24CA1868 Stonig v Midyette 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1868 Jefferson County District Court No. 22CV31081 Honorable Diego G. Hunt, Judge
Christine Stonig,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
J Nold Midyette, Mary Katherine Midyette, and Alexander Midyette,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE LUM Tow and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
Montgomery Little & Soran, P.C., Nathan G. Osborn, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Hutchinson Black and Cook, LLC, Keith M. Edwards, Boulder, Colorado; Grata Law and Policy, Matthew A. Simonsen, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendants- Appellees J Nold Midyette and Mary Katherine Midyette
Dietze and Davis, P.C., Jennifer Walker, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellee Alexander Midyette ¶1 Plaintiff Christine Stonig (Christine) appeals the district court’s
judgment denying her claim for unjust enrichment and her request
for the imposition of a constructive trust against defendants J Nold
Midyette (J Nold), Mary Katherine Midyette (Mary Katherine), and
Alexander Midyette (Alex).1 She also appeals the district court’s
order precluding her from presenting evidence of monetary damages
at trial. We affirm and remand the case for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
I. Background
¶2 Christine and Alex began a relationship in 2008, while Alex
was incarcerated, and they married in 2011 after signing a
premarital agreement. Christine became friendly with Alex’s father,
J Nold, during their visits to the prison facility. In 2009, Christine
informed J Nold that she was in financial trouble and that a
1 Mary Katherine Midyette is married to J Nold. Christine's appeal does not appear to challenge any ruling involving Mary Katherine, but the answer brief was filed jointly on behalf of J Nold, Mary Katherine, and Alex. We use the parties’ first names because multiple parties involved in this suit share the same last name. We mean no disrespect in doing so.
1 foreclosure had been initiated on her home (the property) for failure
to pay the mortgage.
¶3 Shortly thereafter, J Nold began paying Christine’s mortgage
and contributing to her and her children’s living expenses. Between
2009 and 2014, J Nold paid $204,367.50 toward the mortgage. He
also secured Christine employment with one of his business
entities. J Nold expected to be repaid for his contributions related
to the property, but not for other living expenses. He and Christine
executed a promissory note in September 2009 for “up to” $500,000
for his property-related expenditures, including mortgage payments,
property improvements and repairs, homeowner’s insurance, and
property taxes (2009 promissory note). The note was secured by a
deed of trust against the property, dated January 2010 (2010 deed
of trust).
¶4 In 2013 and 2014, Christine unsuccessfully attempted to
refinance the property to alleviate the high mortgage balance. In
December 2014, Christine quitclaimed all of her interest in the
property, valued at $925,000, to J Nold and Alex as tenants in
common (2014 quitclaim deed). At trial, Christine testified that she
took this action with the understanding that J Nold and Alex would
2 secure a better interest rate by refinancing the property’s mortgage
under their names and, upon doing so, would return the property to
her. (The district court found that her testimony was not credible.)
¶5 J Nold testified that Christine asked him to pay off her
mortgage in its entirety. Because he wanted to protect his
investment in the property, he agreed to buy it from Christine by
paying off the $500,947 mortgage balance and executing releases
for the 2009 promissory note and 2010 deed of trust, effectively
forgiving the approximately $900,000 he had advanced to Christine
in mortgage and other property-related payments. J Nold further
testified that, at one time, he orally agreed with Christine to let her
buy back the property in the future at a price equivalent to the
contributions he had made to it.
¶6 After Christine signed the 2014 quitclaim deed, J Nold and
Alex became the new owners and assumed all financial obligations
related to the property. Christine (and Alex) continued to reside at
the property rent-free, while J Nold paid all the expenses and made
improvements.
¶7 In 2021, Christine and Alex filed for divorce. J Nold
subsequently made an offer in which he and Alex would convey
3 their interests in the property back to Christine for a $600,000
promissory note, secured by a deed of trust. Christine didn’t
respond. During the divorce proceedings, Christine and Alex
litigated the validity of their premarital agreement, which, as
relevant here, defined “separate property” as “[p]roperty owned prior
to the marriage of the parties” and “[p]roperty acquired . . . during
the parties’ marriage, if . . . titled in the name of either party
individually.” The dissolution court found that the agreement was
valid and enforceable.
