OPINION
RYAN, Bankruptcy Judge.
After Charles E. Stinson (“Debtor”) filed a chapter 132 petition, Bi-Rite Restaurant Supply, Inc. (“Bi-Rite”) obtained a state judgment in excess of $21,000 (the “State Judgment”) against Debtor. After Debtor’s case was dismissed, he filed another chapter 13 petition. Debtor then filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) against Bi-Rite and its counsel, Cook, Perkiss & Lew (“CPL”),3 for violating the automatic stay in obtaining the State Judgment.
After trial, the bankruptcy court entered a judgment (the “Judgment”) against Bi-Rite for emotional distress damages and attorney’s fees. Debtor timely appealed, and Bi-Rite timely cross-appealed.
We AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part and REMAND.
I. FACTS
In February 1993, Debtor filed his first chapter 11 petition. In April 1993, Sonoma Valley Pizza (“SVP”), a California corporation owned by Debtor’s father, applied for and obtained credit from Bi-Rite. In April 1994, after SVP failed to pay Bi-Rite, it commenced a collection action in state court. In order to resolve the litigation, SVP entered into an agreement (the “Agreement”) with Bi-Rite, stipulating to a judgment of $26,365.85 (the “SVP Judgment”). Pursuant to the Agreement, Debtor guaranteed (the “Guarantee”) the SVP Judgment on May 27, 1994. Shortly before the Agreement, Debtor’s case was converted to chapter 7, and he received a discharge in September 1994.4
In 1995, after Debtor failed to make payments under the Guarantee, Bi-Rite filed a complaint against Debtor in state court (the “State Action”).
In April 1996, Debtor filed a chapter 13 petition. Debtor listed the Bi-Rite obligation in his bankruptcy schedules. In July 1996, Debtor’s case was dismissed.
Thereafter, Bi-Rite obtained a November 21, 1996 trial date in the State Action. However, on August 14, 1996, Debtor filed another chapter 13 petition. Again, Debt- or listed the Bi-Rite obligation in his bankruptcy schedule. Bi-Rite filed a proof of claim for $23,000.
[113]*113Debtor failed to attend two scheduled § 341(a) meetings in the third bankruptcy-case, and the chapter 13 trustee’s minutes of the last § 341(a) meeting indicate “case dismissed.” This fact was reported by Debtor’s counsel to Bi-Rite’s counsel, CPL. The court did not, however, dismiss (the “Dismissal”) the case until December 4,1996.
In the interval between the § 341(a) meeting and when the court actually dismissed the case, the State Action proceeded to trial. Debtor did not appear, and Bi-Rite obtained the State Judgment. An abstract of judgment was promptly recorded. The automatic stay, however, had not been lifted to permit either the trial to be held or the State Judgment to be entered and recorded.
Notice of the Dismissal was sent to CPL on behalf of Bi-Rite. CPL did not seek to have the automatic stay retroactively annulled or the State Judgment re-entered.
Nearly one year later, in late 1997, Debtor’s counsel sent CPL a letter pointing out that the State Judgment had been entered in violation of the automatic stay. CPL even then did not act to correct the situation.
In July 1999, Bi-Rite sought to enforce its State Judgment by selling Debtor’s home and posting a foreclosure notice at Debtor’s house.
In August 1999, Debtor filed the Complaint: (1) seeking to enjoin Bi-Rite from enforcing the State Judgment; (2) seeking damages for Bi-Rite’s violation of the discharge injunction; (3) alleging that Bi-Rite obtained the State Judgment in violation of the automatic stay; (4) alleging that CPL’s enforcement efforts constituted deceptive and unfair practices under federal and state laws; (5) claiming an invasion of privacy right against CPL; and (6) asserting severe emotional distress. Debtor requested compensatory and punitive damages and attorney’s fees.
CPL answered denying all allegations,5 except it admitted that it knew of Debtor’s chapter 13 bankruptcy at the time of the continued § 341(a) meeting in November 1996. CPL asserted that Debtor’s nonappearance at the § 341(a) meeting was a voluntarily abandonment of his bankruptcy case. CPL also stated that it was advised by Debtor’s counsel that the case was dismissed. According to CPL, Debtor’s counsel said that it could go forward with the trial in the State Action and that Debtor would not attend the trial because there was no defense. Therefore, CPL argued that it did not willfully violate the automatic stay. CPL also prayed for attorney’s fees.
CPL and Bi-Rite further argued that the automatic stay terminated on November 19,1996, when the chapter 13 trustee’s minutes noting “case dismissed” were docketed. In addition, they requested annulment of the automatic stay.
After trial,6 the bankruptcy court held that Bi-Rite had willfully violated the automatic stay because: (1) it failed to confirm that Debtor’s chapter 13 ease was dismissed before proceeding to trial in the State Action; (2) it recorded abstracts of judgment; and (3) it attached liens to Debtor’s home after receiving notice of the stay violation.
[114]*114Acting under § 362(h), the court awarded Debtor $26,065.37 in attorney’s fees and costs and $13,000 for emotional distress. It denied punitive damages because Bi-Rite’s conduct was insufficiently egregious. It also denied Bi-Rite’s request to annul the automatic stay as “without legal merit.”
The court rejected Debtor’s initial fee and cost application for $130,326.86 as insufficiently detailed and encompassing services unrelated to § 362(h). It directed Debtor’s counsel to revise the fee application, warning counsel that failure to comply with the court’s order to amend its request by providing more detail and eliminating noncompensable services could result in a pro rata award reflecting the ratio of the claims upon which Debtor prevailed to the total claims, multiplied by the number of hours spent.
When Debtor’s counsel did not adequately comply, the court, citing Coxson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Co. (In re Coxson), 43 F.3d 189 (5th Cir.1995) (affirming pro rata fee award), awarded $26,065.37, or twenty percent of the request based on Debtor’s successful claims. It also made clear that the award included costs.
In denying punitive damages, the court balanced “a three-time debtor lacking in credibility” against “[an] over-aggressive collection attorney” and concluded that there were insufficient egregious factors to warrant an award of punitive damages. Findings of Fact, Opinion and Conclusions of Law (Jul. 10, 2001), at 19.
Debtor timely appealed, and Bi-Rite timely cross-appealed.
II.ISSUES
A. Whether the court violated Debtor’s due process rights.
B. Whether the court erred in denying annulment of the automatic stay.
C. Whether the court erred in awarding attorney’s fees in the amount of $26,065.37 to Debtor.
D. Whether the court erred in awarding emotional distress damages to Debtor.
E. Whether the court erred in denying punitive damages to Debtor.
F. Whether Debtor is entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal.
III.STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review whether the court violated an individual’s right to due process de novo. See Duff v. United States Trustee (In re California Fid., Inc.), 198 B.R. 567, 571 (9th Cir. BAP 1996) (citation omitted).
We review the court’s refusal to annul the automatic stay retroactively for an abuse of discretion. See Fjeldsted v. Lien (In re Fjeldsted), 293 B.R. 12, 18 (9th Cir. BAP 2003); see also National Envtl. Waste Corp. v. City of Riverside (In re Nat’l Envtl. Waste Corp.), 129 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir.1997).
We review the court’s assessment of damages under § 362(h) for an abuse of discretion. See Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. Roman (In re Roman), 283 B.R. 1, 7 (9th Cir. BAP 2002).
IV.DISCUSSION
A. The Court Did Not Violate Debtor’s Due Process Rights.
Debtor contends that the court’s award of fees on a pro rata basis to reflect the percentage of claims on which Debtor prevailed violated his due process rights. He reasons that the Ninth Circuit, unlike the Fifth Circuit, has never held that a pro rata bankruptcy fee award is appropriate and that he was not afforded a full and adequate hearing on the fee application.
