Strong v. Su

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: December 19, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-3633
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DAVID MCARTHUR STRONG,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 24-cv-3633 (CJN)

LORI CHAVEZ-DERMER, Secretary of Labor,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff David M. Strong, proceeding pro se, challenges an Office of Workers’

Compensation Program’s decision to reduce his disability compensation payments. See Compl. at

1, 4–6. The government has moved to dismiss. See ECF No. 10. For the reasons discussed below,

the Court grants that Motion and dismisses this case.

I. Background

As best can be understood from the complaint, Strong worked at the “Department of Health

and Human Services (DHHS), The National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the National Institute

of Denal Research (NIDR)” in the 1970s. Compl. at 25. In “the late Winter or early Spring of

1994” he began having “breathing difficulties,” and eventually “was diagnosed with vasomotor

rhinitis and reactive air ways diseases.” Id. at 26. On January 31, 1995, Strong filed an

occupational disease claim with the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, which was

accepted, and he was placed on periodic compensation rolls while not working. Id. at 39.

Years later, medical examiners determined that Strong’s respiratory conditions had

improved, and he was “capable of performing sedentary or light-duty work” in certain

1 environments. Id. at 39. In June 2011, based on these findings, the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs reduced his compensation benefits. Id. at 40. Strong requested

reconsideration of this decision multiple times without success and eventually appealed to the

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board. Id. at 41. In December 2013, the Board affirmed the

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs’s decision to reduce his benefits. Id. at 38–44. On

December 31, 2024, Strong filed this suit, contesting the Office of Workers’ Compensation

Programs’s decision and requesting “the Court [ ] enter an Order to restore [his] Back Pay with

the sum off [sic], $153111.88.” Id. at 1, 4, 6.

II. Analysis

The government seeks dismissal of this case under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(5). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), a plaintiff must

establish that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over his claims. See Lujan v. Defs. of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). In deciding a 12(b)(1) motion, the Court “assume[s] the truth

of all material factual allegations in the complaint and construe[s] the complaint liberally, granting

plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat. Ins. Co.

v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). It also “may

consider materials outside the pleadings.” Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249,

1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). If the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over a claim, it must dismiss

that claim without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3); see N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v. Wolf,

977 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

“Under Rule 12(b)(5), a party may seek dismissal of a complaint on the basis of

‘insufficient service of process.’” Stallard v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. CV 20-2703 (RBW),

2022 WL 59395, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2022) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5)). This “includes

2 bringing a challenge to ‘the mode of delivery or the lack of delivery of [a] summons and

complaint.’” Id. (quoting 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure

§ 1353 (3d ed. 2004)). “The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that [he] effected proper service.”

Jouanny v. Embassy of France in the United States, 220 F. Supp. 3d 34, 37 (D.D.C. 2016). “[T]o

do so, he must demonstrate that the procedure employed satisfied the requirements of the relevant

portions of Rule 4 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] and any other applicable provision of

law.” Light v. Wolf, 816 F.2d 746, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “If [the] plaintiff does not meet [this]

burden, the Court may dismiss the complaint without prejudice for insufficient service of process.”

Hashem v. Shabi, No. CV 17-1645 (ABJ), 2018 WL 3382913, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2018).

Here, the government argues that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Strong’s

claims because the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (“FECA”) precludes the Court from

reviewing the Secretary of Labor’s determinations of FECA coverage. See ECF 10 at 5–6. The

Court agrees.

When a plaintiff’s claim is covered by FECA, a federal court lacks jurisdiction over that

claim. Auld v. United States, No. CV 22-3129 (RC), 2023 WL 6141666, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 20,

2023) (“This Court’s jurisdiction [ ] is dependent on whether Auld’s claims are covered by FECA:

if they are covered, the Court lacks jurisdiction.”). Strong’s claim here, as best as the Court can

surmise from the complaint, is that the Secretary of Labor erred in reducing his periodic

compensation payments under FECA. See Compl. at 1, 4–6, 11. Put differently, Strong attempts

to have the Court review the Secretary of Labor’s decision to allow his compensation claims under

FECA, to award him periodic compensation payments, and to later reduce those payments after

finding he could resume some form of employment. See id. Because “decisions allowing or

denying compensation claims under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act are ‘not subject to

3 review by another official of the United States or by a court by mandamus or otherwise,’” the

Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Strong’s claim. Hall v. McAleenan, No. 19-5030, 2019 WL

5394627, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 2019) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b)); Southwest Marine, Inc. v.

Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 90 (1991) (“FECA contains an unambiguous and comprehensive provision

barring any judicial review of the Secretary of Labor’s determination of FECA coverage.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)); see also Lepre v. Dep’t of Labor, 275 F.3d 59, 72–74 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Alternatively, Strong has failed to effect appropriate service of process. Rule 4(c)(2) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows service to be effected by “[a]ny person who is . . . not

a party[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (emphasis added). “Rule 4(c)(2) is violated when a plaintiff

personally attempts to serve a defendant—including the United States—by mail.” Olson v. Fed.

Election Comm’n, 256 F.R.D. 8, 10 (D.D.C. 2009). Here, the government asserts that Strong

attempted to effectuate service by personally mailing his complaint and summons to it. See ECF

No. 10 at 6. Strong does not deny that that is how he attempted to effect service, nor demonstrate

that that method satisfied Rule 4. To the contrary, his own affidavit of service states that Strong

mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to the government. See ECF No. 5 at 18.

Accordingly, this matter is dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order will accompany

this Memorandum Opinion.

DATE: December 19, 2025 CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge