Strickland v. City of Wichita

457 P.2d 162, 203 Kan. 954, 1969 Kan. LEXIS 487
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedJuly 17, 1969
Docket45,661
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 457 P.2d 162 (Strickland v. City of Wichita) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Strickland v. City of Wichita, 457 P.2d 162, 203 Kan. 954, 1969 Kan. LEXIS 487 (kan 1969).

Opinions

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Price, C. J.:

These actions — consolidated in the court below— were to enjoin the City of Wichita from levying and collecting special asessments against lands owned by plaintiffs — such assessments arising out of the construction of a sewer.

Judgment was for defendant city, and plaintiff landowners have appealed.

No procedural problems are involved. As we view the case the basic question concerns the factors (or lack thereof) taken into consideration by the city-appointed appraisers in fixing the values of plaintiffs’ lands.

The applicable statute (K. S. A. 12-608) under which the city proceeded, reads in part—

“As soon as the cost of such improvement is determined, the governing body shall determine and assess to each lot or parcel of ground liable for such special assessment the amount to be paid thereon, which amount shall be determined [955]*955by the assessed value of the lots and pieces of land without regard to the buildings or improvements thereon, which value shall be ascertained by three disinterested appraisers appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the council or commission.”

Plaintiff Strickland owned a tract of 58 acres of farm land in the area involved. For general tax purposes it was valued at approximately $12,000.00, and was used exclusively for farming purposes. Its actual value was about $600.00 per acre. The city appraisers valued it at $209,065.00 — which resulted in a special assessment of $49,033.48.

Plaintiff Schramm owned a tract of 57 acres of farm land in the area involved. For general tax purposes it was valued at approximately $11,000.00, and was used exclusively for farming purposes. Its actual value was about $600.00 per acre. The city appraisers valued it at $224,630.00 — which resulted in a special asessment of $52,686.20.

All of the lands in the large area involved had been zoned— ranging from “AA Single Family” to “F Heavy Industrial”.

Plaintiffs’ tracts, together with a number of others — were included in the portion zoned “heavy industrial”.

As will be shown later, the appraisers applied a per square foot price based on zoning.

Plaintiffs then brought these actions — contending the appraisal so based was incorrect and unrealistic, that it was made without regard to the value of their lands as compared to adjacent lands within the same zoning, and that such appraisal — based solely upon mathematical computation — resulted in an unreasonable, arbitrary and grossly excessive assessment — all of which entitled them to injunctive relief.

The pretrial order — among other matters — included the following question for determination:

“2. (b) Is appraisement based upon zoning a proper measure for assessment without regard to land use?”

There was no material dispute in the evidence relating to actual land values. As earlier stated — the underlying question concerns the factors — or lack of them — taken into consideration by the appraisers in fixing values for purposes of the special assessment.

The method and procedure used by the appraisers can best be shown by quoting portions of the testimony — on both direct and [956]*956cross-examination — of the witness Arnold (one of the appraisers) as abstracted in the Record on Appeal:

. . He further testified that in making appraisals, he usually took into consideration location, topography and environment, trafficways, streets and the foregoing covered the matters considered in this type of appraisal because this type of appraisal excluded any type of improvement. That in this type of appraisal they were trying to equalize land values by zoning classifications; that they were not trying to determine a fair market value or a market value of the property or any specific property within the benefit district; that the figure used was an arbitrary figure used in trying to equalize the value.
“The witness testified that each piece of property was figured for square footage by the City Engineer and that the figures were accepted as correct by the appraisers. He further testified that the panel of appraisers applied a per square foot price based on zoning to the square footage in the various plots, tracts of land and railroad property; that they arrived at the figure to be applied to each zoning so as to get uniformity, to arrive at a uniform value and that they applied in each zone a definite per square foot value; that this was done in the whole benefit district and that the whole purpose of their appraisal was to be sure that each piece of property in a particular type of zoning paid the same per square foot value as did all the other property in that particular type of zoning. The witness stated that it was his opinion, as an appraiser, that the whole area zoned “heavy industrial” was not too remote to be developed in the foreseeable future. That they, the appraisers took location of property into consideration but that they still applied the same per square footage price to all of the property in a particular zone in spite of differences of location.
“The witness testified that he had never read K. S. A. 12-608 under which he was appointed and acted and that nobody had pointed out his duties under that statute, that his impression was that they were to arrive at an equitable value of the property assigned to them according to zoning and classifications and the highest, best use. The value arrived at was for uniformity in establishing evaluation.
“That his idea was that they were to arrive at a value without reference to improvements; that it was not a fair market value but a value that the appraisers to arrive at to equalize the value according to zoning classifications; that when they zoned tire property, the fifty acres, belonging to one of these plaintiffs at $200,000 that they did not intend that they thought the property was worth $200,000; that the figures could be anything just so we get proportion of the zoning; that the word “value” meant nothing; that it was merely part of a mathematical formula that they were working out.
“. . . that uniformity is what they were seeking to achieve and that in the witness’ opinion and judgment as an appraiser, considering the multitude and varieties of environmental factors that zoning was as even a measure as they could devise to relate to land values.
[957]*957“The witness testified on re-direct examination that it did not matter what figures were used as long as they were uniform in proportion to the zoning classifications;.....”

There was evidence that land owned by two existing heavy industrial users was worth $1,500.00 and $3,500.00 per acre.

The formula adopted by the appraisers and applied to the entire area, was as follows:

Valuation per front foot Valuation
based on depth per
of 150 feet Square foot
“AA” Zoning (Single Family) ............ $6.00 $0.04
“A” Zoning (Two-Family Dwellings) ...... 6.00 .04
“RB” Zoning (Four-Family Dwellings) .... 8.00 .0533

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Related

Dodson v. City of Ulysses
549 P.2d 430 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1976)
Strickland v. City of Wichita
457 P.2d 162 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1969)

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Bluebook (online)
457 P.2d 162, 203 Kan. 954, 1969 Kan. LEXIS 487, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strickland-v-city-of-wichita-kan-1969.