Hennessey, J.
The plaintiff had a jury verdict in a tort action for libel. The case is before us on the defendant’s outline bill of exceptions. The facts are as follows.
On November 4,1969, Jeffrey C. Stone, the then twenty year old son of the plaintiff, appeared in District Court charged with being present where narcotic drugs were illegally kept and with illegal possession of narcotics. A tablet alleged to be a “harmful drug” was introduced in evidence. The city marshal, Robert F. Jones, testified that [248]*248the other defendants in the District Court case had indicated to him that the defendant Stone was the owner of the harmful drug.
The plaintiff from 1963 to 1972 served on the New-buryport Redevelopment Authority, owned a catering business, and was food service director for the Newburyport schools.
Anthony Pearson, a reporter for the defendant’s newspaper, The Newburyport Daily News, was in court covering the proceedings. He was a reporter who had been at work only four months and had received only several hours of instruction in the work. He was sitting in the back of the court room because he was unaware that there was a reporter’s table near the witness stand. He had trouble hearing some of the witnesses, including Jones.
Pearson understood Jones’s testimony to be that “Mr. Stone”1 was the owner of the “harmful drug,” and inferred that the title “Mister” was used to distinguish the father, who was in the court room, from the son.
That evening, Pearson wrote his story on the trial, translating the “Mr. Stone” of his notes to “John J. Stone,” which he had discovered the father’s name to be. He submitted it to William Coltin, the editor who ordinarily checked over and edited his copy. Coltin testified that he read it about midnight and was “surprised” at the information about the plaintiff (whom he had known for twenty years and whom he considered an “excellent citizen”), but accepted it as the testimony of a reliable public official under oath. He “may have” been surprised enough to question Pearson but did not see the reporter’s notes on the story; he very rarely went back to check notes. The article, which had been written for inclusion on the fifth, was crowded out and its publication postponed for twenty-four hours. During that time Coltin did not communicate any concern about the story to his superiors.
[249]*249There also was evidence from which the jury could infer that police testimony was produced in the District Court proceeding to show that the substance in question was not a harmful drug or narcotic, and that Pearson’s notes and the news story did not include an account of that testimony.
The article was published on November 6. Shortly after it reached the public the plaintiff called Coltin to complain of its inaccuracy. Coltin discussed the matter with John J. O’Neil, the managing editor, and then checked with Jones and discovered the plaintiff had had nothing to do with the case. O’Neil next consulted the editor and general manager of the paper, and then called the plaintiff and discussed on which page a retraction would be printed. O’Neil offered to get the plaintiffs approval of the retraction before printing it and they met the next morning for that purpose. The plaintiff “said it was fine but the damage had already been done.”
The defendant’s exceptions are addressed to the judge’s denial of its motion for a directed verdict and to alleged errors in the judge’s instructions to the jury. Exceptions to the charge relate particularly to the issue whether the news article was defamatory; to the common law privilege of news media in the Commonwealth to report judicial proceedings, including inherent falsehoods, fairly and accurately; and to the constitutional aspects of the case. The judge ruled that the standards enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), were inapplicable. He charged the jury in substance, that a verdict for the plaintiff was warranted on proof, without more, of publication by the defendant of a falsehood which was defamatory of the plaintiff.
We conclude that there was no error in the refusal to direct a verdict, but there was error in the instructions as to constitutional aspects. Consequently, we sustain the defendant’s exceptions and order a new trial.
1. We turn first to a consideration of the instructions to the jury. The defendant’s preliminary argument, which is apposite to the directed verdict issue as well as to the instructions, is that the article did not charge the plaintiff [250]*250with a crime as it only referred to his ownership of the drug, and the crime, if any, would have been in its sale or giving away. This argument avails the defendant nothing. While an imputation of crime is defamatory per se, Lynch v. Lyons, 303 Mass. 116, 118-119 (1939), the general test for libel is much broader: written words which would tend to hold the plaintiff up to scorn, hatred, ridicule or contempt, in the minds of any considerable and respectable segment in the community. Ingalls v. Hastings & Sons Publishing Co. 304 Mass. 31 (1939). The judge’s charge clearly and properly left these issues to the jury, who were instructed to consider damages only if they found the publication libel-lous, either for imputing crime or otherwise harming the plaintiffs reputation.
