Strojnik v. Lonesome Valley Hospitality LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: December 1, 2020
• Docket: 3:20-cv-08276
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8

Peter S trojnik, ) No. CV-20-08276-PHX-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiff, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) Lonesome Valley Hospitality LLC, et ) 12 al., ) 13 ) ) 14 Defendants. )

15 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Arizona Consumer Fraud Act – 16 Brand Deceit Claims to Superior Court Pursuant to U.S.C. 1441(c). (Doc. 11). For the 17 following reasons, the Court will sua sponte remand the entire case for lack of subject 18 matter jurisdiction. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 On or about August 17, 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendants’ hotel to test its 21 compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Doc. 1-1 at 20). On 22 September 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Yavapai County Superior Court alleging 23 eight causes of action: (1) violations of the ADA, (2) negligence, (3) negligent 24 misrepresentation, (4) failure to disclose, (5) fraud, (6) “brand deceit,” (7) civil conspiracy, 25 and (8) aiding and abetting. (Doc. 1-1 at 20-31). On October 23, 2020, Defendants removed 26 the action to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction over the ADA claim and 27 supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law claims. (Doc. 1 at 2). There are also 28 sixteen other cases brought by Plaintiff pending in this Court alleging similar claims against 1 various hotels across Arizona.1 On November 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion 2 to Remand the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act – Brand Deceit Claims. (Doc. 11). These state 3 law claims each relate to the theory that Defendants “have developed a system of deceptive 4 self-identification through the purchase and use of nationally recognizable brand names 5 . . . to mislead the lodging public into believing they are booking a hotel room at a national 6 brand name property when in fact they are booking a room with an unknown owner and an 7 unknown operator.” (Doc. 11 at 2-3). Plaintiff argues these claims “share[] no common 8 factual nucleus with the ADA claim.” (Doc. 11 at 1). 9 II. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 10 Generally, a civil action filed in state court may be removed if the district court has 11 original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(b). Claims arising under the laws of the United 12 States are considered within the original jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. 28 U.S.C. § 13 1331. In a civil action in which a district court has original jurisdiction over at least one 14 claim, the court also has “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related 15 to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same 16 case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 17 Here, notwithstanding the parties’ arguments on supplemental jurisdiction, the 18 Court has doubts as to whether Plaintiff even has standing to bring his ADA claim. If the 19 Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over that claim, it cannot maintain supplemental 20 jurisdiction over the state law claims. See, e.g., Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City and County of 21 Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1118 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[H]ad Skysign lacked standing to 22 bring its federal claim, the district court would have lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 23 that claim and accordingly would have had no discretion to hear the state law claims.”). 24 Additionally, this Court recently remanded a nearly identical Strojnik complaint sua sponte 25 1 Those cases are: 2:20-cv-00343-DWL; 2:20-cv-01434-JJT; 3:20-cv-08194-JAT; 26 4:20-cv-00331-JGZ; 2:20-cv-01532-DJH; 2:20-cv-01566-DJH; 3:20-cv-08232-JJT; 2:20- 27 cv-01763-JJT; 3:20-cv-08247-JAT; 3:20-cv-08268-DWL; 3:20-cv-08264-JJT; 2:20-cv- 02065-DLR; 3:20-cv-08262-DWL; 3:20-cv-08276-SPL; 2:20-cv-02065-DLR; 3:20-cv- 28 08313-MTL; and 2:20-cv-02289-SMB. 1 for lack of standing. Peter Strojnik v. HPTRI Corp. et al., No. CV-20-01868-PHX-SPL, 2 2020 WL 6827765, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2020). The Court will therefore consider 3 Plaintiff’s standing sua sponte here before determining whether supplemental jurisdiction 4 is appropriate. B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir.1999) 5 (“[F]ederal courts are required sua sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as 6 standing.”). 7 III. STANDING 8 A. Legal Standard 9 In ADA cases, “to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a disabled individual 10 claiming discrimination must satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III by 11 demonstrating his standing to sue at each stage of the litigation.” Chapman v. Pier 1 12 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011). At an “irreducible minimum,” a 13 plaintiff must show that he “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 14 challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 15 judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). 16 “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a 17 legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not 18 conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 1548 (citation omitted). “In the context of injunctive 19 relief, [the plaintiff] must additionally . . . establish a ‘real and immediate threat of repeated 20 injury.’” Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) 21 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 22 When bringing claims under the ADA, standing can be shown “either by 23 demonstrating deterrence, or by demonstrating injury-in-fact coupled with an intent to 24 return to a noncompliant facility.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 25 944 (9th Cir. 2011). In other words, an ADA plaintiff has standing if he “intends to return 26 to a noncompliant place of public accommodation where he will likely suffer repeated 27 injury” or, alternatively, if he “has actual knowledge of illegal barriers at a public 28 accommodation to which he or she desires access . . . and remains deterred.” Id. at 948; 1 Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1135-37 (9th Cir. 2002). 2 For the following reasons, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege either an injury-in- 3 fact or a threat of repeated injury, and therefore lacks standing to bring his ADA claim. 4 B. Analysis 5 Plaintiff here, Peter Strojnik, is a serial litigant who has “filed over 1,700 complaints 6 in Arizona state court and over 160 complaints in the Arizona District Court alleging 7 violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (‘ADA’).” Strojnik v. State Bar of 8 Arizona, 446 F. Supp. 3d 566, 571 (D. Ariz. 2020). As this Court explained in Advocates 9 for Individuals With Disabilities LLC v. MidFirst Bank, most of Strojnik’s cases have been 10 dismissed “with prejudice for lack of standing.” 279 F. Supp. 3d 891, 894 (D. Ariz. 2017); 11 see also Strojnik v. IA Lodging Napa First LLC, No. 19-CV-03983-DMR, 2020 WL 12 2838814, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2020) (explaining that “the vast majority of courts who 13 have reached the issue have granted Rule 12(b)(1) motions for lack of standing or 14 dismissed Strojnik’s complaints sua sponte on that basis”); Strojnik v. Vill. 1017 Coronado, 15 Inc., No. 19-CV-02210-BAS-MSB, 2020 WL 3250608, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 16, 2020) 16 (collecting cases and noting that Strojnik “has filed identical allegations in multiple courts 17 and has been repeatedly told that the allegations are insufficient for standing”). 18 Unsurprisingly, Strojnik also fails to sufficiently allege standing in this case. 19 i. Injury-in-fact 20 First, Strojnik’s alleged injury is neither concrete nor particularized. Strojnik 21 continues to use the same boilerplate arguments used in his previous filings but inserts new 22 photos of alleged non-compliance which allegedly “cause[] Plaintiff to experience pain and 23 discomfort” and “deny him the ‘full and equal’ access that would satisfy the injury-in-fact 24 requirement.” (Doc. 1-1 at 9-11, 13). But saying these alleged violations give him standing 25 does not make it so. To plead standing sufficiently, Strojnik must allege “more than labels 26 and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Because Strojnik 27 fails to show how the alleged violations inhibit him because of his specific disabilities, he 28 fails to do so here. 1 For example, Strojnik alleges the hotel has “[n]o [wheelchair] accessibility to 2 passenger waiting area” and that there are “[n]o handrails on ramps throughout” the hotel. 3 (Doc. 1-1 at 13, 14, 16). However, regarding his own personal wheelchair use, Strojnik 4 only alleges he requires the use of a wheelchair to ambulate when his disabilities are “in 5 their unmitigated state.” (Doc. 1-1 at 7). Missing from the Complaint, however, are any 6 factual allegations from which this Court can conclude Plaintiff needed to use his 7 wheelchair when he visited the hotel, or even how frequently Plaintiff needs a wheelchair 8 generally. Compare Strojnik v. Village 1017 Coronado, Inc., No. 19-cv-02210-BAS-MSB, 9 2020 WL 3250608, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 16, 2020) (finding that Strojnik failed to establish 10 Article III standing where he “d[id] not allege when he needs the assistance of a wheelchair 11 or that he needed the assistance of a wheelchair at the time he wished to visit the Hotel”) 12 with Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1136 (holding that the plaintiff, who required use of a wheelchair, 13 adequately plead an injury-in-fact because he was forced to wait in the parking lot of the 14 grocery store due to the store’s lack of wheelchair access, thus establishing that he required 15 wheelchair access at the time he patronized the store). 16 Instead, the Complaint merely lists off Strojnik’s disabilities, includes grainy photos 17 of areas of Defendants’ hotel he claims fall below ADA standards generally, and alleges 18 that “the violations documented above are directly related to his disabilities by the 19 application and use of common sense.” (Doc. 1-1 at 17). But it is not this Court’s job to 20 connect the alleged ADA violations to Strojnik’s disabilities—it is Strojnik’s. See, e.g., 21 Gastelum v. Phoenix Cent. Hotel Venture, LLC, No. CV-17-04544-PHX-DLR, 2019 WL 22 498750, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 2019) (“A ‘bare procedural violation’ unassociated with a 23 plaintiff’s particular disability ‘cannot satisfy the demands of Article III’ standing.”) (citing 24 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). Accordingly, Strojnik fails to allege injury-in-fact. 25 ii. Real and immediate threat of repeated injury 26 Nor has Strojnik sufficiently shown a genuine intent to return to Defendants’ hotel 27 and, as such, he fails to allege a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. An ADA 28 plaintiff “demonstrates a real and immediate threat if he ‘is currently deterred from visiting 1 that accommodation by accessibility barriers.’” Ervine v. Desert View Reg’l Med. Ctr. 2 Holdings, LLC, 753 F.3d 862, 867 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). However, for a 3 plaintiff to “satisfy the requirement of imminent injury” under the deterrence theory, he 4 must express more than a “vague desire to return” to the hotel. Summers v. Earth Island 5 Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009). As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held, 6 “a profession of an ‘inten[t]’ to return . . . is simply not enough. Such ‘some day’ 7 intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of 8 when the some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury 9 that our cases require.