[504]*504RIGGS, J.
In this child support modification case, father appeals a judgment increasing support and awarding mother attorney fees. On de novo review, we reverse and remand.
The parties to this proceeding were never married. In 1986, they entered into a paternity and child support stipulation for a child born in 1984, which resulted in a judgment for child support in Minnesota. The stipulation provided for a payment of a lump sum amount by father to a local family service center. That lump sum payment was to cover father’s child support obligation from November, 1985, through November, 1992. Under the stipulation, father was again to make a lump sum payment in November, 1992, that would support the child until he reached the age of 18. In October, 1992, mother filed an order to show cause in Oregon to recover child support she claimed had not been received since the summer of 1991, and for a modification of the support judgment in accordance with the Oregon Uniform Child Support Guidelines (guidelines). Mother submitted her uniform support affidavit listing her gross monthly income as $2,490, and the child’s monthly needs as $388. On his uniform support affidavit, father listed his gross monthly income as $39,000. At trial, mother testified that different and higher amounts would be necessary to clothe, groom and give lessons to the child. She also testified that child’s monthly needs were $588.1
Following a hearing on those issues, the trial court entered a judgment modifying father’s child support obligation to require father to pay $1,750 per month and awarding mother her attorney fees and costs.2
[505]*505At issue here is the proper application of the guidelines in circumstances where the combined adjusted gross income of the parents exceeds $10,000 per month.3
ORS 25.275(1) requires the Support Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice (SED) to establish guidelines for determining child support awards. In establishing the guidelines, SED is required to consider a number of criteria, including “[a]ll earnings, income and resources of each parent, including real and personal property[.]” ORS 25.275(l)(a). Pursuant to ORS 25.280, the amount of support determined by the formula is presumed to be correct. If the amount of support is unjust or inappropriate, the trial court can rebut the correctness of the guidelines amount by making findings. ORS 25.280. Those findings must comply with OAR 137-50-330(2)(b), which provides:
[506]*506“Effective May 1, 1992, [a] finding must recite the amount that under the guidelines is presumed to be correct, and must include the reason why the order varies from the guidelines amount. A new support amount may be calculated by determining an appropriate dollar value to he attributed to the specific criteria upon which the finding was based and by making an appropriate adjustment in the amounts used in subsections (l)(b) and (l)(d) of this rule.”
The guidelines also set a cap on the presumed basic child support obligation when the combined adjusted gross income of the parents exceeds $10,000 per month. OAR 137-50-490(2) provides that “[a] basic child support obligation in excess of this level may be demonstrated for those reasons set forth in OAR 137-50-330.”
Bailey and Bailey, 108 Or App 678, 816 P2d 1195 (1991), is the only Oregon case that discusses the cap. In Bailey, the parents’ combined adjusted gross income exceeded $10,000. On the basis of father’s household income of $15,000 per month, the two childrens’ monthly expenses of $1,960, and the parties’ high standard of hving while married, we held that the presumption that the amount provided in the guidelines’ formula was correct had been rebutted and affirmed the trial court’s award of $2,000 per month.
In Bailey, we did not discuss whether the factors set out in OAR 137-50-330(2)(a)(A)-(J) are to be accorded equal weight in determining the proper level of child support when the parents’ combined adjusted gross income exceeds $10,000. However, courts in other jurisdictions have discussed the proper method of determining child support when the parents’ combined adjusted gross income exceeds the uppermost level of the guidelines. Most courts have rejected a ‘ ‘flat percentage” approach in which support is simply pegged to a percentage of the parents’ combined adjusted gross income. Instead, the paramount consideration, even in cases of great wealth, is the child’s actual need. In In re the Marriage of Van Inwegen, 757 P2d 1118 (Colo App 1988), the court considered the application of Colorado’s guidelines, which are almost identical to Oregon’s.4 In Van Inwegen, the [507]*507court concluded that “[t]he needs of the child are of paramount importance in determining child support obligations.” 757 P2d at 1121.
In Chasin v. Chasin, 182 AD2d 862, 582 NYS2d 512 (1992), the court reversed a support order that calculated support by applying a flat percentage of 25 percent against the parties’ combined gross annual income of $166,763:
“The blind application of the statutory formula to the combined parental income over $80,000 without any express findings of the children’s actual needs constitutes an abdication of judicial responsibility * * * and renders meaningless the statutory provision setting a cap on strict application of the formula.” 182 AD2d at 863.
Similarly, the court in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 834 SW2d 369, 372 (Tex App 1992) held that “[a]n award of child support above the guidelines without regard to needs and solely because the obligor has great income would amount to de facto alimony.” See also, e.g., Jane Doe VI v. Richard Roe VI, 6 Hawaii 629, 736 P2d 448 (Hi App 1987) (raising the mother’s standard of living through the vehicle of child support constitutes an unauthorized spousal support obligation).