2. The defendant excepted to the judge’s failure, in instructing on the issue of the common law privilege for reports of a judicial proceeding, to charge that the accuracy required to claim the privilege is substantial accuracy and does not require correctness in all particulars. Thompson v. Boston Publishing Co. 285 Mass. 344, 348-349 (1934). We find no error. The standard supplied by the trial judge, “fair and accurate report,” was at least as favorable to the defendant as it had any right to expect. We have previously held that accuracy is required “at least in regard to all material matters.” Sweet v. Post Publishing Co. 215 Mass. 450 (1913). Our statement in another mistaken identity case is almost directly applicable here: “A publication which identifies a person who had nothing to do with the proceedings as the one against whom the proceedings were directed can be neither fair nor accurate.” Whitcomb v. Hearst Corp. 329 Mass. 193, 199 (1952). The jury were wholly warranted in concluding that this privilege did not apply.
3. There was error in the judge’s instructions on the constitutional aspects of the case.
We appreciate that we are dealing here with conflicting interests. On the one hand, the tort law of this Commonwealth has long recognized a right of redress to one who suffers injury to his reputation by the publishing of a [251]*251defamatory falsehood. On the other hand, freedom of expression is guaranteed through the Fourteenth Amendment, and ultimately the First Amendment, of the United States Constitution. A balancing of values is necessary.
Where the news media and their representatives are defendants in libel cases, it is established beyond dispute that special consideration for free speech values is required. “[T]o insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.” St. Amant v. Thompson,
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Hennessey, J.
The plaintiff had a jury verdict in a tort action for libel. The case is before us on the defendant’s outline bill of exceptions. The facts are as follows.
On November 4,1969, Jeffrey C. Stone, the then twenty year old son of the plaintiff, appeared in District Court charged with being present where narcotic drugs were illegally kept and with illegal possession of narcotics. A tablet alleged to be a “harmful drug” was introduced in evidence. The city marshal, Robert F. Jones, testified that [248]*248the other defendants in the District Court case had indicated to him that the defendant Stone was the owner of the harmful drug.
The plaintiff from 1963 to 1972 served on the New-buryport Redevelopment Authority, owned a catering business, and was food service director for the Newburyport schools.
Anthony Pearson, a reporter for the defendant’s newspaper, The Newburyport Daily News, was in court covering the proceedings. He was a reporter who had been at work only four months and had received only several hours of instruction in the work. He was sitting in the back of the court room because he was unaware that there was a reporter’s table near the witness stand. He had trouble hearing some of the witnesses, including Jones.
Pearson understood Jones’s testimony to be that “Mr. Stone”1 was the owner of the “harmful drug,” and inferred that the title “Mister” was used to distinguish the father, who was in the court room, from the son.
That evening, Pearson wrote his story on the trial, translating the “Mr. Stone” of his notes to “John J. Stone,” which he had discovered the father’s name to be. He submitted it to William Coltin, the editor who ordinarily checked over and edited his copy. Coltin testified that he read it about midnight and was “surprised” at the information about the plaintiff (whom he had known for twenty years and whom he considered an “excellent citizen”), but accepted it as the testimony of a reliable public official under oath. He “may have” been surprised enough to question Pearson but did not see the reporter’s notes on the story; he very rarely went back to check notes. The article, which had been written for inclusion on the fifth, was crowded out and its publication postponed for twenty-four hours. During that time Coltin did not communicate any concern about the story to his superiors.
[249]*249There also was evidence from which the jury could infer that police testimony was produced in the District Court proceeding to show that the substance in question was not a harmful drug or narcotic, and that Pearson’s notes and the news story did not include an account of that testimony.
The article was published on November 6. Shortly after it reached the public the plaintiff called Coltin to complain of its inaccuracy. Coltin discussed the matter with John J. O’Neil, the managing editor, and then checked with Jones and discovered the plaintiff had had nothing to do with the case. O’Neil next consulted the editor and general manager of the paper, and then called the plaintiff and discussed on which page a retraction would be printed. O’Neil offered to get the plaintiffs approval of the retraction before printing it and they met the next morning for that purpose. The plaintiff “said it was fine but the damage had already been done.”
