NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250706-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is March 31, 2026 NO. 4-25-0706 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
CHRISTINE STREET, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Woodford County ZELLER DIGITAL INNOVATIONS, INC., an Illinois ) No. 23LA11 Corporation, d/b/a ROOMREADY, ) Defendant-Appellee. ) Honorable ) Michael L. Stroh, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and Grischow concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
¶2 Plaintiff, Christine Street, filed a lawsuit against her former employer, defendant,
Zeller Digital Innovations, Inc., an Illinois corporation doing business as “RoomReady.” Plaintiff
raised claims of breach of written contract, breach of oral contract, violation of the Illinois Wage
Payment and Collection Act (Wage Act) (820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2018)), and violation of
the Sales Representative Act (820 ILCS 120/0.01 et seq. (West 2018)). All of her claims sought
to recover commission payments she claimed defendant owed to her.
¶3 Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that no issue of material
fact existed because plaintiff had been paid all commissions owed to her. Plaintiff filed a
“Motion for Summary Determination of [a] Major Issue Pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(d),” arguing that defendant’s modification of its employee handbook two days before her termination
with provisions concerning commission payments to terminated employees was unenforceable
against her. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied
plaintiff’s “Motion for Summary Determination of [a] Major Issue.” Plaintiff appeals, arguing
the court erred by granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and by denying her
“Motion for Summary Determination of [a] Major Issue.” We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 The undisputed evidence in this case showed that plaintiff worked for defendant,
a company that sold and installed commercial audio-visual equipment and software, in various
roles from 2012 until August 29, 2018, at which time defendant terminated her employment. In
2018, plaintiff worked in a sales role as an account executive, and she was paid commissions for
her work. In early 2018, defendant distributed a “Playbook” to account executives, which set
forth defendant’s commission compensation plan. The Playbook stated, in relevant part:
“In order to further reward a focus on Revenue and Gross Profit goals we
are moving to a compensation plan based on 100% commission up [to] 25%
(starting at 17% with an additional available 8% based on [Key Performance
Indicators (KPIs)]) of each Account Executive[’]s actual Gross Profit. A draw
option will be extended to each Account Executive based on their last year’s
earnings.
Each Account Executive will be able to choose a weekly draw adding up
to 70% of FY 2017 actual year end earnings. *** Commission will pay back the
draw account before being delivered to Account Executives.
At the end of each month, all jobs that have been paid in full will payout
-2- 17% of the actual [Gross Profit] to Account Executives draw account. Anything
above account balance will be paid out to Account Executives.
[KPIs] will be part of compensation package and will be paid out at the
end of each quarter when KPI criteria are met.”
¶6 On August 27, 2018, an updated version of the Playbook (August Playbook) was
issued to employees, including plaintiff, via e-mail. The August Playbook contained a section
titled “**Termination” that was not included in the original Playbook. This section stated:
“When an Account Executive’s employment is terminated (either by the
Account Executive him or herself, or by RoomReady), they will be paid out on
the same monthly/quarterly schedule as when employed. The Account Executive
will no longer receive a weekly draw, but at the end of the month their
spreadsheet will be updated. They will be paid according their closed-out jobs of
which RoomReady has accepted final payment from the customer. The
commission will first go to payback any existing negative balance associated with
the Account Executive’s draw before funds are released to the account executive.
An opportunity with a [purchase order or purchase order] equivalent ***
will be considered closed/won and any [gross profit] associated will be credited to
the Account Executive. If an Account Executive has not received a [purchase
order or purchase order] equivalent before her or his last day the [gross profit]
associated will not be credited to them, but instead it will be credited to the
Account Executive that took it over.”
¶7 On June 30, 2023, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, which she
subsequently amended. On October 23, 2023, plaintiff filed her first amended complaint, which
-3- contained claims for (1) breach of written contract, (2) breach of oral contract, (3) violation of
the Wage Act, and (4) violation of the Sales Representative Act. Plaintiff subsequently withdrew
her claim under the Sales Representative Act.
¶8 The first amended complaint stated that the original Playbook did not restrict the
payment of commissions to terminated workers. The complaint alleged: “On or about August 27,
2018, without prior knowledge or consent of Plaintiff, Defendant *** delivered an email to
Plaintiff that the 2018 ‘Playbook’ was being unilaterally revised.” The complaint alleged that
plaintiff was “on the cusp of solidifying and having executed a Purchase Order *** for several
large customer accounts” prior to her termination and the “unilateral revision” of the Playbook
was “predetermined and intentionally made to deprive [her] of earned commission sales on gross
profit she was solely responsible for soliciting for Defendant.”
¶9 In the first two counts of her first amended complaint (breach of written contract
and breach of oral contract), plaintiff alleged that a written contract and an oral contract existed
between her and defendant; defendant altered the provisions of these contracts by changing the
structure of the Playbook without discussion, consent, notice, or negotiation of its terms; and
“[t]he change in terms resulted in a breach when Defendant terminated Plaintiff without paying
outstanding commissions on several large projects Plaintiff had spent months bringing to
fruition.” Similarly, in the third count of the complaint, plaintiff alleged defendant violated the
Wage Act by withholding commissions owed to plaintiff.
¶ 10 On September 3, 2024, the trial court entered an order setting a discovery
deadline of December 31, 2024, and a deadline for dispositive motions of March 1, 2025.
¶ 11 On December 31, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion to extend the discovery deadline,
stating that plaintiff’s counsel had undertaken a “larger caseload than expected” due to an
-4- unanticipated loss of staff and had “fallen behind” with written discovery disclosures, responding
to written discovery requests, and depositions. Plaintiff requested that the discovery deadline be
extended for written discovery requests and “one or two depositions of Defendant’s principal
officers or agents.” Defendant filed a response opposing an extension. On February 25, 2025, the
trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff does not challenge this ruling on appeal.
¶ 12 A. Summary Judgment
¶ 13 1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
¶ 14 On February 27, 2025, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the
basis that all of plaintiff’s claims failed because she was paid in full for all earned commissions.
In the motion, defendant asserted that all of plaintiff’s claims were “predicated upon the terms of
the contract between [plaintiff and defendant].” Defendant further asserted that the August
Playbook, which it characterized as a contract between plaintiff and defendant, “expressly
provided when a project is closed/won and how employees are paid following termination of
employment.” Defendant asserted: “It is incontrovertible that [plaintiff] was paid all of the
commissions that were due to her for the projects that were closed/won during her employment
with [defendant].” Attached as exhibits to the motion for summary judgment were the affidavits
of Aaron McArdle and Sarah Nix, as well as excerpts from plaintiff’s discovery deposition.
¶ 15 a. McArdle’s Affidavit
¶ 16 In his affidavit, McArdle averred that he was the sole shareholder and member of
the board of directors of Zeller Digital Innovations, Inc., as well as the company’s chief
executive officer, secretary, and treasurer. He stated he was previously the president of
RoomReady from January 2009 to January 2022, and, accordingly, he was familiar with
RoomReady’s sales employees, the commission structure for sales, and client projects during the
-5- time he was president. McArdle stated that, beginning in 2018, a “draw-based commission plan”
was implemented, which was specified in the Playbook.
¶ 17 McArdle asserted that, at the time the Playbook was issued, a salesperson was
“deemed to have closed/won a client project only after receiving a purchase order or purchase
order equivalent approving the project” and was entitled after termination of employment “to
receive commission for projects that were closed/won *** at the time of termination and then
later paid by the client after termination.” McArdle stated that these “established practice[s]”
were not specified in the Playbook but remained in effect when it was issued. McArdle stated
that, in order to provide clarity to employees regarding the established practices of the company,
the Playbook was amended in August 2018.
¶ 18 B. Nix’s Affidavit
¶ 19 In her affidavit, Nix stated that she was employed by defendant as the director of
human resources and she was responsible for maintaining all personnel files (including
plaintiff’s), as well as files on RoomReady’s client projects, which she reviewed prior to
preparing her affidavit. Nix averred that: “At the time of and following [plaintiff’s] termination
on August 29, 2018, the client projects that [plaintiff] had closed/won were tracked on a
spreadsheet identifying, among other items, the date on which the client project was
closed/won.” A copy of this spreadsheet was attached to Nix’s affidavit. Nix further stated:
“Following her termination, in accordance with [the August Playbook, plaintiff] was paid in full
on commissions for all profitable client projects closed/won by [plaintiff] prior to her termination
that were paid by the clients after her termination.” A ledger card report was attached to Nix’s
affidavit, which reflected payments made by defendant to plaintiff between January 1, 2017, and
June 14, 2019.
-6- ¶ 20 c. Plaintiff’s Discovery Deposition
¶ 21 Excerpts from plaintiff’s discovery deposition testimony were also attached to the
motion for summary judgment. In these excerpts, plaintiff stated that, in her experience,
commissions were paid to her once defendant received payment from the client, as stated in the
Playbook. Plaintiff also stated that she received some commission payments from defendant after
her employment was terminated. She stated these payments were for projects she “had already
closed and got [a purchase order] on previous to [her] termination” but that had not been
completed and paid for by the client at the time she was terminated. She received these payments
once the client had paid defendant.
¶ 22 2. Plaintiff’s Response
¶ 23 On March 31, 2025, plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s motion for summary
judgment in which she argued that defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on her three
claims, as several disputed material facts remained. Specifically, she asserted that defendant did
not have an established past practice of requiring a purchase order or equivalent before
commission payments were made; terminated account executives were paid commissions on
projects that did not have purchase orders or equivalents; and plaintiff was not paid for all
profitable projects she closed or won. In support of her claim that she had not been paid on all
profitable projects she won, plaintiff attached her own affidavit, in which she stated: “I was not
paid commissions for projects that did not have signed Purchase Orders as of the date I was
terminated on August 29, 2018.”
¶ 24 Plaintiff asserted that the changes to the original Playbook set forth in the August
Playbook, including the provisions concerning compensation for terminated employees, were
“unenforceable against [her]” because they lacked consideration. Plaintiff argued that she was
-7- instead entitled to payment of commissions under the original Playbook, which she claimed
entitled her to “commissions for projects she solicited, procured, acquired or otherwise garnered
for [defendant], including projects that did not receive or have fully executed Purchase Orders
before she was terminated.”
¶ 25 3. Defendant’s Reply
¶ 26 On April 14, 2025, defendant filed a reply to plaintiff’s response to the motion for
summary judgment. In its reply, defendant asserted that (1) the August Playbook was a
codification of an established past practice that required no additional consideration; (2) even
under the original Playbook, plaintiff was paid commissions for all jobs that were paid in full by
the client at the time of her termination; and (3) plaintiff’s claims were supported only with
speculation and did not create a disputed issue of material fact.
¶ 27 Defendant asserted that plaintiff offered no evidence that any projects other than
the ones for which she was already paid were actually closed by her, profitable, and later paid in
full. Defendant cited portions of plaintiff’s discovery deposition in which she admitted that it
was possible the jobs for which she was claiming commissions did not happen or, if they
happened, did not result in any profit. Defendant asserted plaintiff “adduced absolutely no proof
that any of the projects for which she now seeks a commission were ever closed/won, paid for in
full by a RoomReady client, or profitable.”
¶ 28 B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Determination of a Major Issue
¶ 29 On March 5, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion for summary determination of a major
issue pursuant to section 2-1005(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005(d) (West
2024)). Plaintiff’s motion requested that the trial court find that defendant’s “eleventh hour
unilateral modification to its 2018 handbook on August 27, 2018[,] is unenforceable for lack of
-8- consideration because it disadvantaged [plaintiff] without providing her a benefit.” Plaintiff
argued that defendant was contractually bound to honor the terms of the Playbook in its original
form.
¶ 30 Plaintiff included a full transcript of her discovery deposition as an exhibit to her
motion for summary determination of a major issue. During her deposition, plaintiff identified an
exhibit prepared by her attorney containing a list of projects for which she claimed she was still
owed commissions. The list contained the amounts plaintiff had quoted to customers before her
employment was terminated and the amount of profit she estimated the projects would have
generated based on these quotes. When asked if purchase orders were ever signed as to any of
the projects, plaintiff said she did not have access to that information. Plaintiff stated it was
possible that the projects listed on the exhibit were not profitable. She also stated it was possible
that, for a project identified in the exhibit, defendant never ultimately received a purchase order
from the client and that the project never materialized. However, she later identified several
specific projects that did not have purchase orders at the time of her termination that she had
been told were completed after she was terminated.