We find the reasoning of those cases persuasive. Any decision to set child support above the guidelines cap must, at a minimum, be based primarily on the child’s needs, as set out in specific supporting findings. The tension between needs and resources in cap cases is different from the tension between needs and resources in non-cap cases at the other end of the continuum. Any other interpretation of the guidelines renders the cap illusory. Here, the uncontroverted record evidence, as set out in mother’s uniform support [508]*508affidavit and testimony, is that the child’s needs are no more than $588 per month.5
Thus, the issue reduces to whether factors other than the child’s needs, as detailed in mother’s uniform support affidavit, were sufficiently compelling to rebut the presumptive guidelines cap amount and whether the trial court made appropriate findings required by the guidelines.
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[504]*504RIGGS, J.
In this child support modification case, father appeals a judgment increasing support and awarding mother attorney fees. On de novo review, we reverse and remand.
The parties to this proceeding were never married. In 1986, they entered into a paternity and child support stipulation for a child born in 1984, which resulted in a judgment for child support in Minnesota. The stipulation provided for a payment of a lump sum amount by father to a local family service center. That lump sum payment was to cover father’s child support obligation from November, 1985, through November, 1992. Under the stipulation, father was again to make a lump sum payment in November, 1992, that would support the child until he reached the age of 18. In October, 1992, mother filed an order to show cause in Oregon to recover child support she claimed had not been received since the summer of 1991, and for a modification of the support judgment in accordance with the Oregon Uniform Child Support Guidelines (guidelines). Mother submitted her uniform support affidavit listing her gross monthly income as $2,490, and the child’s monthly needs as $388. On his uniform support affidavit, father listed his gross monthly income as $39,000. At trial, mother testified that different and higher amounts would be necessary to clothe, groom and give lessons to the child. She also testified that child’s monthly needs were $588.1
Following a hearing on those issues, the trial court entered a judgment modifying father’s child support obligation to require father to pay $1,750 per month and awarding mother her attorney fees and costs.2
[505]*505At issue here is the proper application of the guidelines in circumstances where the combined adjusted gross income of the parents exceeds $10,000 per month.3
ORS 25.275(1) requires the Support Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice (SED) to establish guidelines for determining child support awards. In establishing the guidelines, SED is required to consider a number of criteria, including “[a]ll earnings, income and resources of each parent, including real and personal property[.]” ORS 25.275(l)(a). Pursuant to ORS 25.280, the amount of support determined by the formula is presumed to be correct. If the amount of support is unjust or inappropriate, the trial court can rebut the correctness of the guidelines amount by making findings. ORS 25.280. Those findings must comply with OAR 137-50-330(2)(b), which provides:
[506]*506“Effective May 1, 1992, [a] finding must recite the amount that under the guidelines is presumed to be correct, and must include the reason why the order varies from the guidelines amount. A new support amount may be calculated by determining an appropriate dollar value to he attributed to the specific criteria upon which the finding was based and by making an appropriate adjustment in the amounts used in subsections (l)(b) and (l)(d) of this rule.”
The guidelines also set a cap on the presumed basic child support obligation when the combined adjusted gross income of the parents exceeds $10,000 per month. OAR 137-50-490(2) provides that “[a] basic child support obligation in excess of this level may be demonstrated for those reasons set forth in OAR 137-50-330.”
Bailey and Bailey, 108 Or App 678, 816 P2d 1195 (1991), is the only Oregon case that discusses the cap. In Bailey, the parents’ combined adjusted gross income exceeded $10,000. On the basis of father’s household income of $15,000 per month, the two childrens’ monthly expenses of $1,960, and the parties’ high standard of hving while married, we held that the presumption that the amount provided in the guidelines’ formula was correct had been rebutted and affirmed the trial court’s award of $2,000 per month.
In Bailey, we did not discuss whether the factors set out in OAR 137-50-330(2)(a)(A)-(J) are to be accorded equal weight in determining the proper level of child support when the parents’ combined adjusted gross income exceeds $10,000. However, courts in other jurisdictions have discussed the proper method of determining child support when the parents’ combined adjusted gross income exceeds the uppermost level of the guidelines. Most courts have rejected a ‘ ‘flat percentage” approach in which support is simply pegged to a percentage of the parents’ combined adjusted gross income. Instead, the paramount consideration, even in cases of great wealth, is the child’s actual need. In In re the Marriage of Van Inwegen, 757 P2d 1118 (Colo App 1988), the court considered the application of Colorado’s guidelines, which are almost identical to Oregon’s.4 In Van Inwegen, the [507]*507court concluded that “[t]he needs of the child are of paramount importance in determining child support obligations.” 757 P2d at 1121.
