PER CURIAM:
The facts in this case disclose that lele Victoria Stinson died on January 2, 1952, leaving as her sole heirs her husband, L. E. Stinson, and her daughter, Eugenia Sherman. Her Oklahoma estate consisted of real and personal property of the appraised value of $22,897.95, and a community property estate of approximately $57,000.00. Her community property estate having been accumulated under the Community Property Act of 1945 (Title 32, Secs. 1 through 18, S.L.1945, p. 118 — Repealed by Title 32, S.L. 1949, p. 229), was recognized by this court in Page v. Sherman, Okl., 341 P.2d 270.
By the terms of her will lele Victoria Stinson gave her entire estate to her daughter, Eugenia Sherman, stating in her will that her husband was well fixed financially and that her disposition of her estate had his full knowledge and approval. It is not contended that this statement in the will has any legal significance.
The record further discloses that L. E. Stinson, surviving husband of lele Stinson, died on February 7, 1952 (approximately 35 days following the death of his wife). His deceased wife’s will had not been offered for probate at the time of his death and he had made no election as to how he would take.
The County Court concluded that L. E. Stinson was a forced heir and that one-half of lele Victoria Stinson’s estate (which included her real, personal, and community property estate) should be distributed to the estate of L. E. Stinson, deceased, under the law of Descent and Distribution, 84 O.S. 1961, § 213, and that the other one-half of her estate should be distributed to her daughter, Eugenia Sherman. On appeal the District Court determined that L. E. Stin-son had not elected whether to take by succession or under the will of lele Victoria Stinson and that he was a forced heir to all the non-community assets of her estate, but was not a forced heir to the community property assets of her estate. It is from this judgment that J. Ray Stinson and Carl F. Stinson, Administrators of the Estate of L. E. Stinson, deceased, have appealed.
While the non-community assets of Mrs. Stinson are not involved in this appeal [174]*174the Stinsons (appellants) take the position that a spouse may not legally bequeath or devise away from the other so much of his or her estate that the survivor would receive less in value than the survivor would receive through succession by law, citing 84 O.S.1961, § 44; and that this statutory rule applies to “community property assets.” The effect of their argument is that since L. E. Stinson did not elect to take under the will Sec. 44, supra, is controlling, and the trial courts had no alternative but to follow the law of succession. We agree.
84 O.S.1961, § 44, supra, provides in pertinent part as follows:
“Every estate in property may be disposed of by will; * * * but no spouse shall bequeath or devise away from the other so much of the estate of the testator that the other spouse would receive less in value than would be obtained through succession by law; provided, however, that of the property not acquired by joint industry during coverture the testator be not required to devise or bequeath more than one-half thereof in value to the surviving spouse; * *
Unlike some of our former decisions the surviving spouse, L. E. Stinson, died before the will of his deceased wife had been offered for probate, and it is not contended that his conduct after his wife’s death manifested any desire to take under the will or any desire to take under the law of succession. Unlike so many other states we find no statutory law in Oklahoma pertaining to any “right or requirement of election” on the part of the surviving spouse. Under the facts in the present case no election of any kind had been made by the surviving spouse, and the question of waiver to take under the will or the statute is not presented or herein involved.
Under the facts in this case we are of the view that we must look to the provisions of 84 O.S.1961, § 44, to find the answer to our present problem. Therein it is provided that “no spouse shall bequeath or devise away from the other so much of the estate of the testator that the other spouse would receive less in value that would be obtained through succession by law.” By her will Mrs. Stinson attempted to do something the statute says she shall not do. The statute imposes a limitation upon her power to dispose of her property by will, and it seems to us that she has transgressed the limits of her statutory will making power by attempting to give her surviving spouse less than he would receive under succession. Since she “shall” not do this under the statute we must conclude that she has not done so, and therefore under the law her surviving husband (now deceased) must receive from her estate not less than he would receive through succession by law.
The next question is whether L. E. Stin-son, deceased, was a forced heir to the “community property assets” of lele Victoria Stinson, deceased.
The appellee herein, Eugenia Sherman, submits the proposition that the “forced heir” statute and the Community Property law both strive toward the same goal, and that if both are applied in this case the purpose of each would be defeated. In support of this statement our attention is invited to Principles of Community Property by de Funiak and to Community Property Laws in California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington.
