of a trade secret is actually requested. Lee v. Electric Products Co., 37 F.R.D. 42 (N.D.Ohio 1963).

The objection to the remaining interrogatories, to-wit, 18(c), 26-29 and 38, is likewise without merit. Trade secrets are not absolutely privileged and their disclosure will be required where the information sought is relevant and necessary for preparation of the case for trial.3 The court is persuaded that the plaintiff has carried its burden of showing the relevancy and necessity of the material in question.

Since certain of the interrogatories under consideration may involve the disclosure of trade secrets, a protective order as authorized by Rule 30(b), Fed. R.Civ.P., is appropriate. Accordingly, counsel for both sides are instructed to jointly draft and submit a separate order providing that any trade secrets obtained by either side in the course of discovery will be utilized only for the purposes of this litigation and will be revealed only during judicial proceedings. The revelation of trade secrets at the trial will be under such terms as the court deems suitable at the time. United States v. National Steel Corp., 26 F.R.D. 603 (S.D. Tex. 1960).

B. Interrogatories 9(d) and 10 are challenged on the grounds that they are unduly burdensome and that they seek information which is both irrelevant and already available to the plaintiff as public information. Interrogatory 9(d) is concerned with advertising material and interrogatory 10 is directed toward obtaining the names and addresses of defendant’s officers and directors.

[379]*379The objection to interrogatory 9(d) will be sustained. The defendant engages in advertising on a massive scale. The interrogatory would necessarily involve an enormous number of documents. Under the circumstances, the court is of the opinion that the value of the material is far outweighed by the effort that would be required to accumulate such a mass of information. The fact that the advertising material is public information serves to tip the scales even further against the plaintiff on this point. See 4 Moore, Federal Practice, para. 33.20 (1966).

The objection to interrogatory 10- will be sustained in part. The defendant should supply the names and addresses of only those officers and directors who have knowledge of the de-waxing step in the process. (See supra pp. 2-3.)

C. Interrogatories 26-29, which have been discussed in Section “I-A” of this memorandum, are also challenged on the grounds that they are not specific enough to be answered by the defendant without requiring it to exercise its discretion and judgment in determining what it is called on to answer.

The requirement of definiteness is satisfied so long as it is clear what it is the interrogated party is called on to answer. The inquiries need not be phrased in terms of technical precision. 4 Moore, Federal Practice, para. 33.08(1) (1966). The court finds that the interrogatories under consideration are not unduly vague and the objection based on this ground will be overruled. The defendant, however, will be permitted to qualify or restrict its answer as may be necessary because of any uncertainty.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Struthers Scientific & International Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 45 F.R.D. 375, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 565, 12 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 767, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8818 (S.D. Tex. 1968).

45 F.R.D. 375 (Struthers Scientific & International Corp. v. General Foods Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Briggs v. Longline Services
10 Am. Samoa 3d 186 (High Court of American Samoa, 2005)
Dustin Construction, Inc. v. Selby Construction, Inc.
67 Va. Cir. 229 (Loudoun County Circuit Court, 2005)
In Re Columbia University Patent Litigation
330 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D. Massachusetts, 2004)
Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools
182 F.R.D. 486 (W.D. North Carolina, 1998)
Cordis Corp. v. SciMed Life Systems, Inc.
982 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Minnesota, 1997)
Central Sprinkler Co. v. Grinnell Corp.
897 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1995)
Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon International B.V.
862 F. Supp. 603 (D. Massachusetts, 1994)
Fischer Imaging Corp. v. Lorad Corp.
148 F.R.D. 273 (D. Colorado, 1993)
St. Jude Medical, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc.
107 F.R.D. 398 (D. Minnesota, 1985)
Froedge v. Walden
624 S.W.2d 833 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1981)
Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp.
85 F.R.D. 292 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1980)
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Tyco Industries, Inc.
478 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Delaware, 1979)
Dart Drug Corp. v. Corning Glass Works
480 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Maryland, 1979)
In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation
83 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. Illinois, 1978)
Duplan Corporation v. Deering Milliken, Inc.
397 F. Supp. 1146 (D. South Carolina, 1974)
Irons v. Gottschalk
369 F. Supp. 403 (District of Columbia, 1974)
Jarosiewicz v. Conlisk
60 F.R.D. 121 (N.D. Illinois, 1973)