Stoor v. City of Seattle

267 P.2d 902, 44 Wash. 2d 405, 1954 Wash. LEXIS 294
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 12, 1954
Docket32463
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 267 P.2d 902 (Stoor v. City of Seattle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stoor v. City of Seattle, 267 P.2d 902, 44 Wash. 2d 405, 1954 Wash. LEXIS 294 (Wash. 1954).

Opinions

Mallery, J.

— Appellants commenced this action to annul an oral civil service examination from which a list was certified of those eligible for promotion from lieutenant to captain in the Seattle fire department.

. The duties of a captain in the fire department are delineated in exhibit No. 1, p. 3, “Official Bulletin For Fire Promotional Examinations,” as follows:

“Duties: Under general direction of a Battalion Chief, to' direct the activities of a fire company; and to perform related work as required.
“Desired Qualifications: Two years’ experience as a Lieutenant; high school graduation; good knowledge of Fire Department methods and apparatus; familiarity with fire laws, regulations, general and special fire hazards; ability to assume full responsibility for the personnel and equipment of his company; initiative; supervisory ability, including ability to train, instruct and organize.” (Italics ours.)

The civil service commission, believing that the qualities italicized above could not be ascertained by the written examination, found it necessary to give an oral one too.

Appellants are lieutenants in the Seattle fire department. They took the oral examination and received grades that were unsatisfactory to them. No complaint is made as to their grades in the written part of the examination.

The oral examination consisted of a group performance test. One or two problems were given to a group of six or seven applicants, who were allowed a limited time to study the problems and make notes. They then entered the examination room and were seated at a conference table, where they commenced a discussion of the problems in the presence of three examiners, who asked them no questions. The conference lasted forty-two minutes. The examiners graded the applicants on the following qualifications: voice [407]*407and speech, ability to present ideas, comprehension of problems, judgment, emotional stability, self-confidence, diplomacy, co-operation, and over-all estimate of value. The examiners were prominent business people in Seattle and not members of the commission.

Appellants contend that the oral part of the examination violates Art. XVI, § 10, of the charter of the city of Seattle, which provides, in part:

“The Commission shall by its rules provide, that whenever possible vacancies shall be filled by promotion; on the basis of service credit and standing upon written competitive examination, except where tests of manual or professional skill are necessary. The examination questions shall be such as to best determine the practical and technical qualification of the applicants to perform the duties of the position to be filled. ...” (Italics ours.)

Appellants argue that the oral examination was (1) not written, (2) not competitive, and (3) inept.

(1) Appellants contend that, under the purview of the charter provision set out above, an examination for captain of the fire department must be written because that position is not a profession. Appellants contend that leadership, administrative ability, diplomacy, judgment, emotional stability, and the like, are not qualities of professional skills, regardless of whether or not they can be discovered by a written examination, and, hence, the charter does not permit an oral examination to discover them.

We agree that only when it is necessary to discover a professional skill is an oral examination permissible under the charter. We do not agree with appellants’ contention that the vocation of a captain of the fire department is not a profession in the sense in which the word is used in the charter. Appellants, in their brief, have set out definitions of the word “profession” from Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed.). We quote the following part of the definitions:

“ ‘4a. ... a calling in which one professes to have acquired some special knowledge used by way either of instruction [sic], guiding or advising others or of serving them in some art; . . .
[408]*408“ ‘Syn. — Trained; skilled, expert, . . .
“ ‘Ant. — Lay, unprofessional; unskilled; amateur.’ ”

We think that the context in which the words “professional skill” are used in the charter, clearly indicates that it refers to a position, vocation, or employment which requires education, training, experience, ability, and personality characteristics of a specialized nature not possessed by persons generally.

The trial court made the following finding of fact, which we hold is supported by the record:

“ . . . That said test was designed to test the professional skill of plaintiffs and other applicants who took said examination, particularly as to their capacity and ability to assume full responsibility for the personnel and equipment of a fire company, initiative, and supervisory ability including the ability to train, instruct and organize, qualities which cannot readily be determined by written examination. ...”

We hold that a captaincy in the fire department is a profession, and that the charter of the city of Seattle permits an oral examination to discover certain qualifications for it.

(2) Appellants contend that the oral examination was not competitive. They rely upon the rule announced in Fink v, Finegan, 270 N. Y. 356, 1 N. E. (2d) 462, which is as follows:

“A test or examination, to be competitive, must employ an objective standard or measure. Where the standard or measure is wholly subjective to the examiners it differs in effect in no respect from an uncontrolled opinion of the examiners and cannot be termed competitive. . . .
“An examination cannot be classed as competitive unless it conforms to measures or standards which are sufficiently objective to be capable of being challenged and reviewed, when necessary, by other examiners of equal ability and experience.”

Obviously, no oral examination can meet this test of objectivity and opportunity for review. This question of what constitutes a competitive examination is one of first instance in this state.

[409]*409In Almassy v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Comm., 34 Cal. (2d) 387, 210 P. (2d) 503, it is said:

“So pertinent is the following language in the case of State ex rel. King v. Emmons, 128 Ohio 216 [190 N. E. 468, at page 471], where a similar requirement contained in the state constitution with reference to the Ohio civil service law was before the court for interpretation: ‘What, then, is meant by “competitive examination”? In a competitive examination, the candidates match their qualifications each against the others, and the final determination is made by rating and comparison. It is open to all who are eligible. In contrast, a noncompetitive examination is one in which the examining authority selects at pleasure such candidates as he may choose and subjects them to examination as he deems necessary.’ (See Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.), vol. 8, pp.

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Stoor v. City of Seattle
267 P.2d 902 (Washington Supreme Court, 1954)

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Bluebook (online)
267 P.2d 902, 44 Wash. 2d 405, 1954 Wash. LEXIS 294, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stoor-v-city-of-seattle-wash-1954.