[115]*115The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part that “[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ” U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 173, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002) (citation omitted). “This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.” Id. (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). Further, in order to satisfy the demands of due process, the opportunity to be heard “need not be a full adversarial hearing but must be preceded by adequate notice and must afford [the party] a meaningful opportunity to speak in [his] own defense.” Matthews v. Harney County, Or., Sch. Dist. No. 4, 819 F.2d 889, 892 (9th Cir.1987). The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).
At trial, the court indicated that it would bifurcate liability and “deal with attorney’s fees and ... other damages later.” Tr. of Proceedings (Mar. 16, 2001), at 33. On May 29, 2001, the court held a hearing on attorney’s fees. According to the court:
[I]t is simply unacceptable to have submitted time sheets that (a) appear to have some serious problems with them, but (b) make no attempt whatsoever to break out any of the time categories and to attempt to show how these entries are related in some way to the action under 362(h), which is the only action that — in [Debtor’s] complaint that [he] prevailed on ....
And I can’t — I will not and cannot attempt to sort through $136,000 in fees, which is an enormous amount of time to have spent on this matter, to find which of the time entries specifically relate to the 362(h) action.
I should tell you, I am going to give you two weeks to present a document which (a) must comply with the local fee and expense guidelines of this district in every respect; and (b) which specifically identify the time entries that relate to 362(h) portion of your complaint.
Tr. of Proceedings (May 29, 2001), at 3-4.
The court then continued the hearing to give Debtor the opportunity to amend his application for fees. Debtor filed an amended fee application, which Bi-Rite opposed. Later, the court took the continued hearing off calendar and issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on July 10, 2001. According to the court:
Despite giving [Debtor’s] counsel ample opportunity to correct the glaring deficiencies in their initial submission [of the fee application], their amended application is not much better than the first one. Rather than making a sincere effort to cull out entries unrelated to the section 362(h) claim, counsel has attempted instead to rejigger the time entries in an attempt to attribute them to the section 362(h) claim.
Findings of Fact, Opinion and Conclusions of Law (Jul. 10, 2001), at 16.
On appeal, Debtor contends that his due process rights were violated because he was not afforded a full and adequate hearing on the amended fee application. The Record, however, is clear that there was an actual hearing that was continued in order to afford Debtor an additional opportunity to present an adequate fee application and that, in connection with that continuance, Debtor received explicit notice that a further hearing would be held only [116]*116if it was “necessary.” Tr. of Proceedings (Mar. 16, 2001), at 34. Debtor had his day in court on the attorney’s fees issue and was provided with additional time to amend his fee application to comply with the court’s order. He failed to comply.
As stated above, the requirements of due process are satisfied even without a full adversarial hearing so long as Debtor was given adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard. See Harney County, 819 F.2d at 892. Here, Debtor did have an actual hearing, which was continued to afford him the opportunity to present an amended fee application. He was not deprived of the opportunity to present evidence. Thus, he had an opportunity to be heard at “a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Boettcher v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 759 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir.1985). Because Debtor deliberately ignored the court’s order, the continued hearing on the amended fee application was not “necessary.” Therefore, the court did not violate Debtor’s due process rights by not having the continued hearing. Harney County, 819 F.2d at 892.
Further, Debtor has cited no law that supports a due process violation for a mere disagreement with the bankruptcy court’s ruling. Accordingly, the court did not violate Debtor’s due process rights by awarding attorney’s fees on a pro rata basis after affording Debtor an opportunity to make a more specific showing.
B. The Court Did Not Err in Denying the Annulment of the Automatic Stay.
The court denied Bi-Rite’s request to retroactively annul the automatic stay because it was “without legal merit.” On cross-appeal, Bi-Rite contends that the court erred because it should have exercised its equitable powers under § 362(d) to grant retroactive relief from stay.