Our Community Property Act, Ii.B.No. 218, Title 32 S.L.194S, Sec. 3, p. 118, provided in part:
“Sec. 3. All property acquired by either the husband or wife during marriage and after the effective date of this Act, except that which is the separate property of either as hereinabove defined, shall be deemed the community or common property of the husband and wife, and each shall be vested with an undivided one-half interest therein; * * (Emphasis supplied)
In Sec. 15 thereof it is provided in part:
“Sec. 15. Upon the death of the husband or the wife, the surviving spouse shall administer all community property in the same manner and with the [175]*175same duties, privileges and authority as are vested in a surviving partner to administer and settle the affairs of a partnership upon the death of the other partner * * *; and provided further, that when all debts of the community shall have been fully satisfied the survivor shall transfer and convey to the administrator or executor of the deceased one-half of the community property remaining to be administered and distributed as other property of the estate either subject to the terms of the will of the deceased or under the lazvs of descent and distribution as the case may be *. * (Emphasis ours)
We are of the view that the community property law in Oklahoma was not a law of inheritance but a law of property, and that the district court erred in holding that L. E. Stinson was not a forced heir to the community property assets of lele Victoria Stinson, deceased. Under Sec. 15> supra, the executor of the estate of Mrs. Stinson is directed by statute to distribute Mrs. Stinson’s share of the community property as other property of her estate.
The appellants herein, the administrators of the Estate of L. E.
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PER CURIAM:
The facts in this case disclose that lele Victoria Stinson died on January 2, 1952, leaving as her sole heirs her husband, L. E. Stinson, and her daughter, Eugenia Sherman. Her Oklahoma estate consisted of real and personal property of the appraised value of $22,897.95, and a community property estate of approximately $57,000.00. Her community property estate having been accumulated under the Community Property Act of 1945 (Title 32, Secs. 1 through 18, S.L.1945, p. 118 — Repealed by Title 32, S.L. 1949, p. 229), was recognized by this court in Page v. Sherman, Okl., 341 P.2d 270.
By the terms of her will lele Victoria Stinson gave her entire estate to her daughter, Eugenia Sherman, stating in her will that her husband was well fixed financially and that her disposition of her estate had his full knowledge and approval. It is not contended that this statement in the will has any legal significance.
The record further discloses that L. E. Stinson, surviving husband of lele Stinson, died on February 7, 1952 (approximately 35 days following the death of his wife). His deceased wife’s will had not been offered for probate at the time of his death and he had made no election as to how he would take.
The County Court concluded that L. E. Stinson was a forced heir and that one-half of lele Victoria Stinson’s estate (which included her real, personal, and community property estate) should be distributed to the estate of L. E. Stinson, deceased, under the law of Descent and Distribution, 84 O.S. 1961, § 213, and that the other one-half of her estate should be distributed to her daughter, Eugenia Sherman. On appeal the District Court determined that L. E. Stin-son had not elected whether to take by succession or under the will of lele Victoria Stinson and that he was a forced heir to all the non-community assets of her estate, but was not a forced heir to the community property assets of her estate. It is from this judgment that J. Ray Stinson and Carl F. Stinson, Administrators of the Estate of L. E. Stinson, deceased, have appealed.
While the non-community assets of Mrs. Stinson are not involved in this appeal [174]*174the Stinsons (appellants) take the position that a spouse may not legally bequeath or devise away from the other so much of his or her estate that the survivor would receive less in value than the survivor would receive through succession by law, citing 84 O.S.1961, § 44; and that this statutory rule applies to “community property assets.” The effect of their argument is that since L. E. Stinson did not elect to take under the will Sec. 44, supra, is controlling, and the trial courts had no alternative but to follow the law of succession. We agree.
84 O.S.1961, § 44, supra, provides in pertinent part as follows:
“Every estate in property may be disposed of by will; * * * but no spouse shall bequeath or devise away from the other so much of the estate of the testator that the other spouse would receive less in value than would be obtained through succession by law; provided, however, that of the property not acquired by joint industry during coverture the testator be not required to devise or bequeath more than one-half thereof in value to the surviving spouse; * *
Unlike some of our former decisions the surviving spouse, L. E. Stinson, died before the will of his deceased wife had been offered for probate, and it is not contended that his conduct after his wife’s death manifested any desire to take under the will or any desire to take under the law of succession. Unlike so many other states we find no statutory law in Oklahoma pertaining to any “right or requirement of election” on the part of the surviving spouse. Under the facts in the present case no election of any kind had been made by the surviving spouse, and the question of waiver to take under the will or the statute is not presented or herein involved.