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992). 10 Strojnik’s Complaint alleges he “intends to return to the Hotels periodically to test 11 them for ADA compliance.” (Doc. 1-1 at 4-5). But he doesn’t specify when he intends to 12 return or provide any evidence of such an intent. To the contrary, Strojnik’s litigious history 13 casts doubt on the sincerity of his professed intent to return to Defendants’ hotel. See, e.g., 14 Strojnik v. BW RRI II, LLC, No. 20-CV-03142-AGT, 2020 WL 5210897, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 15 Sept. 1, 2020) (“Given the volume of cases Strojnik has filed (numbering in the thousands 16 according to the Arizona Bar), and his litigation practices, there is reason to doubt the 17 veracity of his averment that he intends to visit the [defendant’s hotel] after the hotel’s 18 accessibility barriers are removed. More likely is that he will try to obtain a monetary 19 settlement and move on.”). Strojnik’s conclusory statement of intent to return, without 20 more, fails to show how Strojnik will suffer imminent injury by Defendants’ alleged failure 21 to implement accommodations. See Gastelum v. Canyon Hosp. LLC, No. CV-17-02792- 22 PHX-GMS, 2018 WL 2388047, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 25, 2018) (dismissing Strojnik’s ADA 23 claim for lack of standing because he only made “the bare allegation that he ‘intends to 24 book a room at the Defendant’s hotel once Defendant has removed all accessibility 25 barriers.’”). Accordingly, Strojnik fails to show the “real and immediate threat of repeated 26 injury” required for ADA standing. Fortyune, 364 F.3d at 1081. 27 IV. CONCLUSION 28 For the aforementioned reasons, Strojnik fails to show either that he has suffered an 1 injury-in-fact or a threat of repeated injury. Strojnik therefore lacks standing to bring his 2 ADA claim. See Strojnik v. Pasadena Robles Acquisition, LLC, 801 F. App’x 569, 570 (9th 3 Cir. 2020) (“The district court properly dismissed Strojnik’s ADA claim for lack of 4 standing because Strojnik failed to demonstrate an intent to return to defendant’s hotel or 5 that he was deterred from visiting defendant’s hotel.”). 6 Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the ADA claim, it cannot 7 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. 8 Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 664 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]ith the dismissal of [plaintiff’s] federal 9 constitutional claim for lack of standing, we have no authority to retain jurisdiction over 10 [plaintiff’s] state law claims.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)); see also Strojnik v. Hotel 11 Circle GL Holdings, LLC, No. 119-CV-01194-DAD-EPG, 2019 WL 6212084, at *6 (E.D. 12 Cal. Nov. 21, 2019) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Strojnik’s 13 remaining state claims since his ADA claim failed for lack of standing). 14 The Court will therefore remand the entire case. See Smith v. Mylan Inc., 761 F.3d 15 1042, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he district court may remand at any time prior to final 16 judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”); see also Advocates for Individuals With 17 Disabilities LLC v. WSA Properties LLC, 210 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1225 (D. Ariz. 2016) 18 (concluding, after finding Strojnik’s ADA claims lacked Article III standing, that “the 19 Court will remand rather than dismiss this case. In remanding, the Court will not dismiss 20 the federal ADA claims because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over those claims 21 and the state courts may decide [whether Strojnik has] sufficient standing to pursue 22 them”).2 Accordingly, 23 2 The Court declines to grant Strojnik leave to amend his Complaint. Given 24 Strojnik’s failure to cure almost identical standing defects in prior complaints, despite 25 numerous opportunities to do so, the Court can only conclude that amendment would be futile. See Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 968 (9th Cir. 2016) (although “leave to 26 amend should be ‘freely’ given, that liberality does not apply when amendment would be 27 futile”); see also Strojnik v. Kapalua Land Co., Ltd., 801 Fed. App’x 531 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming district court decisions to dismiss Strojnik’s complaints without leave to amend 28 because amendment would be futile); Pasadena Robles, 801 Fed. App’x at 570 (same). 1 IT IS ORDERED remanding this action to state court sua sponte for lack of subject 2| matter jurisdiction. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Arizona 4) Consumer Fraud Act — Brand Deceit Claims to Superior Court Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 | 1441(c) (Doc. 11) is denied as moot. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall remand this action to 7 | the Yavapai County Superior Court and terminate this case. 8 Dated this Ist day of December, 2020. 9

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