1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Kelli Nicole Stoner, No. CV-25-03024-PHX-SHD
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 ConstruPlan LLC,
13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Kelli Stoner’s motion to proceed in forma 16 pauperis (“IFP”), (Doc. 3), and her Emergency Request for Injunctive Relief, (Doc. 4). 17 I. Legal Standards 18 A. Ability to Pay 19 “There is no formula set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when 20 someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1235 21 (9th Cir. 2015). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges 22 that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. at 1234 23 (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). 24 B. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
25 Congress provided with respect to in forma pauperis cases that a district court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that 26 the “allegation of poverty is untrue” or that the “action or appeal” is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be 27 granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While much of section 1915 outlines 28 how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, section 1915(e) applies 1 to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“section 1915(e) applies to all 2 in forma pauperis Complaints”). “It is also clear that section 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 3 Complaint that fails to state a claim.” Id. Therefore, this court must dismiss an in forma pauperis Complaint if it fails to state a claim or if it is frivolous 4 or malicious.
5 Kennedy v. Andrews, 2005 WL 3358205, *2 (D. Ariz. 2005). 6 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim 7 upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a 8 claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 9 screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 12(b)(6)”).
11 Hairston v. Juarez, No. 22-CV-01801-BAS-WVG, 2023 WL 2468967, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 12 Mar. 10, 2023). 13 II. In Forma Pauperis Application 14 Here, the Court has reviewed the application to proceed IFP. (Doc. 3). The Court 15 finds Plaintiff cannot pay the filing fee and still afford necessities. Accordingly, the motion 16 will be granted. 17 III. Complaint and Request for Injunction 18 Next, the Court will screen the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s 19 Complaint and request for emergency injunctive relief appears to stem from the sale and 20 impending demolition of a property located at 6721 E. Mockingbird Lane, Paradise Valley, 21 AZ 85253.1 According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, demolition was set to occur on 11:00 a.m. 22 on August 21, 2025, (Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, does not establish this 23 Court’s jurisdiction or her standing to assert a claim, and it also it does not appear to state 24 a claim upon which relief can be granted. 25 The first issue with Plaintiff’s Complaint is the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 26
27 1 Plaintiff lists several addresses in her Complaint. Her stated relief, however, is limited to seeking an order immediately stopping Defendant from ““all construction [and] 28 demo work at 6721 E. Meadowlark Ln,” leading the Court to the assumption that this is the subject property. (Doc. 1 at 5.) 1 Plaintiff appears to reference environmental compliance under Federal Law as a basis for 2 federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege why 3 federal environmental laws would apply to the Defendant in this case, which appears to be 4 a private contractor. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish federal question jurisdiction, 5 and does not even attempt to establish diversity citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 6 Next, Plaintiff fails to explain what interest she has in the subject property, and 7 therefore has failed to establish that she has standing. Plaintiff states that she has remained 8 living in the property for the last six months, (Doc. 1 at 5), but this claim is belied by the 9 fact that it is not the address she used on her filings. 10 Finally, the Complaint is too confusing to state a claim. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 11 F.3d 1172, 1177 (affirming dismissal with prejudice of prolix, argumentative, and 12 redundant amended Complaint that did not comply with Rule 8(a)); Nevijel v. North Coast 13 Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673–74 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming dismissal of amended 14 Complaint that was "equally as verbose, confusing, and conclusory as the initial 15 Complaint"); Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1965) (affirming dismissal 16 without leave to amend second Complaint that was “so verbose, confused and redundant 17 that its true substance, if any, [was] well disguised”). The incomprehensible nature of the 18 Complaint is evidenced by the fact that the Court is guessing as to what property is at issue, 19 Plaintiff’s standing with respect to that property, and Plaintiff’s legal theory for relief. 20 In addition to all of the foregoing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 prohibits the issuance of a 21 preliminary injunction without notice, and Plaintiff’s delay in bringing this action until the 22 eve of the alleged demolition is not a basis to forego the notice requirement. See Martin v. 23 Family Lending Servs., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100453, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2009) (noting that 24 a plaintiff may not create her own emergency to circumvent the notice requirement in 25 seeking a preliminary injunction. 26 IV. Leave to Amend 27 Unless the Court determines that a pleading could not be cured by the allegation of 28 other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before 1 dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 2 banc).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Kelli Nicole Stoner, No. CV-25-03024-PHX-SHD
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 ConstruPlan LLC,
13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Kelli Stoner’s motion to proceed in forma 16 pauperis (“IFP”), (Doc. 3), and her Emergency Request for Injunctive Relief, (Doc. 4). 17 I. Legal Standards 18 A. Ability to Pay 19 “There is no formula set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when 20 someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1235 21 (9th Cir. 2015). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges 22 that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. at 1234 23 (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). 24 B. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
25 Congress provided with respect to in forma pauperis cases that a district court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that 26 the “allegation of poverty is untrue” or that the “action or appeal” is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be 27 granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While much of section 1915 outlines 28 how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, section 1915(e) applies 1 to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“section 1915(e) applies to all 2 in forma pauperis Complaints”). “It is also clear that section 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 3 Complaint that fails to state a claim.” Id. Therefore, this court must dismiss an in forma pauperis Complaint if it fails to state a claim or if it is frivolous 4 or malicious.
5 Kennedy v. Andrews, 2005 WL 3358205, *2 (D. Ariz. 2005). 6 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim 7 upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a 8 claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 9 screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 12(b)(6)”).
11 Hairston v. Juarez, No. 22-CV-01801-BAS-WVG, 2023 WL 2468967, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 12 Mar. 10, 2023). 13 II. In Forma Pauperis Application 14 Here, the Court has reviewed the application to proceed IFP. (Doc. 3). The Court 15 finds Plaintiff cannot pay the filing fee and still afford necessities. Accordingly, the motion 16 will be granted. 17 III. Complaint and Request for Injunction 18 Next, the Court will screen the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s 19 Complaint and request for emergency injunctive relief appears to stem from the sale and 20 impending demolition of a property located at 6721 E. Mockingbird Lane, Paradise Valley, 21 AZ 85253.1 According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, demolition was set to occur on 11:00 a.m. 22 on August 21, 2025, (Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, does not establish this 23 Court’s jurisdiction or her standing to assert a claim, and it also it does not appear to state 24 a claim upon which relief can be granted. 25 The first issue with Plaintiff’s Complaint is the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 26
27 1 Plaintiff lists several addresses in her Complaint. Her stated relief, however, is limited to seeking an order immediately stopping Defendant from ““all construction [and] 28 demo work at 6721 E. Meadowlark Ln,” leading the Court to the assumption that this is the subject property. (Doc. 1 at 5.) 1 Plaintiff appears to reference environmental compliance under Federal Law as a basis for 2 federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege why 3 federal environmental laws would apply to the Defendant in this case, which appears to be 4 a private contractor. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish federal question jurisdiction, 5 and does not even attempt to establish diversity citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 6 Next, Plaintiff fails to explain what interest she has in the subject property, and 7 therefore has failed to establish that she has standing. Plaintiff states that she has remained 8 living in the property for the last six months, (Doc. 1 at 5), but this claim is belied by the 9 fact that it is not the address she used on her filings. 10 Finally, the Complaint is too confusing to state a claim. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 11 F.3d 1172, 1177 (affirming dismissal with prejudice of prolix, argumentative, and 12 redundant amended Complaint that did not comply with Rule 8(a)); Nevijel v. North Coast 13 Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673–74 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming dismissal of amended 14 Complaint that was "equally as verbose, confusing, and conclusory as the initial 15 Complaint"); Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1965) (affirming dismissal 16 without leave to amend second Complaint that was “so verbose, confused and redundant 17 that its true substance, if any, [was] well disguised”). The incomprehensible nature of the 18 Complaint is evidenced by the fact that the Court is guessing as to what property is at issue, 19 Plaintiff’s standing with respect to that property, and Plaintiff’s legal theory for relief. 20 In addition to all of the foregoing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 prohibits the issuance of a 21 preliminary injunction without notice, and Plaintiff’s delay in bringing this action until the 22 eve of the alleged demolition is not a basis to forego the notice requirement. See Martin v. 23 Family Lending Servs., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100453, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2009) (noting that 24 a plaintiff may not create her own emergency to circumvent the notice requirement in 25 seeking a preliminary injunction. 26 IV. Leave to Amend 27 Unless the Court determines that a pleading could not be cured by the allegation of 28 other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before 1 dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 2 banc). The Court finding an amendment would be futile alone justifies not granting leave 3 to amend. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (1995). 4 Here, the Court cannot conclude that amendment would be futile. This conclusion 5 is based, in part, on the possibility that Plaintiff could allege additional facts and, in part, 6 on the Court’s uncertainty as to the basis for Plaintiff’s claims and standing, and the Court’s 7 jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court will give Plaintiff the opportunity to amend. 8 Plaintiff must note that an amended Complaint supersedes the original Complaint. 9 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard 10 Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, after amendment, the Court will 11 treat the original Complaint as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action 12 that was raised in the original Complaint and that was voluntarily dismissed or was 13 dismissed without prejudice is waived if it is not alleged in an amended Complaint. Lacey 14 v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). And any Defendant not 15 renamed in the amended Complaint will remain dismissed from this case. See id. 16 V. Conclusion 17 Based on the foregoing, 18 IT IS ORDERED that the motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3) is granted. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Emergency Request for Injunctive Relief, 20 (Doc. 4), is denied. 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for the 22 reasons stated above. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date of this Order to file a first 23 amended Complaint. 24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff files a first amended Complaint, the 25 Clerk of the Court shall not issue subpoenas until the Court screens the first amended 26 Complaint and orders service consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 27 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that if Plaintiff fails to file a first amended Complaint 28 within 30 days, the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case with || prejudice. Plaintiff is cautioned that if any amended Complaint filed does not establish || federal subject matter jurisdiction, this case will be dismissed without further opportunities 3 || to amend. 4 Dated this 21st day of August, 2025. 5 6 / ,
° H le Sharad H. Desai 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
_5-