¶8 In 2023, Christine filed the underlying action against J Nold,
Mary Katherine, and Alex, asserting claims for quiet title, unjust
enrichment, fraudulent inducement, and declaratory relief.2 As
relevant here, Christine claimed that she and J Nold had a
confidential relationship; that she quitclaimed the property to
J Nold and Alex, who promised to reconvey it to her; and that their
failure to keep their promise entitled her to a constructive trust as a
remedy for her quiet title and unjust enrichment claims.
2 The district court consolidated Christine’s claims into an earlier
foreclosure action that J Nold had initiated after Christine asserted in the divorce that the property belonged solely to her.
4 ¶9 After a three-day bench trial, the district court made the
following credibility determinations and findings of fact:
• Beginning in 2009, when J Nold began making mortgage
payments on Christine’s behalf, there was a mutual
understanding that Christine was obligated to repay all
amounts advanced towards the property.
• J Nold contributed more than $900,000 to the property.
• Christine’s testimony that J Nold promised to reconvey
the property to her after refinancing the mortgage for a
better rate wasn’t credible.
• At one time, J Nold agreed that Christine could buy the
property back for the contributions he had made to it.
¶ 10 Based on these findings, the district court concluded that
(1) Christine had no legal interest in the property; (2) J Nold and
Alex were the property’s owners; (3) J Nold wasn’t unjustly enriched
because he had contributed more than $900,000 to the property;
(4) Alex’s interest in the property was governed by a valid and
enforceable premarital agreement, so unjust enrichment didn’t
apply; and (5) Christine wasn’t entitled to equitable relief in the
form of a constructive trust.
5 ¶ 11 After trial, the district court denied Christine’s motion to
amend the judgment, in which she reasserted that she had proved
her unjust enrichment claim and was entitled to a constructive
trust. Christine appeals.
II. Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust
¶ 12 Christine contends that the district court erred by concluding
that J Nold and Alex were not unjustly enriched because (1) the
district court applied the wrong law and (2) even if it applied the
right law, its factual finding that they contributed more than
$900,000 to the property is clearly erroneous. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 13 “Unjust enrichment is a quasi-contractual, equitable remedy
designed to undo a benefit conferred on one party at the unfair
expense of another party.” Pulte Home Corp. v. Countryside Cmty.
Ass’n, 2016 CO 64, ¶ 63. To prevail on an unjust enrichment
claim, a party “must prove that (1) the defendant received a benefit
(2) at the plaintiff’s expense (3) under circumstances that would
make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without
commensurate compensation.” Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134,
1141 (Colo. 2008).
6 ¶ 14 A constructive trust is “remedial in nature and [is] not
appropriately pleaded as a separate cause of action.” Indian
Mountain Corp. v. Indian Mountain Metro. Dist., 2016 COA 118M,
¶ 23. “In general, ‘a constructive trust is imposed . . . because the
person holding the title to property . . . would be unjustly enriched
if he were permitted to keep the property.” Mancuso v. United Bank
of Pueblo, 818 P.2d 732, 737 (Colo. 1991) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Trs. ch. 12, topic 1, intro. note (A.L.I. 1959)). Therefore,
for a plaintiff to be entitled to a constructive trust, they must prove
their unjust enrichment (or other equitable) claim.
¶ 15 “[T]he conclusion of the trial court that a party was unjustly
enriched is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lewis, 189 P.3d at
1141. A trial court abuses its discretion when its “ruling is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” Hock v. N.Y. Life Ins.
Co., 876 P.2d 1242, 1251 (Colo. 1994). We review de novo the
court’s application of the governing legal standards. Lawry v. Palm,
192 P.3d 550, 558 (Colo. 2008). However, we review challenges to
the court’s underlying factual findings for clear error, meaning that
we will reverse only if the findings have no support in the record.
Gagne v. Gagne, 2019 COA 42, ¶ 17.
