Stevens v. Faucet

24 Ill. 483
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedApril 15, 1860
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 24 Ill. 483 (Stevens v. Faucet) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stevens v. Faucet, 24 Ill. 483 (Ill. 1860).

Opinion

Catón, C. J.

The decision of this case depends entirely upon the determination of the question, whether, as between themselves, the firms of Stevens & Co., and Faucet & Co., were partners in the purchase and tanning of these hides, and the sale of this leather. If they were such partners, then the defendant below was a joint owner with the plaintiffs, of the leather which he surreptitiously took away and converted to his own use, for which this action of trover was brought. The agreement between the parties was this:

“ It is this day agreed between Faucet, Isham & Co., of New York city, and W. H. and F. Stevens, of Stevensville, Sullivan county, New York, that said Faucet, Isham & Co. shall send to said W. H. and F. Stevens, what hides they may require for the purpose of being tanned, and manufactured into sole leather in their tannery, at said Stevensville, for three years from this date. The number of hides is not to be less than fifteen thousand each year, nor more than twenty-five thousand each year, unless both parties, in writing, shall hereafter agree to increase or lessen the amount.

“ W. H. and F. Stevensj during the said three years, are not to tan hides for any other party. W. H. and F. Stevens agree to receive the hides at a dock in the city of New York, to pay all expenses of transportation to their tannery, to tan and manufacture them into sole leather in a good and workmanlike manner, to make leather of a quality and a gain in weight equal to that made by all first class tanners, and to return the leather so tanned to said Faucet, Isham & Co., at a dock in the city of New York, clear of all expenses of transportation. For all which services, Fauset, Isham & Co., agree to pay said W. H. and F. Stevens, five (5) cents per pound for each pound of leather so tanned and returned, which shall be due at the average time of each invoice.

“ It is further agreed, that all the profit and loss on all the leather manufactured under this contract shall be equally divided between both parties, which shall be determined as follows: After said Faucet, Isham & Co. shall have sold the leather manufactured from each invoice of hides, they shall deduct from the gross amount of such sales the cost of the hides, with five per cent, added thereto, the amount paid and payable for tanning. All costs and charges of cartage on both hides and leather, inspection, exchanges and interests on all these amounts, till the sales are due, by average. Also six per cent, on the gross amount of the sales, and the balance or difference, being gain or loss, shall be equally divided between said Faucet, Isham & Co., and said W. H. and F. Stevens. Faucet, Isham & Co. are to take the sole risk of all sales made on credit.

“W. H. and F. Stevens agree to return the leather from each invoice of hides within eight months from the time they leave the city of New York, provided that each invoice shall not exceed one thousand hides. In such case they agree to return them in a fair proportionate time; and provided further, that in case hides are sent faster than they can be worked, an allowance shall be made in proportion. Faucet, Isham & Co. shall procure what insurance against fire they may think necessary, one half the cost of which shall be paid by W. H. and F. Stevens.

“New York, Aug. 7, 1855.”

As we are investigating this question of partnership, for the purpose of determining in whom the legal title to this leather was vested, it is of paramount importance to determine what was the intention of the parties on that point, as manifested by this agreement. It must be remembered that this is not a question between third persons and the parties to the agreement, growing out of the subject matter of the agreement, but it arises between, and affects only, parties to the agreement. In such a case the intention of the parties must control, in this as well as in all other agreements, when that intention can be satisfactorily ascertained by the terms of the agreement.

After the most careful and scrutinizing consideration we have been able to give this subject, we are well satisfied that it was the intention of the parties that the title to the hides and leather should all the time remain in Faucet, Isham & Co. By the first paragraph, Faucet, Isham & Co. agree to send what hides they may require to the Stevens, for the purpose of being tanned, for three years.

By the second paragraph, the Stevens agree not to tan hides for any other party. They agree to receive the hides, transport them to their tannery, to manufacture them into sole leather, and to return the leather, so tanned, to Faucet, Isham & Co., at a dock in New York, clear of all expenses of transportation. For all which services Faucet, Isham & Co. agree to pay the Stevens five cents per pound for each pound of leather so tanned and returned. Here is simply an agreement for work and labor of one party, to be performed upon the material of the other party, for a stipulated compensation, and so the parties understood and intended. Of this there can be no doubt. More appropriate terms for expressing such intent could not have been selected.

The next paragraph stipulates, that the profit and loss, on all the leather manufactured under this contract, should be equally divided between both parties. And the balance of the paragraph shows what Faucet, Isham & Co. should charge against the proceeds of the leather when sold, in order to ascertain the gain or loss, which was to be equally divided between the two , firms. This, no doubt, constituted a partnership, but in what, 1 or to what extent, is the question to be determined. Was it k the intention of this provision to change the relations which had been established in the preceding part of the agreement ? We think it was, to the extent there stated, and no farther. It gave the Stevens a right to one-half the profits which Faucet, Isham & Co. should realize by the transaction, and obliged them to pay one-half the losses which should be sustained, but gave them no interest in, or title to, the hides or leather. It was manifestly still the intention of both parties that the title to the property should belong to Faucet, Isham & Co. If such was their in- ,, tention, the partnership only extended to the proceeds of the | leather, and not to the leather itself, or rather, to the profit or \loss resulting from the transaction. Does the law forbid such an arrangement, when the parties so desire and design it ? We think not.

Suppose, after what is now written in this agreement, the parties had added a declaratory clause, stating that it was not the intention of the parties to form a copartnership, either in the purchase of the hides, or in the manufacture or sale of the leather, but only that the Stevens should be entitled to an account after the leather was sold, and to share in the profits or loss, when ascertained. Had this been done, none will contend that this declaratory provision would be nugatory, as contrary to any established legal principle. We think the same intention of the parties is manifest from the terms which they have used in this agreement. It is as manifest that all parties in-. tended that Faucet, Isham & Co. should own*, hold, and control the hides and leather, as if it had been so declared in distinct terms, and in a separate clause. Indeed, to have inserted such a clause would have been but mere repetition, for the intention is as manifest now as it would be then.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
24 Ill. 483, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stevens-v-faucet-ill-1860.