Steven Michael Rindal v. State of Washington; Elizabeth Yost Neidzweski, in her official capacity; Washington State Department of Transportation in its official capacity as an executive agency of the State of Washington

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: November 20, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01805
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE

10 STEVEN MICHAEL RINDAL, Case No. 2:24-cv-01805-RAJ

11 Plaintiff, ORDER

12 v.

13 STATE OF WASHINGTON; ELIZABETH YOST NEIDZWSKI, in 14 her official capacity; WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF 15 TRANSPORTATION in its official capacity as an executive agency of the 16 State of Washington,

17 Defendants. 18 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff Steven Michael Rindal’s 21 Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) and (6), Dkt. # 39. 22 The Court has reviewed the motion, the documents in support of and in opposition to the 23 motion, and the balance of the record. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES 24 Mr. Rindal’s motion. However, the Court, sua sponte, AMENDS the order of dismissal 25 as provided below. 26 1 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 The factual and procedural background of this case are set out in more detail in 3 the Court’s August 5, 2025 order. Dkt. # 33. In that order, the Court dismissed all of 4 Mr. Rindal’s claims with prejudice under the Younger abstention doctrine. Id. Mr. 5 Rindal filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court denied on August 25, 2025. 6 Dkts. # 35, 36. Currently before the Court is Mr. Rindal’s motion for relief from 7 judgement. Dkt. # 39. 8 III. LEGAL STANDARD 9 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), courts may “relieve a party or its 10 legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 11 . . . (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 12 misconduct by an opposing party; . . . or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” To 13 prevail on a motion under Rule 60(b)(3), “the moving party must prove by clear and 14 convincing evidence that the verdict was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or 15 other misconduct and the conduct complained of prevented the losing party from fully 16 and fairly presenting the defense.” Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th 17 Cir. 2004) (quoting De Saracho v. Custom Food Machinery, Inc., 206 F.3d 874, 880 (9th 18 Cir. 2000)). Rule 60(B)(3) requires that fraud “not be discoverable by due diligence 19 before or during the proceedings.” Id. (quoting Pac. & Arctic Ry. And Navigation Co. v. 20 United Transp. Union, 952 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1991)). 21 IV. DISCUSSION 22 A. Motion for Relief from Judgment 23 Mr. Rindal seeks relief from judgment based on many of the same arguments 24 raised in his motion for reconsideration. Specifically, he appears to argue that Defendant 25 Judge Neidzwski, who presided over the underlying state condemnation proceeding, 26 1 “ascended the bench without filing a required official bond, rendering her commission 2 invalid.” Dkt. # 42 at 1. He also appears to argue it was improper for Judge Neidzwski’s 3 counsel, Mr. Pendersen, to represent her in his case. Id. 4 Mr. Rindal fails to meet his burden for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(3) 5 and (6). Mr. Rindal provides no evidence, much less “clear and convincing evidence,” 6 of an alleged fraud. Other than Mr. Rindal’s assertions, there is no documentary evidence 7 in the record showing Judge Neidzwski was not authorized to preside over his state court 8 proceeding or that it was improper for Mr. Pendersen to appear as counsel in this case. 9 Moreover, Mr. Rindal fails to explain how the alleged fraud is relevant to the Court’s 10 Younger analysis, and therefore how it prevented Mr. Rindal from “fully and fairly 11 presenting the defense.” Finally, Mr. Rindal fails to show the alleged fraud could not 12 have been discovered earlier through diligence. Mr. Rindal states in his reply brief that 13 Judge Neidzwski was elected to serve as a superior court judge in 2020. Dkt. # 42 at 4. 14 He provides no non-conclusory reason why he did not discover the alleged issues with 15 Judge Neidzwski’s “official bond” or “ascension to the bench” sooner. Thus, Mr. Rindal 16 fails to show the existence of fraud justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(3), and the Court 17 does not find any other reason for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 18 B. Sua Sponte Amendment of Dismissal Order 19 “[D]ismissal based on Younger abstention is not a determination on the merits and 20 should be without prejudice.” Crossett v. Idaho, No. 23-35610, 2024 WL 3508511, at 21 *1 (9th Cir. July 23, 2024). On the Court’s own review of its August 5, 2025 order, it 22 determined that Mr. Rindal’s claims should have been dismissed without prejudice, rather 23 than with prejudice. 24 // 25 // 26 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 For the forgoing reasons, Mr. Rindal’s Motion for Relief from Judgement, Dkt. # 3 39, is DENIED. 4 The Court, sua sponte, AMENDS its August 5, 2025 order, Dkt. # 33, to reflect 5 that all claims in this action are dismissed without prejudice. All other aspects of the 6 August 5, 2025 order and judgment shall remain unchanged. 7 8 Dated this 20th day of November, 2025.

9 A 10 11 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 12 United States District Judge 13

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