The defendant’s exceptions are addressed to the judge’s denial of its motion for a directed verdict and to alleged errors in the judge’s instructions to the jury. Exceptions to the charge relate particularly to the issue whether the news article was defamatory; to the common law privilege of news media in the Commonwealth to report judicial proceedings, including inherent falsehoods, fairly and accurately; and to the constitutional aspects of the case. The judge ruled that the standards enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), were inapplicable. He charged the jury in substance, that a verdict for the plaintiff was warranted on proof, without more, of publication by the defendant of a falsehood which was defamatory of the plaintiff.
We conclude that there was no error in the refusal to direct a verdict, but there was error in the instructions as to constitutional aspects. Consequently, we sustain the defendant’s exceptions and order a new trial.
1. We turn first to a consideration of the instructions to the jury. The defendant’s preliminary argument, which is apposite to the directed verdict issue as well as to the instructions, is that the article did not charge the plaintiff [250]*250with a crime as it only referred to his ownership of the drug, and the crime, if any, would have been in its sale or giving away. This argument avails the defendant nothing. While an imputation of crime is defamatory per se, Lynch v. Lyons, 303 Mass. 116, 118-119 (1939), the general test for libel is much broader: written words which would tend to hold the plaintiff up to scorn, hatred, ridicule or contempt, in the minds of any considerable and respectable segment in the community. Ingalls v. Hastings & Sons Publishing Co. 304 Mass. 31 (1939). The judge’s charge clearly and properly left these issues to the jury, who were instructed to consider damages only if they found the publication libel-lous, either for imputing crime or otherwise harming the plaintiffs reputation.
2. The defendant excepted to the judge’s failure, in instructing on the issue of the common law privilege for reports of a judicial proceeding, to charge that the accuracy required to claim the privilege is substantial accuracy and does not require correctness in all particulars. Thompson v. Boston Publishing Co. 285 Mass. 344, 348-349 (1934). We find no error. The standard supplied by the trial judge, “fair and accurate report,” was at least as favorable to the defendant as it had any right to expect. We have previously held that accuracy is required “at least in regard to all material matters.” Sweet v. Post Publishing Co. 215 Mass. 450 (1913). Our statement in another mistaken identity case is almost directly applicable here: “A publication which identifies a person who had nothing to do with the proceedings as the one against whom the proceedings were directed can be neither fair nor accurate.” Whitcomb v. Hearst Corp. 329 Mass. 193, 199 (1952). The jury were wholly warranted in concluding that this privilege did not apply.
3. There was error in the judge’s instructions on the constitutional aspects of the case.
We appreciate that we are dealing here with conflicting interests. On the one hand, the tort law of this Commonwealth has long recognized a right of redress to one who suffers injury to his reputation by the publishing of a [251]*251defamatory falsehood. On the other hand, freedom of expression is guaranteed through the Fourteenth Amendment, and ultimately the First Amendment, of the United States Constitution. A balancing of values is necessary.
Where the news media and their representatives are defendants in libel cases, it is established beyond dispute that special consideration for free speech values is required. “[T]o insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 732 (1968). The suggestion has been made that the Constitution provides absolute protection for the press, even for knowing publication of falsehoods, but this suggestion has been rejected.2 As a result, the issue has become, in what circumstances the news media will forfeit the First Amendment protection: whether for publication of falsehoods without fault, or for negligent, reckless or intentional publication.
A limitation on the power of State courts to award damages in libel actions has clearly been established by the United States Supreme Court. Public officials cannot recover damages against critics of their official conduct without proof of actual malice in the publishing. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 283 (1964).
Subsequent to the New York Times Co. case, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, decided that the actual malice standard applied not only to criticism of the official conduct of a public officer but also to the reporting of an event of public or general concern. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 U. S. 29, 44 (1971). Thereafter, we set the standard in this Commonwealth for invoking the First Amendment privilege for libellous material printed without actual malice by holding that the relevant issue is not [252]*252the particular plaintiff involved, but rather the events which were the subject of the publication. Priestley v. Hastings & Sons Publishing Co. of Lynn, 360 Mass. 118, 122-123 (1971). See Twohig v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. 362 Mass. 807, 808-809 (1973).