7 B. Analysis
1. The District Court’s Application of the Law
¶ 16 Christine contends that the district court applied the wrong
legal standard in concluding that J Nold and Alex weren’t unjustly
enriched. Relying on Ralston Oil & Gas Co. v. July Corp., 719 P.2d
334, 338 (Colo. App. 1985), she argues that the court should have
concluded that (1) she and J Nold had a confidential relationship;
(2) J Nold promised to reconvey the property to her; (3) J Nold broke
that promise; (4) a broken promise to reconvey property between
two parties in a confidential relationship is an abuse of that
relationship; and (5) abuse of a confidential relationship is all that
is required to find unjust enrichment and impose a constructive
trust. See id. at 338 (“Where there [wa]s an oral agreement to
reconvey property, . . . the refusal to perform the promise to
reconvey is itself an abuse of confidence sufficient to allow the
conveyance to be set aside.”); see also Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792,
798 (Colo. 1979) (noting that a transaction may be set aside for
abuse of a confidential relationship if the plaintiff proves that the
party in possession of the property at issue refused to act in
accordance with the parties’ mutual intent).
8 ¶ 17 However, even if we assume that J Nold and Christine were in
a confidential relationship (and that the court erred by concluding
otherwise) and that J Nold’s broken promise to reconvey property
(abuse of the relationship) are the only requirements to find unjust
enrichment and impose a constructive trust, Christine hasn’t
demonstrated that the court erred.
¶ 18 In support of her argument, Christine cites J Nold’s testimony:
“I bought the property and then on a friendship basis . . . I said,
‘Christine, . . . at any time you can buy back the property for what I
have in it at that time.’” She also points to text messages and
related testimony with similar sentiments. The district court
acknowledged this testimony in its order.
¶ 19 But Christine cites no evidence in the record indicating that
she ever attempted to buy back the property “for what [J Nold] ha[d]
in it at that time” or that J Nold rejected her attempt. In fact, the
record reflects that J Nold offered to sell the property to Christine
during the divorce proceedings for a $600,000 promissory note
(considerably less than what he had spent on it), secured by a deed
of trust. But, as the district court found, Christine never responded
to that offer and instead pursued this litigation. In short, Christine
9 doesn’t point to any evidence that J Nold ever broke his alleged
promise to reconvey the property in exchange for the amount he
had paid toward it. Thus, even under Christine’s proposed legal
standard, the court didn’t abuse its discretion by concluding that
J Nold and Alex weren’t unjustly enriched.
2. J Nold’s Contributions
¶ 20 Christine argues that J Nold and Alex were unjustly enriched
by the 2014 conveyance because their contributions to the property
were less than its $925,000 value.
¶ 21 First, Christine contends that Alex was unjustly enriched
because he contributed nothing to the property. However, the
district court concluded that unjust enrichment didn’t apply to Alex
because his interest was governed by a valid contract (the
premarital agreement). See Pulte Home Corp., ¶ 64 (“A party
generally cannot recover for unjust enrichment . . . where there is
an express contract addressing the subject of the alleged obligation
to pay.”). Because Christine doesn’t challenge that conclusion, we
perceive no basis for reversal.
¶ 22 Next, Christine argues that the finding underpinning the
district court’s rejection of her unjust enrichment claim against
10 J Nold — that he contributed more than $900,000 to the
property — was clearly erroneous. We disagree.
¶ 23 Christine asserts that J Nold contributed, at most,
$705,316.19 to the property in the form of mortgage payments.
However, the record supports the court’s findings that J Nold made
more than $900,000 in contributions to the property overall. The
court found, with record support, that J Nold paid
• at least $204,000 in monthly payments to Christine’s
mortgage lender between October 2009 and December
2014;
• “$500,947.68 to [Christine’s] mortgage lender on or
around December 30, 2014”;
• “$75,000 for [renovations to install a] basement salon”;
• at least $50,000 in property tax “between 2015 and
2024”;
• “$25,000 for homeowner’s insurance between September
2015 and September 2023”; and
• “$75,000 in property improvements and repairs between
2015 and 2021.”
Together, these payments total at least $929,947.68.
11 ¶ 24 We consider, and reject, Christine’s arguments that the court
should have disregarded some of these payments.
¶ 25 First, Christine contends that the nonmortgage contributions
are unsupported because J Nold didn’t provide “documentation” of
them. However, J Nold testified about the expenditures, and the
district court was entitled to rely on his testimony. Gagne, ¶ 17
(noting that we will affirm the trial court’s factual findings if there is
any record support for them); see also People in Interest of C.A.K.,
652 P.2d 603, 613 (Colo. 1982) (“[The] weight of the evidence[] and
the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom are all within
the province of the trial court.”).
