Strickland v. State

389 S.E.2d 230, 260 Ga. 28

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: March 9, 1990
• Docket: S89A0142
• Status: Published

Opinions

Per curiam.

Robert Strickland shot and killed his wife, Yvonne Strickland, with a handgun. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.¹

Strickland’s first conviction was reversed in Strickland v. State, 257 Ga. 230 (357 SE2d 85) (1987), and the evidence presented at the first trial, except some additional material contained in the JacksonDenno hearing, was substantially the same as the evidence at the second trial.

1. The evidence is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find Strickland guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder of his wife. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. The principal issue of this appeal is whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider certain physical and testimonial evidence obtained as a result of illegal custodial interrogations.² The State concedes that the police conduct was improper, and that the trial court correctly suppressed Strickland’s statements made after he invoked his rights.

(a) Strickland arrived at the police station and reported that there had been a shooting; he gave the name of the victim, location of the body, and a description of the house in which the body was located and a description of two vehicles that were parked in front of the house. He showed police his State Bar of Georgia card and identified himself as an attorney. This took place, according to the evidence, before that invocation of rights.

(b) After Strickland invoked his rights, the continued questioning produced but minimal information. Specifically, the police learned:

(i) that Strickland had purchased a gun somewhere on Memorial Drive. (The gun was never found.)

(ii) that he had spent the previous night in a motel near the police department.

(iii) that he had driven a Cadillac automobile. (During the second interrogation, Strickland told the police that the Cadillac automobile was parked in the police parking lot.)

(c) At no time, either before or after invoking his privilege, did Strickland ever acknowledge any connection with the commission of the crime. Strickland himself testified to the same events as did the manager of the hotel and a sales clerk at the sporting goods store where he purchased the gun.³

Any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (87 SC 824, 17 LE2d 705) (1967).⁴

3. The question relating to the amount of time Strickland was in custody was raised, addressed, and resolved in his first appeal and we will not reconsider it. Gilstrap v. State, 256 Ga. 20 (342 SE2d 667) (1986).

4. (a) Strickland contends that jury instructions on similar transactions, expert testimony, intent, and voluntary manslaughter were erroneous and that the court erred in failing to give other requested instructions.

(b)The following principles govern these contentions:

(i) “It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.” [Cits.] [Hambrick v. State, 256 Ga. 688, 690 (353 SE2d 177) (1987).]

(ii) The failure to give a requested instruction is not reversible error where the charge given substantially covers the same principle of law. [Housel v. State, 257 Ga. 115, 122 (355 SE2d 651) (1987).]

Viewing the instructions as a whole, we find no error in the enumerations of error concerning jury instructions.

5. (a) Strickland contends that the trial court erred in compelling a psychiatrist to testify, in violation of his psychiatrist-patient privilege and Fifth Amendment rights. The psychiatrist never treated Strickland, and no treatment was contemplated. Strickland called the doctor to the stand to testify as to Strickland’s mental state at the time of his wife’s death.

(b) In Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703 (177 SE2d 79) (1970), we held:

Before the psychiatrist-patient communications privilege established by [OCGA § 24-9-21 (5)] may be invoked, the requisite relationship of psychiatrist and patient must have existed, to the extent that treatment was given or contemplated. [Id. at 704.]

“[W]e note that a number of courts have allowed the prosecution to offer otherwise inadmissible psychiatric testimony in rebuttal of psychiatric testimony offered in the first instance by the defense.” Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622, 636 (323 SE2d 801) (1984).

There was no error.

6. The trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury sua sponte on the issue of insanity. Strickland withdrew his insanity plea during the course of the trial; he did not request an insanity charge; and a charge was not authorized by the evidence.

7. The trial court did not err in allowing the state to impeach its own witness. Davis v. State, 249 Ga. 309, 314 (290 SE2d 273) (1982).

8. Strickland claims that the transcript is inaccurate. The trial court heard evidence regarding the accuracy of the transcript, and found that there was no reason to doubt its accuracy “as to anything material.” We find no error.

9. The trial court did not err in refusing to admit one of Strickland’s exhibits for want of proper authentication. Suarez v. Suarez, 257 Ga. 102, 104 (355 SE2d 649) (1987).

10. Strickland contends that the trial court erred in refusing him permission to respond to questions of law not presented except in the state’s concluding argument. Strickland referred to “points that were raised concerning motive and the injury being feigned to get drugs that we hadn’t any prior knowledge of.” The trial court correctly denied Strickland an opportunity to respond to the state’s closing argument.

11. The trial court denied Strickland’s request to have his co-counsel perform a demonstration with a gun during Strickland’s closing argument. This did not amount to a denial of the right to comment upon physical evidence introduced by the state. There was no error.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Smith, P. J., and Benham, J., who dissent.

1 The crime was committed on October 16, 1985. The DeKalb County jury returned its verdict of guilty on June 7, 1988. The motion for new trial was denied on August 17, 1988. The notice of appeal was filed on September 14, 1988. The transcript of evidence was filed on June 14, 1989. The record was docketed in this Court on June 16,1989. The case was argued on September 14, 1989.

2 We generally will not review claimed error that has been resolved in an earlier appeal. Gilstrap v. State, 256 Ga. 20 (342 SE2d 667) (1986). In this case, however, there was new evidence at the Jackson-Denno hearing regarding the custodial interrogation. The trial court’s order states, in pertinent part:

In the second trial, the state again offered these “fruits.” To the extent here relevant, the evidence presented in the second trial was essentially the same as the first although there was perhaps a bit more evidence in the second trial as to the police conduct.

The court allowed this evidence over the defendant’s objections.

3 Strickland testified as follows:

And during the lunch on Monday, Vonnie had emphasized to me again the death threats by Brewer’s family, and that they were serious, and that I should take them serious. So, I drove from the Applebee’s to the Pine Lake Gun Shop and bought the pistol. . . .

Q: You were testifying about when you purchased the gun at the pawn shop. Did you later rent a room at the Aloha Motel?

A: Yes. The gun shop wasn’t a pawn shop. It was just a sporting goods type store. I had the room at the motel rented prior to going to Applebee’s, I believe.

Q: And why did you rent that room?

A: I was anticipating that after that lunch together, that [my wife and I] would go to that motel and make love.

4 Note our prior holding in Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 378-9 (290 SE2d 442) (1982):

We therefore hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence derived from a voluntary statement obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona [,451 U. S. 477 (101 SC 1880, 68 LE2d 378) (1981)], and that it was not error to admit the “fruits” of the defendant’s statement in this case.

Subsequent holdings by the United States Supreme Court, however, raise some question as to whether or not this holding remains valid. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431, 441 (104 SC 2501, 81 LE2d 377) (1984). Compare Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (105 SC 1285, 84 LE2d 222) (1985).