Strand v. Rocha

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: September 15, 2020
• Docket: 3:20-cv-05706
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4

5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 HAMAL JACOB STRAND, CASE NO. C20-5706 MJP 11 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: DISMISSAL 12 v. 13 AMOREA ROCHA, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 The above-entitled Court, having reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint and the grounds stated 17 for his various claims of injury, enters the following order: 18 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall show cause, by no later than September 25, 2020, 19 why this matter should not be dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all initial discovery under FRCP 26 is STAYED 21 pending resolution of this order to show cause; the parties need not meet and confer until this 22 order to show cause is resolved. 23 24 1 Discussion 2 Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and this Court only has 3 jurisdiction over cases which rightfully arise under federal law. If there is no subject matter 4 jurisdiction, the Court will not even consider the merits of a case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

5 Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 6 A review of Plaintiff’s complaint reveals a number of jurisdictional defects. In the first 7 place, Plaintiff appears to bring his lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 8 Both of these statutes require state involvement. Regarding § 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court has 9 held that “a conspiracy to violate [constitutional] rights is not made without proof of state 10 involvement.” United Bhd. Of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 832 (1983)(citing 11 Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189, 1193 (7th Cir. 1976)).1 42 U.S.C. 1983 12 only applies to persons acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 13 usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.” 14 Two of the named Defendants (Rocha and White) – in fact, the only persons who have

15 appeared in this matter since it was filed nearly two months ago – are private individuals. 16 Private individuals are exempt from liability under these statutes. 17 The remainder of the Defendants are state actors of some form or other, but all are 18 protected by either absolute or qualified immunity. Three of the Defendants (Parker, Paja, and 19 Drury) are state court judges; one is employed by the Attorney General of Texas. State court 20 judges and prosecutors performing their official duties are entitled to absolute immunity from 21 civil liability. 22 1 42 U.S.C. §1985 exists to enforce equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. “The 23 Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done by individuals.” United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 799 (1966)(emphasis in original). 24 1 The Supreme Court has held that individuals performing certain governmental functions have absolute immunity from liability under § 2 1983. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 751-752, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982). Whether absolute immunity is available to an official 3 does not depend on the official's job title or agency; the focus is on the function that the official was performing when taking the actions that 4 provoked the lawsuit. Bothke v. Fluor Engineers and Constructors, Inc., 713 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1983); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 5 745 F.2d 560, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court has recognized absolute immunity for those performing judicial, legislative, and 6 prosecutorial functions. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 745. Absolute immunity is accorded to these functions so that the decision-making process is not 7 hampered by a fear of lawsuits. Id. 8 Samuel v. Michaud, 980 F.Supp. 1381, 1400 (D. Idaho 1996). 9 The remaining Defendant (Brown) is a law enforcement officer. Police officers 10 performing their official duties are entitled to invoke qualified immunity, which protects law 11 enforcement personnel from liability in the performance of their discretionary functions unless 12 the complaining party can demonstrate that a “clearly established” constitutional right has been 13 violated (Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)), a test which has evolved to a requirement 14 of proving that “every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing 15 violates that right.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 740 (2011); see also Mattos v. Aragano, 16 661 F.3d 433, 442 (9th Cir. 2011). 17 Thus it can be seen that every defendant named by Plaintiff in his complaint is either 18 exempt from liability or entitled to immunity from this kind of lawsuit. In the absence of any 19 properly joined defendants, the Court cannot permit this litigation to proceed. 20 Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to show cause why this matter should not be 21 dismissed. His briefing cannot exceed twelve (12) pages, double-spaced, in length and must be 22 filed no later than September 25, 2020. Defendants need not respond to the briefing unless 23 ordered to do so by the Court. 24 1 Furthermore, until this show cause order is resolved and the matter is either dismissed or 2 permitted to go forward, all discovery and other obligations under FRCP 26 are stayed; in 3 particular, there is no need for the parties to meet and confer until the stay is lifted. 4

5 The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel. 6 Dated September 15, 2020. A 7 8 Marsha J. Pechman United States Senior District Judge 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24