¶ 26 Second, Christine contends that the district court shouldn’t
have considered J Nold’s contributions to improvements on the
property absent evidence that the improvements increased the
property’s value. In support of her argument, she relies on Martinez
v. Martinez, 638 P.2d 834, 836 (Colo. App. 1981), and Thomas v.
Thomas, 352 P.2d 279, 280-81 (Colo. 1970). Martinez and Thomas
concern the consideration due to a cotenant who makes
improvements to jointly owned real estate for purposes of partition.
12 Christine doesn’t cite, and we haven’t found, any case extending
that principle to unjust enrichment claims.
¶ 27 Third, Christine argues that the district court’s $900,000
figure is inflated because it “double counted” property taxes and
insurance that were already part of J Nold’s mortgage payments.
However, the district court found, with record support, that J Nold
paid those amounts in 2015 and later — after he had paid off the
mortgage in full.
¶ 28 Fourth, as best we understand her, Christine argues that
(1) much of the $900,000 J Nold contributed was a gift and (2) the
amount she needed to repay J Nold for him to reconvey the property
was unclear. However, we decline to address these arguments
because they weren’t sufficiently developed in her opening brief.
People v. Relaford, 2016 COA 99, ¶ 70 n.2 (“We do not consider bare
or conclusory assertions presented without argument or
development.”); In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31 (“We do
not consider the arguments [raised] for the first time in [the] reply
brief or those that seek to expand upon the contentions [appellant]
raised in her opening brief.”).
13 III. Monetary Damages and Set-Off
¶ 29 Finally, Christine contends that the district court erred when
it precluded her from presenting evidence of her monetary damages
and “set off” as a sanction for her untimely disclosure. We perceive
no basis for reversal.
A. Monetary Damages
¶ 30 In her amended complaint, Christine requested
“commensurate compensation to avoid unjust enrichment” in the
event the district court ruled in favor of J Nold and Alex. She
asserts this statement notified J Nold and Alex of her request for
monetary damages. C.R.C.P. 26(a) requires a party requesting
damages to disclose a “computation of any category of . . . damages
claimed” “within 28 days after the case is at issue.” However,
Christine didn’t make any such disclosure until approximately
three weeks before trial.
¶ 31 In a pretrial conference held on March 27, 2024, the district
court heard arguments pertaining to Christine’s damages
calculation and issued an oral ruling concluding she had violated
her discovery obligations and precluding her from seeking damages
because of her delay. The court entered a minute order (sanctions
14 order) on April 4, 2024, stating, “[T]he [c]ourt finds [a] discovery
violation for [the] reasons stated on the record and precludes
[Christine] [from] pursuing damages on the unjust enrichment
claim.”
¶ 32 “The trial court has broad discretion in managing discovery,
including an ability to issue discovery sanctions.” Warden v.
Exempla, Inc., 2012 CO 74, ¶ 32. A court abuses its discretion in
ordering a discovery sanction when the decision is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Hock, 876 P.2d at 1251.
¶ 33 Christine argues that the district court’s refusal to allow her to
request monetary damages and failure to sufficiently explain its
reasoning in the order constitutes an abuse of discretion. However,
we can’t evaluate her claim because the transcript from the pretrial
conference isn’t part of the record on appeal. Id. at 1252 (the
appellant has the duty to designate all portions of the record
necessary for appeal). The sanctions order indicates that the
district court explained its reasoning orally. And in the absence of
this material portion of the record, we assume that it supports the
district court’s decision to preclude Christine’s damages evidence.
Id. We therefore decline to disturb the court’s ruling.
15 B. C.R.C.P. 105 Set-Off
¶ 34 C.R.C.P. 105(e) provides that a party who makes permanent
improvements to real property in good faith may obtain a set-off for
the value of those improvements in the event the court enters a
judgment in favor of the other party for possession of the property.
In her answer to J Nold’s counterclaim and cross-claim for quiet
title, Christine asserted that she was “entitled to an off-set under
C.R.C.P. 105.”
