Strompolos v. Premium Readers Service

326 F. Supp. 1100, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13240
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedMay 18, 1971
Docket70 C 3238
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 326 F. Supp. 1100 (Strompolos v. Premium Readers Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Strompolos v. Premium Readers Service, 326 F. Supp. 1100, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13240 (N.D. Ill. 1971).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILL, District Judge.

The issue presented by defendant's motion for summary judgment is whether Section 226.1 et seq. of Volume 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations (otherwise known as and hereinafter referred to as Regulation Z) is a regulation constitutionally promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board within the scope of .the authority granted to it by the Truth in Lending Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. For the reasons stated below, we resolve this issue in the affirmative and therefore deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

This suit is a class action brought under the Act and Regulation Z, alleging that the plaintiff Strompolos entered into a retail installment contract with the defendant Premium Readers Service for the purchase of a number of magazines to be. delivered over a period of sixty months and to be paid for over a period of thirty months. The plaintiff alleges that the contract failed to disclose the total cash price and amount to be financed under the contract in violation of the Act and seeks to recover twice the amount of the finance charges imposed in connection with the transaction plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 130 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640. The defendant contends that it does not levy any finance *1102 charge for the extension of credit but charges the same unitary price for its magazine subscriptions irrespective of whether the customer pays cash at the beginning of the contract term or over the thirty months installment period. The defendant claims, therefore, that it is not a creditor within the terms of the Act and that if Regulation Z brings the activities under the terms of the Act, the regulation is void as beyond the authority of the Federal Reserve Board.

The Truth in Lending Act was promulgated by Congress as an attempt “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uniformed use of credit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601. Under the Act, the Federal Reserve Board is charged with the obligation of making regulations to effectuate the purposes of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1604. Pursuant to the above section, the Federal Reserve Board promulgated Regulation Z, which defines the coverage and liability of the Act to include persons who extend “consumer credit.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.2 (m). Consumer credit is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) to mean credit extended to a natural person and for which either a finance charge is or may be imposed, or which, pursuant to an agreement, is or may be payable in more than four installments. It is this so-called “four installment rule” which the defendant urges was beyond the statutory authority of the Board to promulgate because it renders any and all such four or more installment transae-' tions subject to the disclosure requirements and liability provisions of the Act irrespective of whether the transaction involves the imposition of a finance charge. The defendant argues that this regulation ignores the language of the Act and the Act’s legislative history, and is a lawless extension of the Act by the Board to cover persons and transactions such as those involved in this suit which Congress did not intend to reach.

Our starting point of inquiry as to the validity of this challenge to Regulation Z must, of course, be the statute itself. As stated above, the purpose of the Act is to foster the informed use of credit by making the consumer aware of the cost of credit. 15 U.S.C. § 1601. The duty to disclose certain information is imposed upon creditors by Sections 127-129 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637-1639, with the Act limited in its application to creditors who are defined as “creditors who regularly extend, or arrange for the extension of credit for which the payment of a finance charge is required.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f). Criminal sanctions and potential civil liability are imposed upon those who fail to comply with the Act by Sections 112 and 130 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1611 and 1640.

That portion of the Act which grants the Federal Reserve Board the power to issue regulations, Section 105, states:

“The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this sub-chapter. These regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations, or other provisions * * * as in the judgment of the Board are necessary to effectuate the purposes of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.” (emphasis added) 15 U.S.C. § 1604

As the defendant’s sale of magazines clearly comes within the four installment rule of Regulation Z and, if this regulation is valid, under the purview of the Act, our inquiry focuses upon Section 105 of the Act quoted above to determine if the Board has gone beyond its powers in promulgating this Regulation.

We recognize that the judiciary is not obliged simply to rubber stamp an administrative decision that is inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrates a Congressional policy underlying a statute. N. L. R. B. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 85 S.Ct. 980, 13 L. *1103 Ed.2d 839 (1965); Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 85 S.Ct. 1301, 14 L.Ed.2d 223 (1965). We further recognize that the Constitution requires the courts to inquire and determine if an administrative agency has exceeded its statutory power, Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Benjamin Harris & Co., 245 F.Supp. 467 (N.D.Ill.1965), and that the efforts of an administrator or administrative agency to enlarge or restrict the application of a statute should be subjected to close scrutiny. Celebrezze v. Kilborn, 322 F.2d 166 (5 Cir. 1963). Nevertheless, accepting the above governing principles, we conclude that the Board’s enactment of the four installment rule was a proper exercise of the power granted to it under Section 105 of the Act.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
326 F. Supp. 1100, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13240, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strompolos-v-premium-readers-service-ilnd-1971.