Section 362 provides in pertinent part:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay ... such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-—
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). Therefore, § 362(d) “gives the bankruptcy court wide latitude in crafting relief from the automatic stay, including the power to grant retroactive relief from the stay.” National Envtl. Waste Corp., 129 F.3d at 1054.
We have stated that:
in deciding whether to grant relief from stay retroactively, many courts focus on two factors: “(1) whether the creditor was aware of the bankruptcy petition; and (2) whether the debtor engaged in unreasonable or inequitable conduct, or prejudice would result to the creditor.” However, in addition to considering these two factors, a court must “balance [] the equities in order to determine whether retroactive annulment is justified.” Such a determination necessarily involves a “case by case analysis.”
Palm v. Klapperman (In re Cady), 266 B.R. 172, 179 (9th Cir. BAP 2001), aff’d, 315 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (internal citations omitted).
We recently re-emphasized that stay annulment decisions are to be assessed by balancing equities on a case-by-case basis. See Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. at 21-24.
Here, the court refused to retroactively lift the automatic stay because Bi-Rite had clear notice of Debtor’s bankruptcy:
Mr. Cook [Debtor’s counsel] was put on full and complete notice that there [117]*117was a bankruptcy filed. He promptly filed a proof of claim ... but nonetheless cavalierly pursued a trial date that could not take place until the case was dismissed. And rather than determining for a fact that the case had been dismissed, he relief [sic] upon Mr. Smyth, debtor’s counsel, to give him the go-ahead to pursue his trial on November the 21st, 1996. Mr. Cook is no stranger to Bankruptcy Court ... And Mr. Cook knew or should have known better than anyone that Mr. Smyth couldn’t grant him relief from the automatic stay.
Tr. of Proceedings (Mar. 13, 2001), at 155.
The court also balanced Debtor’s delay in asserting the automatic stay defense against CPL’s long-term failure to take steps to correct the problem. CPL knew about the problem in December 1996 when it received notice of the Dismissal, but did nothing to correct the problem at that time. Further, after Debtor specifically raised the stay violation issue with CPL a year later, CPL “obdurately refused to do anything” to correct the problem:
[H]ad [Mr. Cook] checked to make sure that Mr. Smyth was correct, he would have found that he wasn’t correct and that the case wasn’t dismissed until after the trial was over, making his judgment at that point void ... and more significantly, even after he was informed that the judgment was void, he obdurately refused to do anything about removing not one but two judgments, two abstracts of judgment for the same judgment, from the records of the court. He could just as easily, even if he had violated the automatic stay, he could have mitigated the damages therefrom almost entirely by saying, “All right. I might have gotten a judgment, but now I’m going to have to go back and do it all over again because in fact I was in violation of the stay, so I can get a valid judgment.”
Tr. of Proceedings (Mar. 13, 2001), at 155-56.
On appeal, Bi-Rite contends that cause existed to justify a retroactive annulment of the stay because CPL relied on “the affirmative statements of Debtor’s attorney that the bankruptcy judge dismissed the case and Bi-Rite could proceed to [the State Action] trial .... ” Appellee’s Reply Brief (Dec. 23, 2002), at 1. The court properly weighed these statements against the extensive experience of Bi-Rite’s counsel and found such reliance unreasonable. This finding has not been appealed. Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of Bi-Rite.
Bi-Rite further alleges that Debtor filed the August 1996 chapter 13 case in bad faith. Nonetheless, Bi-Rite offers nothing more specific than repeat filings to support its contention that the case was filed in bad faith. At trial, the bankruptcy court properly rejected Bi-Rite’s sole argument that repeat filings equate to bad faith filings.
Finally, Bi-Rite contends that the alleged stay violation caused no injury or prejudice to any party. To be sure, the relative harmlessness of a stay violation is a typical feature of meritorious motions to annul the stay.
