Stricker v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided March 3, 2020·No. 18-56·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

********************* HAYLEY STRICKER, * * No. 18-56V * Special Master Christian J. Moran Petitioner, * v. * * Filed: February 6, 2020 SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Attorneys’ fees and costs, interim Respondent. * award, expert invoice *********************

Andrew D. Downing, Van Cott & Talamante, PLLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner; Robert P. Coleman, III, United States Dep’t of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

PUBLISHED DECISION AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS ON AN INTERIM BASIS1

On January 11, 2018, Hayley Stricker (“Petitioner”) filed a petition under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–10 through 34 (2012). Petitioner claims that she suffered from undifferentiated connective tissue disease, after receiving the human papillomavirus vaccine on September 29, 2015. Pet., filed May 1, 2017, ¶¶ 5, 33. Petitioner’s counsel of record is Mr. Andrew Downing.

On November 2, 2018, the undersigned issued an order suspending respondent’s Rule 4(c) report deadline, and directing petitioner to file an expert report. See Order, issued Nov. 2, 2018, ECF No. 28. To develop her case,

1 The E-Government Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services), requires that the Court post this decision on its website. This posting will make the decision available to anyone with the internet. Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 18(b), the parties have 14 days to file a motion proposing redaction of medical information or other information described in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4). Any redactions ordered by the special master will appear in the document posted on the website. petitioner filed an expert report from Dr. Thomas M. Zizic. Exhibit 37. In rebuttal, the Secretary filed reports from Dr. James Moy on June 14, 2019, and Dr. Carlos Rose on September 13, 2019. Exhibits A, L.

On October 7, 2019, petitioner moved for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on an interim basis, requesting $31,108.50 in fees and $44,268.06 in costs, for a total of $75,376.56. Pet’r’s Mot. IAFC at 5. For the reasons that follow, petitioner is awarded $30,835.31 with a remainder deferred.

* * *

The requested fees include work performed and costs incurred as of October 7, 2019, when petitioner filed her motion. Petitioner argues that an award of interim fees and costs is appropriate in this case because: the threshold requirements regarding the amount of fees and costs requested are met, Pet’r’s Mot. IAFC at 3, and it will likely be a significant time period before the case concludes. Id. at 2

The Secretary filed his response to petitioner’s motion on October 18, 2019. Resp’t’s Resp. The Secretary did not provide any objection to petitioner’s request. Id. Instead, he stated that he “recommends that the [Special Master] exercise [his] discretion regarding petitioner’s request for an interim award of attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 4.

This matter is now ripe for adjudication.

* * *

Petitioner’s motion implicitly raises a series of sequential questions, each of which requires an affirmative answer to the previous question. First, whether petitioner is eligible under the Vaccine Act to receive an award of attorneys’ fees and costs? Second, whether, as a matter of discretion, petitioner should be awarded her attorneys’ fees and costs on an interim basis? Third, what is a reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees and costs? These questions are addressed below.

1. Eligibility for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

As an initial matter, interim fee awards are available in Vaccine Act cases. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352. Since petitioner has not received compensation from the 2 Program, they may be awarded “compensation to cover [her] reasonable attorneys’ fees and other costs incurred in any proceeding on such petition if the special master or court determines that the petition was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1). As the Federal Circuit has stated, “good faith” and “reasonable basis” are two separate elements that must be met for a petitioner to be eligible for attorneys’ fees and costs. Simmons v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 875 F.3d 632, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

“Good faith” is a subjective standard. Id.; Hamrick v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-683V, 2007 WL 4793152, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 19, 2007). A petitioner acts in “good faith” if he or she honestly believes that a vaccine injury occurred. Turner v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-544V, 2007 WL 4410030, at * 5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 30, 2007). The Secretary has not challenged petitioner’s good faith here, and there is little doubt that petitioner brought the claim with an honest belief that a vaccine injury occurred.

In contrast to good faith, reasonable basis is purely an objective evaluation of the weight of the evidence. Simmons, 875 F.3d at 636. Because evidence is “objective,” the Federal Circuit’s description is consistent with viewing the reasonable basis standard as creating a test that petitioners meet by submitting evidence. See Chuisano v. Secʼy of Health & Human Servs., No. 07-452V, 2013 WL 6234660 at *12–13 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 25, 2013) (explaining that reasonable basis is met with evidence), mot. for rev. denied, 116 Fed. Cl. 276 (2014).

Here, the reports from the expert petitioner has retained, Dr. Zizic, satisfy the reasonable basis standard. See exhibits 37, 72. These reports, combined with petitioner’s medical records, establish a theory of causation and provide a reasonable basis sufficient for the attorneys’ fees and costs determination.

2. Appropriateness of an Interim Award

Interim awards should not be awarded as a matter of right. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Instead, petitioner must demonstrate “undue hardship.” Id. The Federal Circuit noted that interim fees “are particularly appropriate in cases where proceedings are protracted and costly experts must be retained.” Id. The Circuit has also considered whether petitioners faced “only a short delay in the award” before a motion for final fees could be entertained. Id.

3 The Federal Circuit has not attempted to specifically define what constitutes “undue hardship” or a “protracted proceeding.” In the undersigned’s practice, interim fees may be appropriate when the amount of attorneys’ fees exceeds $30,000 and the case has been pending for more than 18 months. Petitioner clears both hurdles.

3. Reasonableness of the Requested Amount

Under the Vaccine Act, a special master may award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1). Reasonable attorneys’ fees are calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by a reasonable number of hours expended on litigation, the lodestar approach. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1347–48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Special masters may rely upon their experience in adjudicating requests for attorneys’ fees and costs. Saxton v.

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