Steven Whang v. Walgreens

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided December 2, 2025·No. 2:25-cv-02335·Unknown

Opinion

* * *

Steven Whang, Case No. 2:25-cv-02335-JAD-BNW

Plaintiff, ORDER v.

Walgreens,

Defendants.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Steven Whang’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff submitted the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing an inability to prepay fees or costs or give security for them. Therefore, his request to proceed IFP will be granted. I. Analysis A. Screening standard Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court liberally construes pro se complaints and may only dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. Unless it is clear the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s deficiencies. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). B. Screening the complaint Plaintiff seeks to assert claims under Title VII, the ADEA, the FLSA based on actions that took place while he was working at Walgreens. It also appears Plaintiff may be attempting to assert one or more retaliation claims. A. Title VII Claim To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to adverse employment action; (4) similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class were treated more favorably. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Here, Plaintiff asserts that several individuals discriminated against him. But he does not explain how he arrives at that conclusion or whether the discrimination was based on sex, race, national origin, or all three. Moreover, he does not provide any facts asserting he was qualified for his position or how other similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class were treated more favorably. As a result, the Court will dismiss this claim with leave to amend. B. ADEA Claim To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must allege in his complaint that: (1) he was at least forty years old; (2) he was performing his job with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under circumstances otherwise giving rise to an inference of age discrimination. See Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). Here Plaintiff asserts he is over 40years of age but does not otherwise assert facts alleging he was performing his job satisfactorily or what circumstances give rise to an inference of age discrimination. As a result, this court will dismiss this claim with leave to amend. C. Retaliation Claim When an employee files a complaint regarding an unlawful practice, he has engaged in a protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(e). Employers may not retaliate against an employee because he has opposed any unlawful act or practice. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To state a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he engaged in a protected act; (2) he suffered some sort of adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between his protected action and the adverse act. Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2008). Similar requirements apply to retaliation claims under the ADEA. See Stilwell v. City of Williams, 831 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2016). First, it is not clear whether Plaintiff alleges retaliation under Title VII, the ADEA, or both. In addition, Plaintiff fails to provide most facts underlying these elements. He does not explain what the protected activity is he engaged in1 or how his termination would not have taken place but for the protected activity in which he engaged. The FLSA requires employers to pay employees who work in excess of forty hours per week “at a rate not less than one and one half times” their normal wages. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Plaintiff asserts that he was required to undergo bag checks after clocking out but not paid. For purposes of screening, which employs a liberal standard, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to pursue this claim.

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Related

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N. A.
550 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Davis v. Team Electric Co.
520 F.3d 1080 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. Partnership
521 F.3d 1201 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Scott Nordstrom v. Charles Ryan
762 F.3d 903 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Ronnie Stilwell v. City of Williams
831 F.3d 1234 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Cato v. United States
70 F.3d 1103 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)