Nevertheless, the assessment of the equitable balance to annul occurs when the issue is presented to the court. Here, if a motion had been made in December 1996, the equitable balance might have warranted annulling the stay. However, the years of obduracy by Bi-Rite before the request to annul the stay was made presented the court with a different inventory of facts to balance. We construe the court’s ruling that the request was “without legal merit” to be a ruling that, by the time the annulment request was made, the balance had [118]*118tipped heavily against Bi-Rite. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in this analysis.
A bankruptcy court has “wide latitude” in granting or denying annulment of the stay. See Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. at 21; see also National Envtl. Waste Corp., 129 F.3d at 1054. Here, the court properly balanced the equities in refusing to grant relief from stay retroactively. Therefore, it did not err in denying the annulment of the automatic stay.
C. The Court Did Not Err in Awarding Attorney’s Fees in the Amount of $26,065.87 to Debtor.
Debtor contends that the court’s award of fees on a pro rata basis offends the “actual damages” requirement of § 362(h).
Section 362(h) provides that an individual injured by a willful violation of the stay “shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorney’s fees .... ” 11 U.S.C. § 362(h). The words “shall recover” indicate that “Congress intended that the award of actual damages, costs and attorney’s fees be mandatory upon a finding of a willful violation of the stay.” Roman, 283 B.R. at 7. A violation of the stay is willful if: “the creditor knew of the automatic stay and intentionally performed the actions that violated the stay; and neither a good faith belief that the creditor had a right to the property nor good faith reliance on the advice of counsel is relevant.” Barnett v. Edwards (In re Edwards), 214 B.R. 613, 620 (9th Cir. BAP 1997).
Under the plain language of § 362(h), the injured party must be awarded the entire amount of actual damages “reasonably incurred as a result of a violation” of the automatic stay. Beard v. Walsh (In re Walsh), 219 B.R. 873, 876 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (citing Stainton v. Lee (In re Stainton), 139 B.R. 232, 235 (9th Cir. BAP 1992)). Therefore, an award of attorney’s fees under § 362(h) must be reasonable. See Roman, 283 B.R. at 11.
In Coxson, the debtors purchased a property giving a promissory note. After defaulting and filing a chapter 13 petition, the debtors claimed that the note violated state usury law, that the loan documents violated the Federal Truth in Lending Act, and that the creditor violated the automatic stay. See Coxson, 43 F.3d at 190. The court found for the debtor on the violation of the automatic stay claim, and for the creditor on the remaining claims. Based primarily on a contract provision in the note, the court awarded the parties a prorated amount of their legal fees. Id.
Here, the court found that Bi-Rite had willfully violated the automatic stay. During a continued hearing on attorney’s fees, the court specifically warned Debtor of the consequence if he failed to comply with its order:
I reserve the right to follow the approach used in Coxon [sic] v. Commonwealth Mortgage Company of America ... wherein the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ... simply took the percentage of the claims upon which the debtor was successful and multiplied it times the number of hours spent.
Tr. of Proceedings (May 29, 2001), at 4-5.
In his amended fee application, Debtor did not segregate the time spent on the automatic stay violation claim from the other claims.7 Therefore, we cannot say [119]*119that the court erred in finding that Debtor simply “rejigger[ed] the time entries in an attempt to attribute [the fees] to the section 362(h) claim.” Findings of Facts, Opinion and Conclusions of Law (July 10, 2001), at 16.
The court tried to get Debtor to adequately segregate and describe the attorney time related to the stay violation from the other time. Debtor failed to comply with this request. This placed the court in the difficult position of having to determine the reasonableness of the fee request without adequate information. It was not up to the court to struggle through a myriad of time entries and guess as to what time actually pertained to the stay violation and make arbitrary allocations. This was Debtor’s task, and after being given a fair opportunity to comply, Debtor failed to adequately respond to the court’s appropriate request.
Under these circumstances, it was within the court’s discretion to prorate the requested fees based on the proportion of claims on which Debtor succeeded. Therefore, we cannot say that the court’s adoption of the Coxson approach was unreasonable in this context.
Accordingly, the court did not err in awarding fees in the amount of $26,065.37 to Debtor.