The judge here ruled that United States Supreme Court cases limiting the constitutionally permissible reach of the law of defamation in cases involving communications media were inapplicable to the facts of this case. He charged the jury accordingly. This was error. Clearly, the judicial proceeding which was reported was an event of public or general concern.3 Not- only was it a trial of criminal complaints but the alleged crimes involved the presence of narcotic drugs in the community. The fact that the plaintiff was in no way a participant in this event was irrelevant. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 471 F. 2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), cert, granted 410 U. S. 925 (1973). Therefore proof of actual malice was required.
4. We turn now to a consideration of the meaning of “actual malice,” and the question, as raised by the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, whether there was evidence of actual malice for the jury’s consideration in this case.
Mr. Justice Harlan’s plurality opinion in the earlier case of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130,155 (1967), had allowed recovery, at least for a “public figure” who was not a public official, on a showing of “highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.” This language implies an objective test and a requirement of something less than recklessness. This requirement fell short of actual malice [253]*253and was never adopted by a majority of the court, however. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 471 F. 2d 801, 806, fn. 11 (7th Cir. 1972). In any event, at least, the rule of the Curtis Publishing Co. case has no applicability in a case concerned with reporting on the official conduct of a public officer (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 [1964]), or on a matter of public interest. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 U. S. 29 (1971).
Actual malice is proved, not necessarily in terms of ill will or hatred, but by showing that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 279-280 (1964). “[Defeasance of the privilege is conditioned, not on mere negligence, but on reckless disregard for the truth.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 79 (1964).
“ ‘Reckless disregard,’ it is true, cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition____[H]owever... [t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 730-731 (1968). The test is thus entirely a subjective one. That information was available which would cause a reasonably prudent man to entertain serious doubts is not sufficient. To negate the privilege the jury must find that such doubts were in fact entertained by the defendant, or by the defendant’s servant or agent acting within the scope of his employment. They may, of course, reach this conclusion on the basis of objective evidence; it would perhaps be rare for a defendant in such a circumstance to admit to having had serious, unresolved doubts. But the conclusion must be reached in order to hold the defendant liable.
As the constitutionally mandated standard of recklessness in this civil context thus requires actual malice,4 it is [254]*254conceptually narrower than the Massachusetts common law concept of recklessness sufficient to impose criminal liability, e.g., in a homicide case. In the criminal law we have held that an objective standard of recklessness and thus proof of implied malice will suffice, and said of a defendant that though “ ‘. . . in fact he did not realize the grave danger, he cannot escape the imputation of wanton or reckless conduct in his dangerous act or omission, if an ordinary normal man under the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger. . . .’ ” Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 398-399 (1944). Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165 (1884). Cf. Am. Law Inst., Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft (May4, 1962) § 2.02 (2) (c).
Subsequent decisions, both in this court and in the United States Supreme Court, adopt and apply the formulation in the St. Amant case. Twohig v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. 362 Mass. 807 (1973). Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U. S. 279 (1971). The test for forfeiture of the privilege is uniform and, like that for its application, is unrelated to whether the plaintiff is a “ ‘public official,’ ‘public figure,’ or ‘little man.’ ” Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 U. S. 29, 52, fn. 18 (1971).
5. In reviewing the denial of the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict we consider the evidence in the light of this concept of actual malice. Thus we are faced with the issue whether the evidence adduced at trial constituted sufficient proof of the requisite state of mind for recklessness so as to warrant the jury in returning a verdict for the plaintiff. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra, at 52 (1971). Despite evidence of what the jury could find to be gross carelessness on the part of Pearson, we do not believe that the evidence warranted a conclusion of recklessness on his part. Of course, we have no way of knowing what the evidence at a new trial may show as to his state of mind. '
In any event, we hold that there was sufficient evidénce to warrant a conclusion that the defendant’s news editor, Coltin, allowed the story in question to be printed despite serious doubts as to its accuracy with respect to ,jt„hp [255]*255plaintiff. Coltin admitted he was “surprised” by the report of the plaintiffs involvement. He denied that this term was an understatement and stated that he accepted the reported testimony of the city marshal. Nevertheless, combining this admission with his testimony that he considered the plaintiff, whom he knew well, to be an “excellent citizen,” and the fact that the article was written by an inexperienced reporter, of whose minimal training Coltin was fully aware, a jury might draw the inference that the news editor had in fact entertained doubts as to the story’s accuracy. The detailed evidence of Coltin’s knowledge of the plaintiffs reputation and character, all of which evidence could be found to be inconsistent with the nature of the crime charged, might well support such a finding.
