Steward v. Mulligan

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Steward v. Mulligan

47 A.D.3d 822, 849 N.Y.S.2d 175

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 22, 2008

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 47 A.D.3d 822 (Steward v. Mulligan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Steward v. Mulligan, 47 A.D.3d 822, 849 N.Y.S.2d 175 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2008).

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Opinion

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Westchester County Department of Planning, dated February 14, 2006, which, after a hearing, confirmed the termination of the petitioner’s participation in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (see 42 USC § 1437f [b] [1]).

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is [823]*823denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, without costs or disbursements.

Substantial evidence “means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” (300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180 [1978]; see Matter of Lynnann P. v Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs., 28 AD3d 484, 485 [2006]).

The record provides substantial evidence to support the respondents’ determination to terminate the petitioner’s participation in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 231 [1974]; Matter of Friend v Mulligan, 16 AD3d 685 [2005]; Matter of Langton v Rutkoske, 252 AD2d 504 [1998]). While the bulk of the respondents’ proof constituted hearsay, it was sufficient to serve as the basis for the determination (see Matter of BiCounty Brokerage S. Corp. v State of N.Y. Ins. Dept., 4 AD3d 470, 471 [2004]; Matter of Bullock v State of N.Y. Dept. of Social Servs., 248 AD2d 380, 381 [1998]; Matter of Nieto v DeBuono, 231 AD2d 573 [1996]). Additionally, the notice of termination adequately apprised the petitioner of the violation upon which her termination from the program was based (see Matter of Block v Ambach, 73 NY2d 323, 333 [1989]; Matter of Douglas v Lannert, 272 AD2d 327 [2000]; Matter of Colon v Blum, 81 AD2d 637, 638 [1981]).

The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. Ritter, J.P., Florio, Miller and Dillon, JJ., concur.

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Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Westchester County Department of Planning, dated February 14, 2006, which, after a hearing, confirmed the termination of the petitioner’s participation in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (see 42 USC § 1437f [b] [1]).

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is [823]*823denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, without costs or disbursements.

Substantial evidence “means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” (300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180 [1978]; see Matter of Lynnann P. v Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs., 28 AD3d 484, 485 [2006]).

The record provides substantial evidence to support the respondents’ determination to terminate the petitioner’s participation in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 231 [1974]; Matter of Friend v Mulligan, 16 AD3d 685 [2005]; Matter of Langton v Rutkoske, 252 AD2d 504 [1998]). While the bulk of the respondents’ proof constituted hearsay, it was sufficient to serve as the basis for the determination (see Matter of BiCounty Brokerage S. Corp. v State of N.Y. Ins. Dept., 4 AD3d 470, 471 [2004]; Matter of Bullock v State of N.Y. Dept. of Social Servs., 248 AD2d 380, 381 [1998]; Matter of Nieto v DeBuono, 231 AD2d 573 [1996]). Additionally, the notice of termination adequately apprised the petitioner of the violation upon which her termination from the program was based (see Matter of Block v Ambach, 73 NY2d 323, 333 [1989]; Matter of Douglas v Lannert, 272 AD2d 327 [2000]; Matter of Colon v Blum, 81 AD2d 637, 638 [1981]).

The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. Ritter, J.P., Florio, Miller and Dillon, JJ., concur.

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47 A.D.3d 822, 849 N.Y.S.2d 175, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/steward-v-mulligan-nyappdiv-2008.

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