D. The Court Erred in Awarding Emotional Distress Damages to Debtor.
The court awarded Debtor emotional distress damages pursuant to § 362(h) in the amount of $13,000. On cross-appeal, Bi-Rite contends that the court erred because: (1) Debtor did not seek any medical treatment and his distress consisted only of loss of sleep; (2) the stress stemmed from the current litigation and not the alleged stay violation; and (3) Debtor did not suffer any economic injury as a result of the stay violation.
The Ninth Circuit has not spoken on the award of emotional distress damages in the § 362(h) context, and there seems to be an embryonic division of opinion among other courts of appeal.
The Seventh Circuit has held that emotional distress is not compensable under § 362(h) in the absence of financial injury. See Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 879-80 (7th Cir.2001). It reasoned that the automatic stay protection is “financial in nature” and is not intended to protect “peace of mind.” Id. at 879. “The Bankruptcy Code was not drafted with reference to the emotional incidents of bankruptcy ... and the bankruptcy judges are not selected with reference to their likely ability to evaluate claims of emotional injury.” Id. The Seventh Circuit was particularly concerned about the “potential for abuse” because “[emotional distress] [is] so easy to manufacture.” Id. at 880-81. Therefore, unless the debtor suffers a financial loss, the Seventh Circuit would deny emotional distress damages under § 362(h). Id. at 881. Nonetheless, the [120]*120Aiello court was careful to note that “victims of tortious infliction of emotion distress in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding” are not without remedies because their remedies lie under state tort law. Id. at 880.
The First Circuit, in contrast, has held that “emotional damages qualify as ‘actual damages’ under § 362(h).” Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 269 (1st Cir.1999). There, the creditor attempted to foreclose on the debtor’s property in violation of the automatic stay by publishing a foreclosure notice in a local newspaper. The debtor testified that as a result of the creditor’s action, he “dfidn’t] sleep well” and his “eating habits ha[d] changed.” Id. at 270. Further, there was a “sharp decline in social invitations and outings” after the debtor’s neighbors became aware of the foreclosure proceedings. Id. at 269.
The First Circuit declined to address the issue of whether physical injury or corroborating medical testimony are required to recover for emotional distress damages under § 362(h) because the creditor failed to raise the arguments before the bankruptcy court. Id. Nonetheless, based on the debt- or’s testimony, the Fleet Mortgage court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s award of emotional distress damages of $25,000. Id.
We agree with the concern expressed by the Seventh Circuit that emotional distress claims under § 362(h) present an opportunity for abuse. We accept as did the Seventh Circuit that under appropriate circumstances emotional distress damages may be recovered as “actual damages” under § 362(h). “And, as we said earlier, if [the debtor] could show that [he] had suffered a loss within the contemplation of section 362, which is to say a financial loss, [he] might be permitted to piggyback a claim for damages for incidental emotional distress.” Aiello, 239 F.3d at 881. If the significant economic loss involves primarily attorney’s fees, the attorney’s fees must primarily redress the harm caused by the stay violation.
Initially, we note that although the court specifically rejected Aiello and adopted Fleet Mortgage in awarding emotional distress damages of $13,000 to Debtor, case law has not provided a meaningful standard for determining when emotional distress damages are appropriate under § 362(h).8 Therefore, we turn to the Restatement for guidance.
[121]*121Under Restatement (2d) of Torts § 47 (“§ 47”), emotional distress may be an element of damages where other interests have been invaded, and tort liability has arisen apart from the emotional distress:
Where the actor’s tortious conduct in fact results in the invasion of another legally protected interest, ... emotional distress caused either by the resulting invasion or by the conduct may be a matter to be taken into account in determining the damages recoverable. In many instances there may be recovery for emotional distress as an additional, or “parasitic” element of damages in an action for such a tort.
Restatement (2d) Of Torts § 47 comment b (emphasis added).
