Strege v. Gmail-Google

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: June 26, 2024
• Docket: 24-2012
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-2012 Document: 010111070634 Date Filed: 06/26/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 26, 2024 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court ADAM STREGE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 24-2012 (D.C. No. 2:23-CV-00816-JB-GBW) GMAIL-GOOGLE; NEWFOLD (D.N.M.) DIGITAL, 80 Website Hosting Companies; SPAM TITAN, Titanhq.com; MICROSOFT CORPORATION; LEXIS/NEXIS; PEOPLE ON TRILLION, TRILLION, TRILLION, TRILLION, TRILLION, TRILLION, TRILLION, TRILLION, TRILLION, TRILLION TIMES A TRILLION PLANETS; GOD LOVES US; GOD HATES US AND GOD LOVES COMPLETELY; AMAZON.COM E-COMMERCE COMPANY; NIDEC CORPORATION KATO ENGINEERING; CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS SPECTRUM INTERNET; CRAZY COMPUTER HEWLETT PACKARD; FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CHAIR LINA M. KHAN, in her individual and official capacity,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

* After examining the brief and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 24-2012 Document: 010111070634 Date Filed: 06/26/2024 Page: 2

_________________________________

Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Adam Strege, proceeding pro se,1 appeals from the district court’s order

granting his motion to dismiss his case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(a)(2). Because Strege fails to explain why he believes the district court erred in

dismissing the case at his own request, we dismiss this appeal as frivolous.

In September 2023, Strege filed a pro se complaint against Google, Microsoft,

and others. A magistrate judge granted Strege leave to proceed in forma pauperis

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and screened the complaint, which consisted of rambling,

incoherent allegations about “[g]od, email, semen, [COVID-19], nuclear missiles,

[the] World Trade Center [c]ollapse, World War II[, the H]olocaust, and other

topics.” App. 26. Because the complaint was “largely unintelligible,” the magistrate

judge issued an order to cure, giving Strege an opportunity to explain the bases for

his claims. Id. Strege filed an amended complaint the next day, before receipt of that

order. He later objected to the order to cure and filed a second amended complaint,

which remained largely unintelligible.

After reviewing the magistrate judge’s order, the district court overruled

Strege’s objections and instructed him to file yet another amended complaint. In

response, Strege filed a motion for clarification, noting that he had already submitted

1 We construe Strege’s pro se filings liberally, but we will not act as his advocate. James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). 2 Appellate Case: 24-2012 Document: 010111070634 Date Filed: 06/26/2024 Page: 3

a second amended complaint and asking if he had permission to file a third. A few

weeks later, before receiving a response from the district court, Strege filed a third

amended complaint.

Strege then moved to dismiss the case because “[p]olice [we]re harassing

[him] every time [he went] outside.” Id. at 151. The district court granted the motion

to dismiss, which it construed as a request for voluntary dismissal by court order

under Rule 41(a)(2), and denied Strege’s earlier motion for clarification. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (permitting plaintiff to request dismissal of action “by court order, on

terms that the court considers proper”). The district court dismissed the case without

prejudice.

Strege now appeals. But he fails to explain the basis for his appeal and

presents no coherent argument on why the district court erred in dismissing the case

at his own request. Instead, Strege merely repeats the indecipherable allegations

contained in his district-court filings. Because his pro se appellate brief, even

liberally construed, is “wholly inadequate to preserve issues for review,” we

conclude that Strege’s appeal is frivolous. Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer,

425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Wheeler v. Comm’r, 528 F.3d 773, 782

(10th Cir. 2008) (“An appeal may be frivolous if it consists of irrelevant and illogical

arguments . . . , or when the result is obvious, or the appellant’s arguments of error

are wholly without merit.” (quoting Lewis v. Comm’r, 523 F.3d 1272, 1277–78

(10th Cir. 2008))).

3 Appellate Case: 24-2012 Document: 010111070634 Date Filed: 06/26/2024 Page: 4

We therefore dismiss this appeal as frivolous. See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). We also

deny Strege’s lengthy and incoherent pending motions, and we remind Strege that he

remains obligated to pay the full filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (excusing only

prepayment of appellate filing fees). As a final matter, we note that this is the third

time we have dismissed one of Strege’s appeals as frivolous. See Strege v. Comm’r,

SSA, 848 Fed. App’x 368, 370 (10th Cir. 2021); Strege v. Comm’r, SSA, No. 21-1311,

2022 WL 500543, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2022) (unpublished). As we did in our

most recent dismissal, we caution that Strege could become subject to filing

restrictions in this court if he submits further frivolous filings. See Strege, 2022 WL

500543, at *2; Ford v. Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 2008); Andrews v.

Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1078 (10th Cir. 2007).

Entered for the Court

Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge