Strawn v. Sokoloff

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 3, 2025
• Docket: 1:22-cv-01245
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAE DEAN STRAWN, No. 1:22-cv-01245-KES-EPG 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 BRUCE SOKOLOFF, J. ANAYA, and CITY OF PORTERVILLE, Docs. 45, 46 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 On January 18, 2022, plaintiff Rae Dean Strawn was arrested by defendants Lieutenant 19 Bruce Sokoloff and Detective Julia Anaya of the Porterville Police Department for improperly 20 wearing a face mask while attending a Porterville City Council meeting. Doc. 50 (“Pl.’s Stmt. 21 Mat. Facts”) ¶¶ 8, 25, 29. She contends that Sokoloff and Anaya arrested her without lawful 22 authority and used excessive force during the arrest. Doc. 26 (“FAC”) ¶¶ 22–47. Defendants 23 move for summary judgment on all claims. Doc. 46 (“MSJ”). For the reasons set forth below, the 24 Court grants the motion. 25 I. Background 26 Following the outbreak of COVID-19, the City of Porterville (“City”) enacted Ordinance 27 No. 1874 (“Ordinance”) which required individuals to comply with the California Department of 28 Public Health’s “Guidance for the Use of Face Coverings” (“Guidance”). Doc. 49 (“Sullivan 1 Decl.”), Ex. 1 (“Ordinance No. 1874”) at 4–5. Among other requirements addressing risks 2 related to COVID-19, the Guidance required that individuals, except those specifically exempted, 3 wear a face mask “that covers the nose and mouth” in public spaces. Id. at 7, 9. The Ordinance 4 provided that “[city] staff [are] authorized to engage in code enforcement efforts to remedy 5 violations of the [Guidance, and] violations of these requirements are punishable as permitted by 6 State law.” Id. at 5. 7 On January 18, 2022, plaintiff Rae Dean Strawn, who was seventy-six years old at the 8 time, attended a Porterville City Council meeting wearing a sweatshirt that read “Unmask Tulare 9 County,” the name of a local group that opposed face mask requirements for children at school. 10 Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 9–10; Doc. 45-2 (“Scott Decl.”), Ex. 7 (“Video”) at 03:28. Prior to the 11 start of the city council meeting, Strawn was not wearing a face mask, and Lieutenant Bruce 12 Sokoloff ordered her to put one on or leave the meeting. Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 12–16. Strawn 13 retrieved masks for herself and another person from a table in the city council chambers and they 14 put them on. Id. There were seven people in the audience, and three of them, including Strawn, 15 were speaking about face masks. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. During their conversation, Sokoloff told Strawn 16 that she needed to wear the mask “properly.” 1 Id. ¶¶ 17–19. Strawn contends that the mask was 17 too big and would not stay over her nose, and she did not understand that “properly” meant 18 “cover the nose.” Id. 19 Sokoloff then stated, “I’m going to ask you to leave. If not, you’re going to leave in 20 handcuffs.” Id. ¶ 22; Video at 0:03. Strawn, whose mask still did not cover her nose, responded, 21 “I have a right to be here,” and Sokoloff then ordered her to stand up and told her that she was 22 under arrest. Id. ¶ 23; Video at 0:08. Although Sokoloff did not answer Strawn when she asked 23 what law she had violated, Video at 0:11–0:20, he asserts that she was arrested for violating the 24 Ordinance and California Penal Code § 148, which makes it a crime to “willfully resist[], delay[], 25 or obstruct[] any public officer . . . in the discharge [of] any duty.” Id. ¶¶ 8, 29; MSJ at 9. 26 1 Strawn disputes this fact. See Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶ 17. However, the video reveals that he 27 told her she needed to wear the mask properly at least once. See Video at 0:01. Defendants contend that Sokoloff told her to pull the mask up over her nose twice and told her to wear the 28 mask “properly.” Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 17, 18. 1 Detective Julia Anaya and Sokoloff handcuffed Strawn and escorted her outside. Id. ¶¶ 25–30; 2 Video at 0:10–01:43. Greg Meister, another attendee, recorded the arrest on his phone and 3 followed them outside. Id. ¶ 27. 4 Anaya directed Strawn to the parking lot and, as they arrived at the spot where they would 5 wait for a police cruiser to take her to the station, Strawn informed Anaya that she had a “bad leg” 6 and asked to slow down, so Anaya stopped. Id. ¶ 31; Video at 01:59–02:04. As they waited, 7 Strawn complained that the handcuffs were too tight and hurt her wrists. Id. ¶ 32. Anaya 8 checked them by placing a finger between the cuff and Strawn’s wrist, saw that there was 9 adequate room, and told Strawn they were fine. Id. ¶¶ 32, 64; Video at 02:14–02:25. Strawn 10 abruptly responded, “You’re full of shit,” but did not complain of the handcuffs being too tight 11 again. Id. ¶ 33; Video at 02:14–07:34. 12 The police cruiser arrived several minutes later, and Anaya directed Strawn into the 13 backseat. Id. ¶ 40. Strawn had trouble getting into the backseat because a prior knee surgery 14 inhibited her ability to bend her left leg. Id.; Video at 07:34–08:05. Strawn put her right leg in, 15 sat down, and Anaya then helped her lift her left leg into the vehicle. Id. She was then 16 transported to the Porterville Police Station and released shortly thereafter. Opp’n at 2. 17 The arrest bruised both of Strawn’s wrists. Id. ¶ 53. She did not seek medical treatment 18 for this injury, and she does not contend that she was physically injured in any other respect. Id. 19 ¶ 54. 20 Following the arrest, Mr. Meister filed a complaint concerning Strawn’s arrest with the 21 City. Id. ¶ 50. An officer interviewed him about the complaint and decided that his allegations 22 were unfounded. Id. ¶¶ 51–52. 23 On September 28, 2022, Strawn filed her federal complaint in this action. On April 3, 24 2023, the Court dismissed certain claims in her initial complaint. Doc. 22. She filed a first 25 amended complaint on April 21, 2023, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive 26 force and Monell liability, as well as state law claims of assault, battery, false arrest, false 27 imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, gross negligence, and willful and 28 wanton misconduct. FAC ¶¶ 22–47. On September 30, 2024, defendants moved for summary 1 judgment. Doc. 46 (“MSJ”). Strawn opposed the motion, Doc. 48 (“Opp’n”), and defendants 2 filed a reply, Doc. 51 (“Reply”). The motion was taken under submission without a hearing. 3 II. Legal Standard 4 Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 5 and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is 6 “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. 7 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome 8 of the suit under the governing law.” Id. The parties must cite “particular parts of materials in 9 the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The Court then views the record in the light most favorable 10 to the nonmoving party and draws reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Matsushita Elec. 11 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986). However, the nonmoving party’s 12 version of the facts need not be credited if it is blatantly contradicted by video evidence. Vos v. 13 City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018). The “purpose of summary 14 judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a 15 genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citations omitted). 16 “A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the 17 basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses 18 that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, 19 Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 20 (1986)). If “the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must 21 affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving 22 party.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984; Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 23 moving defendant bears the burden of proof on the issue of qualified immunity.”). 24 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to 25 produce evidence supporting its claims or defenses and “establish that there is a genuine issue of 26 material fact.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585. The nonmoving party “must do more than simply 27 show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. at 586 (citation omitted). 28 “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position” is 1 insufficient to survive summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 2 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the nonmoving party need 3 not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. 4 Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 5 dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 6 trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (quoting First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 7 253, 289 (1968)). However, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is 8 blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not 9 adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott 10 v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380. Nevertheless, “[t]he mere existence of video footage of the incident 11 does not foreclose a genuine factual dispute as to the reasonable inferences that can be drawn 12 from that footage.” Vos, 892 F.3d at 1028 (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). 13 “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of 14 material fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment. But if the nonmoving 15 party produces enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party 16 defeats the motion.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 17 1103 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). 18 III. Discussion and Analysis 19 Defendants move for summary judgment on each of Strawn’s claims. MSJ at 7–15. This 20 Order examines each claim in turn. 21 a. False Arrest/False Imprisonment 22 Strawn’s claim for false arrest and false imprisonment is premised on two bases: First, she 23 argues, the Ordinance was “not a law,” and second, the officers did not have probable cause to 24 arrest her. Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶ 7; see Opp’n at 4–7. 25 “Under California law, ‘false arrest is not a different tort’ but ‘is merely one way of 26 committing a false imprisonment.’” Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Auth., 261 F.3d 912, 27 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 28 1998)). False imprisonment is “the violation of the personal liberty of another without lawful 1 privilege.” Id. at 920 (quoting Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 842, 850 (Cal. 2 1997)). However, a police officer may not be held liable “for false arrest or false imprisonment 3 arising out of any arrest when . . . [t]he arrest was lawful, or the [] officer . . . had reasonable 4 cause to believe the arrest was lawful.” Cal. Penal Code § 847(b)(1) (West 2024). 5 Strawn first contends that the arrest was not lawful because “there is no California law 6 that states a person is required to wear a facemask indoors . . . [or] that a person must wear a 7 facemask covering the nose.” Id. at 7. Strawn acknowledges the existence of the Ordinance but 8 argues that because the Guidance it referred to was only – in her view – a recommendation, the 9 Ordinance could not have made its terms criminally punishable. Id. 10 Strawn’s argument is plainly without merit. The California Constitution provides that a 11 “city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and 12 regulations not in conflict with general laws.” Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7. “An ordinance is a local 13 law which is adopted with all the legal formality of a statute,” and it “prescribes a permanent rule 14 of conduct or of government.” Childhelp, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 91 Cal. App. 5th 224, 238 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2023) (citations omitted). 16 On its face, the Ordinance provided that “[i]ndividuals, while in the City of Porterville, are 17 required to comply with [the Guidance].” Ordinance No. 1874 at 5 (emphasis added). Then, the 18 Guidance, which is attached as an exhibit to the Ordinance, provides that “[p]eople in California 19 must wear face coverings when they are . . . inside of . . . any indoor public space.” Id. at 7 20 (emphasis added). The Guidance defines “face covering” as “a material that covers the nose and 21 mouth.” Id. at 9. Strawn was therefore in violation of the Ordinance’s plain terms when she 22 entered the City Council chambers without a mask and when she failed to wear it properly. 23 Moreover, contrary to Strawn’s argument that the Guidance was only a recommendation, 24 the specific terms of the Ordinance and the Guidance are mandatory. The Ordinance states that 25 people within the city limits of Porterville are “required to comply” with the Guidance and 26 authorizes its enforcement, id. at 5, and the Guidance states that it “mandates that face coverings 27 be worn,” id. at 7 (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that the word “guidance” in the title implies 28 that the Guidance’s requirements are merely recommendations, but the consistent, repeated use of 1 mandatory language throughout the text clearly refutes her interpretation. See id. Strawn relies 2 solely on the word “guidance” in the title and does not point to any non-mandatory or ambiguous 3 language in the actual text of the Guidance. As courts have regularly noted when interpreting 4 statutes and regulations, the title of a statute or regulation can assist in understanding the meaning 5 of its provisions but cannot alter its otherwise clear language. See, e.g., Ratha v. Rubicon 6 Resources, 111 F.4th 946, 961 (9th Cir. 2024) (noting that “titles of acts are not part of the law” 7 and are not afforded “dispositive weight”); Dailey v. City of San Diego, 223 Cal. App. 4th 237, 8 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]itle or chapter headings are unofficial and do not alter the explicit 9 scope, meaning, or intent of a statute.”). 10 The officers were authorized to enforce the Ordinance by arresting her. The Porterville 11 Municipal Code provides that “any person violating any of the provisions . . . or mandatory 12 requirements [of an ordinance] . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Porterville, Cal., City Code ch. 1 13 § 1-9(E)(1) (2024). The Ordinance itself also states that “[v]iolations of these requirements are 14 punishable as permitted by State law.” Id. at 5. Under California law, a “public officer . . . may 15 arrest a person without a warrant whenever the officer or employee has reasonable cause to 16 believe that the person . . . has committed a misdemeanor in the presence of the officer . . . that is 17 a violation of [an] ordinance that the officer . . . has the duty to enforce.” Cal. Penal Code 18 § 836.5(a) (West 2024); see People v. Bloom, 185 Cal. App. 4th 1496, 1501 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) 19 (“A warrantless arrest by a [public officer] for a misdemeanor occurring in [his or her] presence is 20 lawful.”). Strawn’s failure to comply with the Ordinance was therefore a misdemeanor for which 21 she was subject to arrest. 22 Nor did Strawn’s arrest pursuant to the Ordinance violate her Fourth Amendment rights, 23 as she contends. See Opp’n at 3–6. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Supreme Court 24 examined an arrest made by a police officer due to the arrestee’s failure to wear a seatbelt. 532 25 U.S. 318, 323–25 (2001). A Texas law made it “a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not less 26 than $25 or more than $50” to drive without a seatbelt. Id. at 323 (citing Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 27 § 545.413(d) (West 1999)). The Court held that when “an officer has probable cause to believe 28 that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, 1 without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Id at 354. Strawn’s arrest was 2 therefore not barred by the Fourth Amendment, so long as Sokoloff and Anaya had probable 3 cause. 4 “Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy 5 information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or 6 is being committed by the person being arrested.” United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 7 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). An officer has probable cause 8 “when under the totality of circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would 9 have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the suspect] had committed a crime.” Id. 10 (quotations omitted). This is true “regardless of the officer’s subjective reasons for” making the 11 arrest. Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2006). Probable 12 cause “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing 13 of such activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). 14 Here, Strawn was wearing her mask below her nose in violation of the Ordinance, and 15 despite having been previously warned to wear the mask properly, when Sokoloff and Anaya 16 arrested her. Video at 0:00–0:25; Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 23, 24, 25. Strawn disputes that the 17 mask was below her nose, but the video clearly shows otherwise. Video at 0:00–0:10. This 18 factual dispute is not genuine because Strawn’s version of this fact is “blatantly contradicted by 19 the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, [and in such a case,] a court should not 20 adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott, 21 550 U.S. at 380. Therefore, considering that the mask was below her nose, Sokoloff had probable 22 cause to arrest her because there was not only “a substantial chance of criminal activity,” but 23 rather, “an actual showing of such activity.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. 24 The arrest was lawful, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Strawn’s false 25 arrest and false imprisonment claims. See California Penal Code § 847(b)(1) (“[No] cause of 26 action shall arise against, any peace officer . . . acting within the scope of his or her authority, for 27 false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest when . . . [t]he arrest was lawful, or the 28 1 peace officer . . . had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.”). 2 b. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Excessive Force Against the Officers 3 Sokoloff and Anaya also seek summary judgment on Strawn’s excessive force claim. 4 MSJ at 7–8, 12–13. To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the action 5 (1) occurred under color of state law, and (2) resulted in the deprivation of [a] constitutional or 6 federal statutory right.” Rodriguez v. City of Modesto, No. 1:10-cv-01370-LJO-MJS, 2015 WL 7 1565354, at *14 (E.D. Cal. April 8, 2015) (quoting Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632–33 (9th 8 Cir. 1988)). The parties agree that Sokoloff’s and Anaya’s actions occurred under color of state 9 law. 10 Sokoloff and Anaya argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Strawn’s Fourth 11 Amendment claim for excessive force. MSJ at 7–8. Qualified immunity shields “government 12 officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 13 established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 14 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 15 (1982)). The doctrine “balances two important interests – the need to hold public officials 16 accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 17 harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. An officer 18 may be denied qualified immunity only if “(1) the [evidence], taken in the light most favorable to 19 the party asserting injury, show[s] that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) 20 the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident such that a reasonable officer 21 would have understood her conduct to be unlawful in that situation.” Calonge, 104 F.4th at 44 22 (quoting Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011)). Courts are “permitted 23 to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity 24 analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” 25 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 26 The Court first analyzes whether Sokoloff’s and Anaya’s use of force violated Strawn’s 27 constitutional rights. The “use of force to effect an arrest” is examined “in light of the Fourth 28 Amendment’s prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures,” and it is “measured by the 1 standard of objective reasonableness.” Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 2 2001). This standard requires courts to decide “whether the totality of the circumstances justified 3 a particular” use of force. Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 878 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 4 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)). “The reasonableness of the force used . . . is 5 determined by ‘carefully balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s 6 Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Deorle, 7 272 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)). A substantial governmental 8 interest justifies a “greater intrusion upon the Fourth Amendment rights of the person,” while an 9 insubstantial governmental interest could render “the application of even minimal force” 10 unreasonable. Nelson, 685 F.3d at 878. “When balancing the degree of force used against the 11 governmental interests, ‘it is the need for force which is at the heart of the analysis.’” Id. (quoting 12 Headwaters Forest Def. v. Cnty. of Humboldt (“Humboldt II”), 276 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 13 2002)). 14 i. Nature and Quality of the Intrusion 15 Homing in first on the nature and quality of the intrusion, the force used in this case was 16 minimal and was not more than needed to arrest Strawn. The officers’ only use of force was 17 placing Strawn in handcuffs, holding her by the elbow to direct her outside, and lifting her left leg 18 to help her into the backseat of the police cruiser. Video at 0:11–8:05. 19 Analysis of an excessive force claim is a fact-specific inquiry and requires consideration 20 of a non-exhaustive list of factors to determine whether the governmental interest supported the 21 intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests. See Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 22 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 2013). However, aside from setting out the legal standard, Strawn 23 points to no helpful authority and fails to explain how Sokoloff’s and Anaya’s use of force was 24 excessive. See Opp’n at 12–13 (citing the standard for excessive force but not explaining how it 25 applies). As far as can be gleaned from Strawn’s moving papers, the only asserted basis for an 26 excessive force claim is the officers’ use of handcuffs, which she alleges were too tight and 27 caused small bruises on both her wrists. See Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 53–54. The Court 28 therefore evaluates whether the officers’ use of handcuffs rose to the level of unconstitutionally 1 excessive force. 2 An examination of two Ninth Circuit cases involving similar types of force illustrates 3 where on the spectrum the amount of force employed against Strawn lies. On the one hand, in 4 Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 816–19 (9th Cir. 2018), the Ninth Circuit, confronted with 5 force used by officers to disperse a large protest, held that officers’ use of batons to jab arrestees 6 in the torso and one officer’s overhand strike to an arrestee’s hand constituted minimal force. In 7 reaching this conclusion, the court noted that “[w]hile injuries are not a precondition to section 8 1983 liability, their absence can suggest a lesser degree of force.” Id. at 817. Considering that 9 only one arrestee alleged that he suffered any injury, a welt which did not require medical 10 attention, the court concluded that, even though the “force used was of a type that is generally 11 intrusive, the amount of force applied [] was minimal.” Id. at 816–17. 12 On the other hand, in Alexander v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 1320, 1322–23 13 (9th Cir. 1995), the court explained that although “measures used to restrain individuals, such as . 14 . . handcuffing them, are reasonable” when performed responsibly, under some circumstances the 15 use of handcuffs might constitute an intermediate or significant level of force. There, the facts 16 showed that officers slammed the arrestee against a car, kicked his legs apart, and handcuffed him 17 for forty-five minutes to an hour. Id. at 1322–23. The officer admitted that when he grabbed the 18 arrestee’s “wrists [to] handcuff him . . . [he] felt that [the arrestee’s] wrist was kind of mushy . . . 19 around the wrist area and [the arrestee] simultaneously stated that he was a dialysis patient.” Id. 20 at 1323. The arrestee asked the officers to loosen the handcuffs “repeatedly” throughout his 21 detention, but they refused to do so for forty-five minutes to an hour. Id. “Nine months after this 22 incident, . . . [the arrestee’s] right hand was still swollen in that it had a walnut-sized protrusion 23 on the back of it below the wrist[,] also remained numb, and he was not able to make a fist with 24 it.” Id. Without defining precisely whether this use of force was intermediate or significant, the 25 court concluded that it was excessive. Id. 26 This case is readily distinguishable from Alexander, and a comparison to Felarca 27 demonstrates that the force used was minimal. Although Strawn was handcuffed for a 28 comparable amount of time to the arrestee in Alexander, she did not “repeatedly” ask the officers 1 to loosen the handcuffs – she asked only once. Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶ 32; Video at 02:14–07:34. 2 More importantly, when Strawn asked, Anaya checked the handcuffs and made sure they were 3 not too tight. Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶ 33. While Strawn says that this fact is disputed, this does 4 not create a genuine factual dispute which the Court must resolve in her favor because the video 5 clearly shows that, after Strawn complained, Anaya checked the handcuffs by placing a finger 6 between the cuff and her wrist, Video at 02:14–02:25, the technique encouraged by the State of 7 California Commission on Police Officer Standards and Training’s regulations, Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. 8 Facts ¶ 64; Doc. 45-2 (“Norton Decl.”) ¶ 11. When events such as these are captured on video, 9 the Court need not view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; it “should [] 10 view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 381. As such, the 11 uncontroverted evidence establishes that Strawn complained only once of the handcuffs being too 12 tight, and that officers then checked to make sure that they were not too tight, unlike in 13 Alexander. 14 This case is also distinguishable in that the arrestee in Alexander told police officers that 15 he was ill and the officer could tell that the area around his wrist was “mushy,” rendering it 16 obvious that the handcuffs might hurt him more than the average person, especially if bound too 17 tightly. Alexander, 64 F.3d at 1323. Here, however, Strawn did not and does not contend that 18 she had any physical ailment which would make the use of handcuffs more likely to hurt her than 19 the average person. Although she told the officers that she was seventy-six years old, Video at 20 03:28, this fact, standing alone, does not make the use of handcuffs rise to a greater level of force 21 – and Strawn does not argue that it does. 22 The force used is more akin to that examined in Felarca, where an officer delivered an 23 overhand strike to one plaintiff’s hand which left a welt that did not require medical attention. 24 Felarca, 891 F.3d at 816. Here, the use of handcuffs left bruises which did not require medical 25 attention. Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 53–54. Arguably, the force used in Felarca was more 26 substantial than the force used here, as the Ninth Circuit has counseled that “[p]hysical blows or 27 cuts often constitute a more substantial application of force than categories of force that do not 28 involve an impact to the body.” Rice v. Morehouse, 989 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2021) 1 (quotations omitted). In any event, the force used here was minimal. 2 ii. Governmental Interest 3 The next consideration is the government’s interest in this particular use of force. The 4 need for the government’s use of force is determined by a number of factors, including “‘(1) the 5 severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of 6 the officers or others . . . (3) whether he [was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 7 arrest by flight,’ and any other ‘exigent circumstances [that] existed at the time of the arrest.’” 8 Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Humboldt I, 240 F.3d at 1189–99). However, these factors are 9 non-exhaustive and a court should consider the totality of the circumstances. See Gravelet- 10 Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1091. It bears repeating that “‘it is the need for force which is at the heart of 11 the analysis.’” Nelson, 685 F.3d at 878 (quoting Humboldt II, 276 F.3d at 1130). 12 As to the “severity of the crime,” the Ninth Circuit applies this factor in “two slightly 13 different ways.” Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2019). First, the court has 14 applied it with a felony-misdemeanor distinction, which counsels that when “all other things [are] 15 equal,” use of force is more reasonable “when applied against a felony suspect than when applied 16 against a person suspected only of a misdemeanor.” Id. Second, the court has used it “as a proxy 17 for the danger a suspect pose[d] at the time force is applied,” even though “the danger a suspect 18 [posed] is a separate Graham consideration.” Id. 19 In this case, Strawn committed a non-violent misdemeanor and the officers therefore had 20 only a minimal governmental interest in using force. As defendants concede, “the Ordinance 21 could be viewed similarly [to] the seat belt law in Atwater – a minor offense that does not 22 ordinarily require handcuffs and transportation to jail.” MSJ at 10. Nevertheless, the Ninth 23 Circuit has held that even though misdemeanors like this are “minor infraction[s],” their 24 commission still “justifies . . . a minimal use of force.” See Nelson, 685 F.3d at 880; see also 25 Humboldt I, 240 F.3d at 1189–99 (noting that “the commission of a misdemeanor offense is not 26 to be taken lightly” (quotations omitted)). 27 /// 28 /// 1 The only remaining relevant factor is whether Strawn resisted.2 The Ninth Circuit draws a 2 distinction between passive and active resistance. Bryan, 630 F.3d at 830. Resistance is not “a 3 binary state,” but rather, “runs the gamut from the purely passive protestor who simply refuses to 4 stand [at an officer’s command], to the individual who physically assault[s] [an] officer.” Id. 5 “Even purely passive resistance can support the use of some force, but the level of force an 6 individual’s resistance will support is dependent on the factual circumstances underlying that 7 resistance.” Id. 8 Here, defendants contend that Sokoloff instructed Strawn to pull the mask up over her 9 nose numerous times and she refused to do so. Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 17–24. While Strawn 10 disputes this contention, her version of the facts can be accepted only to a limited extent given the 11 video evidence of the encounter. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81 (“At the summary judgment 12 stage, . . . [courts] should not [rely] on visible fiction; [they should view] the facts in the light 13 depicted by the videotape.”). The video shows, in the first ten seconds, Sokoloff ordering Strawn 14 to wear her mask properly, while the mask is below Strawn’s nose. Video at 00:02. When 15 Strawn does not adjust the mask to cover her face properly as directed, Sokoloff states, “I’m 16 going to ask you to leave. If not, you’re going to leave in handcuffs.” Video at 0:06. Strawn then 17 turns her back to Sokoloff and does not comply with his command. Video at 0:07. At that point, 18 Sokoloff and Anaya arrest Strawn. Video at 0:11–0:25. 19 Strawn’s conduct constituted only passive resistance. The Ninth Circuit has held on 20 numerous occasions that “a failure to . . . immediately comply with an officer’s orders neither 21 rises to the level of active resistance nor justifies the application of a non-trivial amount of force.” 22 Nelson, 685 F.3d at 881. In Humboldt II, for example, the court concluded that protestors who 23 used “black bear” devices to lock themselves to a tree and refused officers’ orders to stand and 24 disperse did not actively resist. 276 F.3d at 1130. And in Bryan, the arrestee refused an officer’s 25 command to get back in his vehicle, shouted gibberish, and began hitting himself in the 26 quadriceps before the officer used a taser to subdue him. 630 F.3d at 830. The Ninth Circuit 27 2 Defendants do not claim that Strawn posed a threat to the officers’ safety. See MSJ at 7–8, 12– 28 13. 1 explained that, even when “viewed in the light most favorable to the officer,” the arrestee’s 2 behavior may not have been purely passive, but “it is a far cry from actively struggling with an 3 officer attempting to restrain or arrest an individual.” Id. Strawn’s conduct prior to her arrest is 4 closer to Humboldt II, and the Court concludes that she engaged in passive resistance. 5 In sum, Strawn committed a minor infraction and passively resisted by refusing to follow 6 the officers’ commands. The governmental interest in using force was therefore minimal, but 7 there was nonetheless some interest given Strawn’s non-compliance with the officers’ lawful 8 orders. 9 iii. Balancing 10 “The factors that justify the use of force must be weighed against the degree of intrusion 11 posed by the particular type of force to determine if the use in the particular instance was 12 reasonable.” Nelson, 685 F.3d at 883. Under the circumstances, the need for force was low, as 13 was the level of force the officers used. Officers Sokoloff and Anaya handcuffed Strawn and 14 obliged her request to check the handcuffs when she said they were too tight, by placing a finger 15 in between the cuff and her wrist to ensure there was sufficient room. Thereafter, Strawn did not 16 complain of the handcuffs being too tight, and she had only small bruises on her wrists and did 17 not require medical attention. 18 The force employed was no more than what was needed to perform the arrest. As the 19 Ninth Circuit has advised that both the commission of a misdemeanor, see Nelson, 685 F.3d at 20 880, and passive resistance justify the use of minimal force, see Bryan, 630 F.3d at 830, the Court 21 concludes that Sokoloff’s and Anaya’s use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. The 22 officers did not violate Strawn’s Fourth Amendment rights, so they are entitled to summary 23 judgment on this claim.3 24 c. Monell Liability 25 The City moves for summary judgment on Strawn’s claim against it for municipal liability 26 3 Given this finding that the officers did not use excessive force and did not violate Strawn’s 27 Fourth Amendment rights, whether the right was clearly established at the time of the incident need not be addressed. See Felarca, 891 F.3d 809, 816 (“A plaintiff must prove both steps of the 28 [qualified immunity analysis] to establish the officials are not entitled to immunity.”). 1 pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). MSJ at 11– 2 12. This claim can be swiftly dealt with because, for Strawn to prevail, she must first “establish[] 3 a deprivation of a constitutional right,” and then “must establish that the city was the ‘person’ 4 who cause[d] [her] to be subjected to the deprivation.” City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 5 817 (1985) (quotations omitted). Although Strawn asserts multiple theories of municipal liability, 6 Opp’n at 9–12, each requires the prerequisite of a constitutional violation by an official or 7 employee of the City. See, e.g., Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992). As 8 Strawn has failed to establish that she suffered a violation of any constitutional right, the City is 9 entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 10 d. Remaining State Law Claims 11 Strawn’s remaining state law claims for (i) “assault, battery, . . . [and] intentional 12 infliction of emotional distress,” and (ii) “gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct” are 13 likewise foreclosed by the conclusions above that the officers had probable cause to arrest her and 14 utilized an objectively reasonable amount of force in conducting the arrest. Each is discussed in 15 turn. 16 First, a “prima facie case for battery [against an officer] is not established under California 17 law unless the plaintiff proves that [the] officer used unreasonable force against him to make a 18 lawful arrest or detention.” Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1157 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 19 Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)); see Arpin, 261 F.3d 20 at 922. As explained above, the officers did not use unreasonable force, so this claim fails. 21 Strawn’s assault claim fails for the same reason. 22 Next, under California law, a claim for “intentional infliction of emotional distress 23 consist[s] of: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intent to cause, or 24 reckless disregard for the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) suffering of severe or 25 extreme emotional distress by the plaintiff; and (3) the plaintiff’s emotional distress is actually 26 and proximately the result of defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Chang v. Lederman, 90 Cal. Rptr. 27 3d 758, 774 (Cal. 2009) (quotations omitted). Strawn’s IIED claim against the officers fails at the 28 first prong. “Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct that is so extreme as to exceed all 1 bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has explained 2 on several occasions that an officer’s “behavior [cannot] be outrageous [if] he acted in an 3 objectively reasonable manner” while conducting an arrest. E.g., Long v. City & Cnty. of 4 Honolulu, 511 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2007). 5 Given that Strawn’s claim is based entirely on her argument that the officers arrested her 6 without lawful authority and utilized excessive force, see FAC ¶¶ 34–43; Opp’n at 12–13, 7 Sokoloff and Anaya are also entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 8 Finally, the Court turns to Strawn’s claim for gross negligence or willful or wanton 9 misconduct, which unlike the other state law claims, is asserted against all defendants. FAC 10 ¶¶ 44–47. Gross negligence has “long [] been defined in California and other jurisdictions as 11 either a want of even scant care or an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.” 12 Joshi v. Fitness Int’l, 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022) (quotations omitted). It is a 13 “subspecies of negligence,” rather than a “separate tort.” Id. Similarly, wanton misconduct is “an 14 aggravated form of negligence, differing in quality rather than degree from ordinary lack of care.” 15 Berkley v. Dowds, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 304, 310–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 16 As both gross negligence and wanton misconduct are different forms of negligence, 17 Strawn’s claim is foreclosed by the conclusions above that the officers had probable cause to 18 arrest Strawn and used an objectively reasonable amount of force in doing so. “In the context of 19 an arrest, if probable cause exists, there can be no claim for negligence [for an officer’s decision 20 to make] that arrest.” Collins v. Cnty. of San Diego, 275 Cal. Rptr. 3d 290, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 21 2021). Additionally, a negligence claim based on an officer’s use of force fails if the use of force 22 was objectively reasonable. See Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2010); 23 Warren v. Marcus, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 24 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 12 (Cal. 2009) (holding that prior ruling on Fourth Amendment excessive 25 force claim precludes separate claim for negligence because both require consideration of 26 whether arrest was reasonable under totality of circumstances). As Strawn cannot make out even 27 an ordinary negligence claim, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on her claim for gross 28 1 | negligence or willful and wanton misconduct. 2 | IV. Conclusion and Order 3 For the reasons explained above: 4 1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Docs. 45, 46, is GRANTED; 5 2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment for defendants Bruce Sokoloff, J. 6 Anaya, and City of Porterville; and 7 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. 8 9 19 | IT IS SO ORDERED. _ 11 Dated: _ January 2, 2025 4h UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 18