¶ 35 To the extent the district court’s sanctions order precluded
Christine from pursuing a set-off under C.R.C.P. 105, we must
assume the record supports the court’s decision in the absence of
the transcript of the proceedings. Hock, 876 P.2d at 1252.
Moreover, Christine doesn’t explain how the adverse ruling
prejudiced her — for example, she doesn’t explain what evidence
she would have presented concerning “permanent improvements”
she made to the property or the value of those improvements.
C.R.C.P. 105(e). We therefore perceive no reversible error. See
C.R.C.P. 61 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.”); State ex rel. Weiser v. Ctr. for
16 Excellence in Higher Educ., Inc., 2023 CO 23, ¶ 60 (“An error affects
a substantial right only if ‘it can be said with fair assurance that the
error substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired
the basic fairness of the trial itself.’” (quoting Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d
529, 535 (Colo. 2010))).
IV. Request for Attorney Fees
¶ 36 J Nold, Mary Katherine, and Alex seek reasonable attorney
fees incurred in this appeal under C.A.R. 38, asserting that
Christine’s appeal is frivolous.
¶ 37 An appeal may be frivolous as filed or frivolous as argued. An
appeal is frivolous as filed when “the judgment by the tribunal
below was so plainly correct and the legal authority contrary to [the]
appellant’s position so clear that there is really no appealable
issue.” Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App.
2006) (quoting Dungaree Realty, Inc. v. United States, 30 F.3d 122,
124 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Even if an appeal is not frivolous as filed, the
appellant’s misconduct in arguing the appeal may justify the
conclusion that an appeal is frivolous as argued. Id.
¶ 38 While we don’t do so lightly, we conclude that the monetary
damages portion of the appeal is frivolous as argued.
17 ¶ 39 As discussed above, Christine didn’t include in the record the
hearing transcript for the pretrial conference where the district
court heard arguments and made findings as to the untimely
disclosure of her damages calculation. This was a violation of
C.A.R. 10(d)(3), which requires the appellant to include “transcripts
of all proceedings necessary for considering and deciding the issues
on appeal.”
¶ 40 While the failure to designate the transcript may well have
been inadvertent, the sanctions order made clear that the district
court made additional findings on the record at the pretrial
conference. But instead of attempting to supplement the record
with the transcript, Christine argued that the district court abused
its discretion because (1) “the record is void of any evidence of
misconduct or bad faith” related to the untimely disclosure and
(2) the sanctions order “[did] not contain sufficient analysis as to
why there is no prejudice or why there could not have been a less
severe sanction imposed.” (Emphases added.) And her opening
brief avoids any reference to the notion that the court gave
additional reasoning that wasn’t contained in its order. (In fact, the
opening brief avoids any reference to the pretrial hearing at all).
18 Furthermore, even after the answer brief explicitly called attention
to the missing transcript and the district court’s reference to
“reasons stated on the record,” Christine continued to argue in her
reply brief that the order “contain[ed] insufficient analysis” and that
the record contained no evidence of misconduct or bad faith.
¶ 41 For these reasons, we award J Nold, Mary Katherine, and Alex
their reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with
responding to Christine’s arguments related to the preclusion of
evidence of monetary damages. C.A.R. 38; see also Northstar Project
Mgmt., Inc. v. DLR Grp., Inc., 2013 CO 12, ¶ 18 (Because a party
failed to designate required transcripts, the “appellate court should
consider the full range of possible sanctions.”). We note that this
award does not include fees incurred in responding to arguments
related to the preclusion of C.R.C.P. 105 evidence (to the extent
such fees are distinct from those incurred in responding to the
monetary damages argument) because it’s unclear whether the
sanctions order pertains to C.R.C.P. 105. Finally, although
Christine didn’t prevail on the remainder of her arguments, they are
not so lacking in substance as to be frivolous. In re Estate of
Shimizu, 2016 COA 163, ¶ 34 (stating that appellate attorney fees
19 are “appropriate only in clear and unequivocal cases where no
rational argument is presented and, thus, the appeal is frivolous”).
¶ 42 We exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1 to remand the
case to the district court for a determination of (1) the reasonable
attorney fees incurred on appeal in relation to the monetary
damages argument and (2) whether those fees should be assessed
against Christine, her counsel, or both.
V. Disposition
¶ 43 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.