Assuming a jury so found, the amount of time necessary and available for checking the accuracy of the story might be considered relevant to determine whether pushing aside or disregarding those doubts rose to the level of recklessness. In this regard, there was evidence of a delay of a full day in the publication of the story. Cf. Priestley v. Hastings & Sons Publishing Co. of Lynn, 360 Mass. 118, 123-125 (1971), and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 159 (1967). All told, there was sufficient evidence to warrant consideration by the jury. Therefore, it is appropriate for us to order a new trial of the case, rather than order that judgment should enter for the defendant.
6. The Rosenbloom opinion, at p. 52, speaks of the necessity for “clear and convincing proof’ in such a case, and the New York Times Co. opinion, at pp. 285-286, calls for “convincing clarity” of proof. We think it advisable to comment that, in our view, these expressions are not intended to vary the usual measure of the plaintiffs burden of proof. Proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence is still the requirement. The “convincing clarity” and “clear and convincing” concepts are not a necessary or appropriate part of the instructions to the jury in a case such as the instant one. It seems evident that these phrases were used by the Supreme Court with reference to the necessity for proof of at least recklessness, and not mere negligence, [256]*256in publication. As such they relate only to the judge’s consideration of the issues raised by a motion for a directed verdict.
7. Since we have determined to order a new trial, it is appropriate that we should address ourselves to the suggestion that excessive and unbridled jury verdicts can, themselves, infringe First Amendment values by promoting apprehensive self-censorship in the news media. See the dissenting opinions of Justices Harlan and Marshall in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 U. S. 29 (1971). While the majority of the Supreme Court have not as yet articulated any constitutional limit on.libel damage judgments, the seriousness of the problem behooves us to examine closely the permissible limits under our own State law.
In a case of defamation the plaintiffs recovery is limited to actual damages, which are compensatory for the wrong done by the defendant. Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co. 198 Mass. 538 (1908). Where specific harm is alleged to have resulted from the tort, it may be pleaded and damages recovered. Muchnick v. Post Publishing Co. 332 Mass. 304 (1955). Cf. Lewis v. Vallis, 356 Mass. 662 (1970). Otherwise the plaintiff is limited to general damages, which include mental suffering, Chesley v. Tompson, 137 Mass. 136, 137 (1884); Pion v. Caron, 237 Mass. 107, 111 (1921), and harm to reputation. Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co., supra. Punitive damages are never allowed, Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co., supra, even after proof of actual malice. G. L. c. 231, § 93, as appearing in St. 1943, c. 360. The defendant may introduce evidence of a retraction in mitigation of damages, G. L. c. 231, § 94, as amended by St. 1943, c. 361, but the degree of mitigation, if any, is for the jury. Whitcomb v. Hearst Corp. 329 Mass. 193 (1952).
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent in the Rosenbloom case, 403 U. S. at 62 (1971), refers to the threat that excessive libel damage judgments pose to First Amendment values and suggests “that it is impermissible, given the substantial constitutional values involved, to fail to confine the amount of jury verdicts in such cases within any [257]*257ascertainable limits” (at 64). Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting at p. 170). The problem is certainly less severe in this Commonwealth, as punitive damages may not be assessed, but it is by no means absent. Chief Justice Shaw, in Treanor v. Donahoe, 9 Cush. 228 (1852), stated, “These are damages not measurable by any standard, but capable, in many instances, of producing the severest suffering, yet, in others, cause little or no actual injury” (at 230). The indefiniteness of the degree of the harm caused by a libel increases the risk that damages which in theory are only compensatory will in practice be awarded by outraged jurors to punish the defendant.
Such a practice would upset the delicate balance between the conflicting interests protected by the common law of libel and constitutional cases such as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964). To prevent this occurrence both trial and appellate judges must be vigilant in charging juries and reviewing verdicts to see that damages are no more than compensatory. Thus, while Chief Justice Shaw’s solution to the difficulty of measuring libel damages, that “the court will be slow to pronounce a verdict excessive,” Treanor v. Donahoe, supra, at 231, remains valid for purely private libel cases, it has far more limited applicability where freedom of the press is at stake. Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 138 (1967); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 U. S. 29, 40 (1971).
8. The defendant’s exceptions are sustained and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial on all issues.
So ordered.