¶ 31 C. Ruling on Dispositive Motions
¶ 32 On June 9, 2025, the trial court entered a written order stating that, “[f]or the
reasons stated on the record,” it was granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and
denying plaintiff’s motion for summary determination of a major issue. (No transcript of the
arguments on the parties’ dispositive motions or the court’s oral pronouncement of its ruling
appear in the record on appeal.) This appeal followed.
¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS
-9- ¶ 34 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s
motion for summary judgment and by denying her motion for summary determination of a major
issue. We first address plaintiff’s argument that the court erred by granting defendant’s motion
for summary judgment, as we find it dispositive.
¶ 35 Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for
summary judgment when it ruled that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to her claims
of breach of written contract, breach of oral contract, and violation of the Wage Act. She
contends she was not paid all of the commissions to which she was entitled, as she was not paid
for commissions on projects she solicited or procured that did not have fully executed purchase
orders as of the date of her termination. She argues that the provisions in the August Playbook
concerning commission payments to terminated employees were unenforceable against her
because they lacked consideration and the original Playbook contained no language concerning
postemployment limitations on commissions. She also argues that defendant did not have a past
practice of refusing payment to terminated account executives for projects without purchase
orders, as it claimed in its motion for summary judgment.
¶ 36 Defendant argues, inter alia, that the trial court properly granted summary
judgment because the undisputed facts demonstrate that plaintiff’s commission claims are
supported with only speculation as to the additional jobs on which she believes she earned
commissions and, accordingly, she cannot establish any damages. Defendant argues that plaintiff
failed to produce any evidence that she is owed additional commissions under the original
Playbook or otherwise, other than unsupported assertions and conclusory statements. Defendant
notes that plaintiff claimed in her discovery deposition that she was entitled to commissions for
projects listed on an exhibit her attorney had prepared. However, she also stated during the
- 10 - deposition that she calculated these commissions based on what she estimated the profit on the
projects would be rather than the actual profit, and she admitted it was possible the jobs did not
result in any profit or possibly never even materialized in the first place.
¶ 37 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735
ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2024). “A genuine issue of material fact exists where the material facts
are disputed or reasonable people could draw different inferences from the undisputed material
facts.” Haase v. Kankakee School District 111, 2025 IL 131420, ¶ 29. “Disposing of litigation on
a motion for summary judgment is a drastic measure; as such, a motion should only be granted if
the movant’s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Id.
¶ 38 “On a motion for summary judgment it is the movant who bears the burden of
persuasion and the initial burden of production.” Hall v. Flowers, 343 Ill. App. 3d 462, 469
(2003). “A defendant *** may meet the initial burden of production either: (1) by affirmatively
showing that some element of the cause of action must be resolved in defendant’s favor; or
(2) by demonstrating that plaintiff cannot produce evidence necessary to support the plaintiff’s
cause of action.” Id. at 469-70. If the defendant satisfies the initial burden of production, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to present some factual basis that would arguably entitle him or her
to a favorable judgment. Id. at 470.
¶ 39 While a plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the summary judgment
stage, “the nonmoving party must present a factual basis that would arguably entitle the party to
a judgment” in order to survive a summary judgment motion. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d
- 11 - 324, 335 (2002). “If the plaintiff fails to establish any element of the cause of action, summary
judgment for the defendant is the proper result.” Winters v. MIMG LII Arbors at Eastland, LLC,
2018 IL App (4th) 170669, ¶ 44. “[U]nsupported conclusions, opinions, or speculation are
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Valfer v. Evanston Northwestern
Healthcare, 2016 IL 119220, ¶ 20.