Under the facts in this case we are of the view that we must look to the provisions of 84 O.S.1961, § 44, to find the answer to our present problem. Therein it is provided that “no spouse shall bequeath or devise away from the other so much of the estate of the testator that the other spouse would receive less in value that would be obtained through succession by law.” By her will Mrs. Stinson attempted to do something the statute says she shall not do. The statute imposes a limitation upon her power to dispose of her property by will, and it seems to us that she has transgressed the limits of her statutory will making power by attempting to give her surviving spouse less than he would receive under succession. Since she “shall” not do this under the statute we must conclude that she has not done so, and therefore under the law her surviving husband (now deceased) must receive from her estate not less than he would receive through succession by law.
The next question is whether L. E. Stin-son, deceased, was a forced heir to the “community property assets” of lele Victoria Stinson, deceased.
The appellee herein, Eugenia Sherman, submits the proposition that the “forced heir” statute and the Community Property law both strive toward the same goal, and that if both are applied in this case the purpose of each would be defeated. In support of this statement our attention is invited to Principles of Community Property by de Funiak and to Community Property Laws in California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington.
Our Community Property Act, Ii.B.No. 218, Title 32 S.L.194S, Sec. 3, p. 118, provided in part:
“Sec. 3. All property acquired by either the husband or wife during marriage and after the effective date of this Act, except that which is the separate property of either as hereinabove defined, shall be deemed the community or common property of the husband and wife, and each shall be vested with an undivided one-half interest therein; * * (Emphasis supplied)
In Sec. 15 thereof it is provided in part:
“Sec. 15. Upon the death of the husband or the wife, the surviving spouse shall administer all community property in the same manner and with the [175]*175same duties, privileges and authority as are vested in a surviving partner to administer and settle the affairs of a partnership upon the death of the other partner * * *; and provided further, that when all debts of the community shall have been fully satisfied the survivor shall transfer and convey to the administrator or executor of the deceased one-half of the community property remaining to be administered and distributed as other property of the estate either subject to the terms of the will of the deceased or under the lazvs of descent and distribution as the case may be *. * (Emphasis ours)
We are of the view that the community property law in Oklahoma was not a law of inheritance but a law of property, and that the district court erred in holding that L. E. Stinson was not a forced heir to the community property assets of lele Victoria Stinson, deceased. Under Sec. 15> supra, the executor of the estate of Mrs. Stinson is directed by statute to distribute Mrs. Stinson’s share of the community property as other property of her estate.
The appellants herein, the administrators of the Estate of L. E. Stinson, deceased, make the contention that their opponent’s appeal (to the district court) should have been dismissed by the district court because the same was not taken by a party aggrieved by the county court’s order; that it was an appeal by the executrix rather than the devisee under the will, and that their motion to dismiss filed in district court was erroneously overruled. The motion to dismiss was based largely upon questions of fact to be determined from the record. We have carefully examined the record and appellate procedure as presented to the district court and are unable to conclude that the district court erred in refusing to dismiss the appeal.
In appellants’ proposition three (3) it is stated:
“The court erred in deducting all of the funeral expenses and expenses of last illness from the Oklahoma estate and in not pro-rating said expenses between the Oklahoma and Texas estates; and in allowing the executrix (of Mrs. Stinson’s estate) $794.00 travel expenses in addition to her regular fees.”
Appellants have failed to argue the alleged errors set forth in their proposition three (3) and under the rule of this court assignments of error on appeal will be treated as waived by this court where plaintiffs in error fail to argue or cite authorities supporting same in their briefs. Harrington v. City of Tulsa, 170 Okl. 20, 39 P. 2d 120, and Railway Express Agency v. Stephens, 183 Old. 615, 83 P.2d 858.
The judgment of the district court in holding that L. E. Stinson, deceased, was not a forced heir to the “community property” portion of lele Victoria Stinson’s estate is reversed with instructions to direct the county court to distribute one-half of lele Victoria Stinson’s “community property estate” to Eugenia Sherman and one-half to the estate of L. E. Stinson, deceased. The judgment of the district court is otherwise affirmed.
Appellants herein have filed with the Clerk of this court a verified statement showing that they have spent $238.00 for case-made and $25.00 for filing their appeal in this court and pray judgment for these costs. When a judgment or final order is reversed in part and affirmed in part costs shall be equally divided between the parties. It is so ordered. 12 O.S.1961, § 978; Owens v. Clark, 177 Okl. 519, 61 P.2d 201, 204; and rule 32 of this court, 12 O.S.A. c. 15 Appendix.
JACKSON, V. C. J., and DAVISON, BLACKBIRD, IRWIN and BERRY, JJ., concur.
HALLEY, C. J., concurs in part and dissents in part.