We note that Restatement (2d) of Torts § 46 (“§ 46”), which subjects a defendant to liability for emotional distress if his conduct is “extreme and outrageous,” is not applicable here. Section 46 “creates liability only where the actor intends to invade the interest in freedom from severe emotional distress.” Restatement (2d) Of Torts § 47 comment a. In other words, § 46 views the intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort unrelated to any other wrongful or tortious conduct. Id.; see also Patton v. Univ. of Chicago Hospitals, 706 F.Supp. 627, 631 (N.D.Ill.1989); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 580, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032 (1973). Here, because the emotional distress award stemmed from § 362(h), § 46 is not applicable. See Gruenberg, 9 Cal.3d at 580, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032.
Therefore, following comment b to § 47, it stands to reason that emotional distress should be an element of actual damages incidental to a willful violation of the automatic stay. This makes perfect sense because the automatic stay is intended to protect legal interests of the debtor. In using the term “actual damages” in § 362(h), Congress obviously intended to give debtors substantial latitude in seeking damages for willful violation of the automatic stay. There is nothing in the statute nor the legislative history that indicates that courts should restrictively apply § 362(h). Additionally, a willful violation of the automatic stay is analogous to intentional torts that cause actual damages from the impact on legally protected rights. See, e.g., Davis v. Courington (In re Davis), 177 B.R. 907, 911 (9th Cir. BAP 1995) (‘Willful violation of the automatic stay is an intentional tort for which compensatory and punitive damages may be awarded”). Therefore, we follow the Seventh Circuit in holding that emotional distress damages are recoverable under § 362(h), subject to the threshold described below.
The Ninth Circuit recently addressed the issue of emotional distress damages incidental to tortious conduct in Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass’n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d 895 (9th Cir.2000), stating:
[t]hough emotional distress must be severe to be actionable by itself, no heightened showing is required to obtain damages for mental suffering that naturally ensues from the commission of a distinct and independent tort. The requirement of severity is designed to address “ ‘the fear of fictitious or trivial claims, distrust of the proof offered, and the difficulty of setting up any satisfactory boundaries to liability’ ” when no injury other than emotional distress is alleged. [122]*122These concerns are mitigated when “substantial damages for loss of property” corroborate the plaintiffs mental suffering. A plaintiff may therefore recover damages for nonsevere emotional distress ensuing from tortious conduct that also results in significant economic loss.
Id. at 903 (citing Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032 (1973) and Restatement (2d) Of Torts § 46) (emphasis added).9 “Thus, once the threshold requirement of economic loss is met, the [plaintiff] need not show additional loss or injury to recover damages for his mental distress as long as such damages were proximately caused by [the host cause of action].” Pershing Park, 219 F.3d at 904 (quoting Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 53 Cal.3d 121, 128, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 822 P.2d 374 (1991)).
Here, in order to be entitled to emotional distress damages, there must be significant economic loss caused by the willful violation of the automatic stay. This is in keeping with the Ninth Circuit’s standard set forth in Pershing Park. Therefore, Debtor must first show a significant economic loss caused by the stay violation and then establish that his loss caused him emotional injury. Because the court did not apply the above standard in awarding the $13,000 in emotional distress damages,10 we remand for the bankruptcy court to decide whether emotional distress damages are appropriate here.
E. The Court Did Not Err in Denying Punitive Damages to Debtor.
The court denied Debtor’s request for punitive damages because it did not find that Bi-Rite acted with sufficient recklessness to warrant such an award. On appeal, Debtor contends that the court erred because it applied a “balancing of the equities” test.
Section 362(h) provides that an individual injured by a willful violation of a stay “shall recover actual damages ... and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(h). However, punitive damages should not be awarded absent actual damages. See McHenry v. Key Bank (In re McHenry), 179 B.R. 165, 168 (9th Cir. BAP 1995).