¶ 40 Here, plaintiff has alleged claims for breach of written contract, breach of oral
contract, and violation of the Wage Act based on defendant’s alleged failure to pay her for all
commissions due to her under the original Playbook. “To succeed on a breach of contract claim,
a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract,
(2) substantial performance by the plaintiff, (3) breach by the defendant, and (4) damages caused
by that breach.” Ivey v. Transunion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc., 2022 IL 127903, ¶ 28. To
recover under the Wage Act, plaintiff was required to show (1) defendant was an “employer” as
defined in the Wage Act, (2) plaintiff was an “employee” as defined by the Wage Act, (3) the
parties entered into an “employment contract or agreement,” (4) she was due “final
compensation” pursuant to this contract or agreement, and (5) defendant failed to timely pay her
all the final compensation she was due. 820 ILCS 115/2, 14(a) (West 2024); see Catania v. Local
4250/5050, 359 Ill. App. 3d 718, 724 (2005).
¶ 41 Thus, plaintiff’s claims for both breach of contract and violation of the Wage Act
required a showing that defendant failed to pay her commissions that were due to her under an
employment contract. In its motion for summary judgment, defendant asserted that plaintiff had
received all the commissions due to her for projects that she closed or won during her
employment because, pursuant to the August Playbook, she had been paid commissions for all
projects for which a purchase order had been received at the time of her termination. The motion
- 12 - was supported by Nix’s affidavit, in which Nix averred that plaintiff was paid commissions for
all projects she closed or won prior to her termination that were paid by clients after her
termination. A spreadsheet purportedly listing all of plaintiff’s closed projects and the
commissions she earned on each project and a ledger sheet reflecting the payments defendant
made to plaintiff were attached to Nix’s affidavit as exhibits.
¶ 42 In her response, plaintiff did not dispute that she had received these payments.
Rather, she argued that, under the terms of the original Playbook, she was entitled to additional
commissions for projects she had procured but that did not yet have purchase orders at the time
of her termination, and the portion of the August Playbook concerning compensation for
terminated employees did not apply to her because it lacked consideration. However, the only
evidence she offered in dispute of defendant’s claim that she had been paid all of the
commissions due to her for profitable projects she closed or won during her employment was the
following statement in her own affidavit: “I was not paid commissions for projects that did not
have signed Purchase Orders as of the date I was terminated on August 29, 2018.”
¶ 43 Even if we were to accept plaintiff’s argument that the August Playbook was
unenforceable against her and that she was entitled under the original Playbook to commissions
for projects she procured but did not have fully executed purchase orders on the date of her
termination, she failed to provide a sufficient evidentiary basis in support of her claim that she
was actually owed additional commissions. Under the terms of the original Playbook, plaintiff
was only entitled to receive commissions on projects that were profitable and paid for in full by
the client. However, plaintiff failed to include any evidence in her response to defendant’s
summary judgment motion specifically identifying projects she procured during her employment
which did not have signed purchase orders at the time of her termination but (1) for which
- 13 - purchase orders were subsequently received, (2) which were ultimately paid for in full by the
client, and (3) which were profitable. See Tafoya-Cruz v. Temperance Beer Co., 2020 IL App
(1st) 190606, ¶ 68 (“[T]he party opposing summary judgment ordinarily must produce actual
evidentiary facts that would enable a jury to return a favorable verdict—and mere speculation,
conjecture, or guess is insufficient.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
¶ 44 Plaintiff’s general statement in her affidavit that she was not paid commissions for
projects that did not have signed purchase orders when she was terminated was insufficient to
raise a genuine issue of a material fact as to whether additional commissions were owed to her.
See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 132 (1992)
(“Statements in an affidavit which are based on information and belief or which are unsupported
conclusions, opinions, or speculation are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.”).
While plaintiff identified in her discovery deposition several projects she claimed she procured
but did not yet have fully executed purchase orders for at the time of her termination and
indicated she was later told were completed, she failed to present any evidence that these projects
were profitable. Without evidence of a project’s profitability, plaintiff could not establish her
entitlement to damages, an element common to all of her claims against defendant.
¶ 45 Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. As such, we need not address plaintiff’s claim that the court erred by
denying her motion for summary determination of a major issue.
¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 47 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 48 Affirmed.
- 14 -