In Chasin v. Chasin, 182 AD2d 862, 582 NYS2d 512 (1992), the court reversed a support order that calculated support by applying a flat percentage of 25 percent against the parties’ combined gross annual income of $166,763:
“The blind application of the statutory formula to the combined parental income over $80,000 without any express findings of the children’s actual needs constitutes an abdication of judicial responsibility * * * and renders meaningless the statutory provision setting a cap on strict application of the formula.” 182 AD2d at 863.
Similarly, the court in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 834 SW2d 369, 372 (Tex App 1992) held that “[a]n award of child support above the guidelines without regard to needs and solely because the obligor has great income would amount to de facto alimony.” See also, e.g., Jane Doe VI v. Richard Roe VI, 6 Hawaii 629, 736 P2d 448 (Hi App 1987) (raising the mother’s standard of living through the vehicle of child support constitutes an unauthorized spousal support obligation).
We find the reasoning of those cases persuasive. Any decision to set child support above the guidelines cap must, at a minimum, be based primarily on the child’s needs, as set out in specific supporting findings. The tension between needs and resources in cap cases is different from the tension between needs and resources in non-cap cases at the other end of the continuum. Any other interpretation of the guidelines renders the cap illusory. Here, the uncontroverted record evidence, as set out in mother’s uniform support [508]*508affidavit and testimony, is that the child’s needs are no more than $588 per month.5
Thus, the issue reduces to whether factors other than the child’s needs, as detailed in mother’s uniform support affidavit, were sufficiently compelling to rebut the presumptive guidelines cap amount and whether the trial court made appropriate findings required by the guidelines. Here, the trial court referred to two factors: father’s substantial gross income and the fact that father claimed the child as a dependent for tax purposes. Neither justified an award in excess of that provided by the guidelines cap.
The trial court improperly considered father’s gross income from employment as “resources available” to rebut the presumed cap amount. Because the guidelines child support calculation is basically a function of the parties’ gross income, that income has already been considered.6 Under these facts, a trial court cannot use father’s income to determine the amount due under the guidelines and then use that same figure to depart from those guidelines without reference to the child’s needs. See Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, supra.
With regard to the tax consequences of taking the dependency exemption, we cannot tell if the trial court thought that father was receiving an economic benefit from the tax exemption and, thus, had additional financial resources beyond gross income which would justify a departure. Father’s 1990 and 1991 tax returns are in evidence. Because of father’s filing status, income limit and adjusted gross income, we can find no financial benefit to father from the exemptions for those two tax years. The parties concede [509]*509as much. Indeed, if such a financial tax benefit did exist, OAR 137-50-330(2)(b) requires attribution of a specific dollar amount to such a tax benefit in the trial court’s findings. See Hay and Hay, 119 Or App 372, 374, 850 P2d 410 (1993). On this record, we cannot make such an attribution and we suspect neither could the trial court. Consideration of any purported tax benefit to rebut the guidelines amount was error.7
On de novo review, we conclude that the evidence did not support a deviation from the presumed child support under the guidelines. Therefore, we find that the upper limit guidelines amount, $1,039, is the amount from which the trial court must calculate support using the guidelines formula. That support should commence November 1,1992, and thereafter.
Father also argues that the trial court erred when it ordered:
“2. Thereafter, defendant’s support is set at $1,750.00 per month until further order of the Court. The sum of $250.00 per month is to be placed into an account by mother (as trustee for child) to be used for emergency medical needs or education.”
Father argues that the trial court had no authority to create a trust for the child under these circumstances. Authorization for the creation of trusts for the support of children comes from ORS 107.105(l)(g). That subsection applies to trusts created as part of a property division between divorcing spouses. Father argues that this case does not involve property division, and, thus, ORS 107.105(l)(g) is inapplicable. He is correct, but as a statement of the law his argument does not go far enough. ORS 107.105 only applies to decrees of annulment, dissolution or separation. ORS 107.135 is the appropriate statutory provision for modification of child support, and it contains no provision for the creation of trusts out of a child support award. Accordingly, the trial court erred in ordering the creation of the trust.
[510]*510Finally, father argues that the trial court erred in awarding mother attorney fees and costs at trial, because the court failed to follow the requirements of ORCP 68. A discussion of the claimed error or arguments would not be illuminating to the bench and bar, but we agree with father that there was error. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a hearing on attorney fees and costs pursuant to ORCP 68.
Reversed and remanded for recalculation of child support effective November 1,1992, and for hearing on award of attorney fees. No costs to either party.