Further, “[p]unitive damages will be awarded only if a defendant’s conduct was malicious, wanton or oppressive.” Ramirez v. Fuselier (In re Ramirez), 183 B.R. 583, 590 (9th Cir. BAP 1995). Punitive damages are also warranted if the violator engaged in “egregious, intentional misconduct.” McHenry, 179 B.R. at 168.
In Goichman v. Bloom (In re Bloom), 875 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.1989), the Ninth Circuit held that it has “traditionally been reluctant to grant punitive damages absent some showing of reckless or callous disregard for the law or rights of others.” Id. at 228.
Here, the court denied punitive damages after a balancing of equities:
The Court noted during trial that in balancing the equities between a three-time debtor lacking in credibility and a overly-aggressive collection attorney, an award of punitive damages was unlikely----Finally, the Court adds that had [123]*123the defendants waited only thirteen days, they could have brought the suit without being in violation of the automatic stay. Hence, taken together there are insufficient egregious factors to warrant an award of punitive damages.
Findings of Fact, Opinion and Conclusions of Law (Jul. 10, 2002), at 19.
On appeal, Debtor contends that the bankruptcy court erred in imposing a balancing of equities standard in denying punitive damages. According to Debtor, punitive damages are warranted because the court found that Bi-Rite acted “cavalierly, nonchalantly and continuously in violation of the stay.” Appellant’s Opening Brief (Oct. 15, 2002), at 17. Although the court found that Bi-Rite willfully violated the automatic stay and that its actions “may have represented an arrogant defiance of the law,” it held that Bi-Rite did not act with sufficient recklessness and egregiousness to warrant an award of punitive damages. Findings of Fact, Opinion and Conclusions of Law (Jul. 10, 2002), at 18. On appeal, Debtor does not offer other evidence of Bi-Rite’s egregious conduct.
A bankruptcy court has discretion in granting or denying punitive damages under § 362(h). See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Roberts (In re Roberts), 175 B.R. 339, 344 (9th Cir. BAP 1994). Here, the court properly balanced the equities and found that Debtor lacked credibility. Because a willful violation of the automatic stay does not require a specific intent to violate the stay, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Bi-Rite did not engage in egregious conduct. Id. Therefore, it is within the court’s discretion to deny Debtor’s request for punitive damages. Accordingly, the court did not err in denying punitive damages to Debtor. See McHenry, 179 B.R. at 168.
F. Debtor is Not Entitled to Attorney’s Fees on Appeal.
On appeal, Debtor requested attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 362(h) because “[s]uch additional damages are mandatory.” Appellant’s Reply Brief (Dec. 12, 2002), at 17.
“A successful debtor is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs incurred in resisting a nonfrivolous appeal of a § 362(h) order. Such additional damages are mandatory under § 362(h).” Roman, 283 B.R. at 15 (citing Walsh, 219 B.R. at 878).
In Walsh, we held that when a court determines that a creditor willfully violated the automatic stay, “the bankruptcy court is required to award actual damages clearly traceable to and reasonably incurred as a result of the stay violation, including damages suffered by a debtor for ‘having to resort to the courts to enforce his rights.’” Walsh, 219 B.R. at 879 (Ryan, J., concurring).
Here, the court entered a § 362(h) order granting attorney’s fees and emotional distress damages to Debtor and denying Debtor’s request for punitive damages. Debtor appealed on both the attorney’s fees and punitive damages issues. We affirm the court on these issues. Therefore, Debtor is not “successful” in upsetting the § 362(h) order, and he is not entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal. See Roman, 283 B.R. at 15.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the court did not (1) violate Debtor’s due process rights; (2) err in denying the annulment of the automatic stay; (3) err in awarding attorney’s fees in the amount of $26,065,37 to Debtor; or (4) err in denying punitive damages to Debt- or.
[124]*124However, the bankruptcy court should have applied the standard set forth in Pershing Park in awarding emotional distress damages. As such, we remand for the bankruptcy court to decide whether emotional distress damages are appropriate here.
Finally, Debtor is not entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part and REMANDED.