Steven Helm v. Derek Slaughter

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: February 3, 2026
• Docket: 24-3161
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 24-3161 ____________

STEVEN HELM, Appellant

v.

DEREK SLAUGHTER; GABRIEL CAMPANA; CITY OF WILLIAMSPORT ____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 4:21-cv-00705) Magistrate Judge: Honorable William I. Arbuckle ____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on December 2, 2025

CHAGARES, Chief Judge, FREEMAN and MASCOTT, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 3, 2026)

_______________

OPINION * _______________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.

Steven Helm brought First Amendment retaliation claims against the City of

Williamsport and two of its mayors (collectively, “Defendants”). A jury returned a

verdict in Defendants’ favor. On appeal, Helm seeks a new trial based on challenges to

two of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

I

Helm is a longtime police officer for the Williamsport Police Department. He

started as a patrolman in 1993 and was promoted several times, reaching the rank of

lieutenant in 2008. In 2017 and 2018, he sued the City for First Amendment retaliation

based on his union activities. The parties settled both lawsuits in June 2019.

Later in 2019, then-Mayor Gabriel Campana appointed another lieutenant to an

open Assistant Chief of Police position. The Assistant Chief position became open again

in September 2020 during Mayor Derek Slaughter’s term. Helm applied for the position,

but Slaughter selected a different lieutenant over Helm. 1

Helm sued Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that he should

have been selected for Assistant Chief, but each mayor refused to select him in retaliation

for exercising his First Amendment rights in previous lawsuits. He also alleged that the

City had a policy of such retaliation.

1 The lieutenant whom Slaughter selected later withdrew his name from consideration. Slaughter never filled the position and instead promoted two officers to police captain.

2 Before trial, Helm moved in limine to preclude Defendants from presenting

(1) evidence pertaining to Defendants’ alleged justifications for not promoting him, and

(2) evidence that Defendants would have made the same decision but for their

consideration of his protected conduct. As to the first issue, he argued that any non-

retaliatory justifications were irrelevant because Defendants’ hiring process violated state

and municipal civil service code provisions. As to the second issue, he argued that

Defendants waived the so-called “same-decision defense” by not raising it in their answer

to his complaint. Additionally, he argued that the only lawful decision Defendants could

make was to fill the positions through the civil service process.

A Magistrate Judge, who presided with the consent of the parties, denied the

motion. He reasoned that the mayors’ respective reasons for not promoting Helm were

relevant to whether their actions were retaliatory. He also concluded that the same-

decision defense is part of a burden-shifting framework and need not be pleaded as an

affirmative defense. The Magistrate Judge did not rule on Helm’s argument related to the

civil service process, but he noted that Helm had not explained how any defect in that

process was relevant.

Trial commenced in November 2024. Before opening statements, Helm sought

clarification about whether he could present evidence and arguments about alleged

violations of the civil service process. The Magistrate Judge ruled that Helm could not.

He explained that Helm had not pleaded a civil-service-process violation, and any such

violation was not relevant to the First Amendment claim.

3 At trial, both mayors testified to their reasons for not selecting Helm for the

Assistant Chief position. Campana invoked concerns about personality and trust, and

Slaughter testified that the person he selected was a better fit for his administration. Both

mayors denied that the prior lawsuits were a factor.

The jury returned a verdict in Defendants’ favor. Although the jury found that

Helm’s protected speech was a motivating factor in Campana’s decision, it found that

Campana would have made the same decision absent Helm’s protected activity. It found

that Helm’s protected speech was not a factor that motivated Slaughter’s decision.

Because the jury found that neither mayor retaliated against Helm, it did not return a

verdict about whether the City had a policy of retaliation.

Helm timely appealed.

II 2

When a party seeks a new trial based on evidentiary rulings, we review preserved

evidentiary objections for abuse of discretion. Leonard v. Stemtech Int’l Inc., 834 F.3d

376, 400 (3d Cir. 2016). 3 To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, Helm “must show that

the District Court’s decision was arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable.” Hart v.

2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3 Helm did not move for a new trial after the jury returned its verdict. Nonetheless, we assume without deciding that we can review his evidentiary objections and assess whether they support a new trial. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. HPSC, Inc., 480 F.3d 26, 32–33 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Sunshine Supermarket, Inc., 753 F.2d 321, 324–25 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a definitive ruling on a motion in limine was sufficient to preserve for purposes of appeal the issue raised in the motion).

4 Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation modified). He has not done

so.

Helm first challenges the Magistrate Judge’s order precluding him from presenting

evidence about the civil service process. He contends that this evidence was crucial to

proving his case. He reasons that the civil service process is the only legitimate means of

determining promotions for the Assistant Chief position, so any other justifications for

refusing to promote Helm had no legal significance. We disagree.

The Magistrate Judge correctly determined that evidence and arguments related to

the civil service process were irrelevant because Helm’s claims were for First

Amendment retaliation, not violations of state or municipal laws. See Nicholas v. Pa.

State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 143–45 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding that the contract breach

arising from an employee’s termination did not support his First Amendment retaliation

claim). The Magistrate Judge properly precluded the civil-service-process evidence on

this basis.

Helm next argues that the same-decision defense was illegitimate because it relied

on Defendants’ alleged violations of civil service hiring process provisions. 4 Once again,

Helm’s emphasis on any separate violations of the civil service process is misplaced.

Once a plaintiff has established that his constitutionally protected speech was a

“motivating factor” in an adverse employment decision, the burden shifts to the

4 On appeal, Helm does not revive his argument that Defendants waived the same- decision defense.

5 defendants to show by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have come to the

“same decision . . . even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed.

v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); see also Nicholas, 227 F.3d at 144. The Magistrate

Judge acted well within his discretion in permitting Defendants to rebut Helm’s evidence

of First Amendment retaliation using evidence and argument in support of their same-

decision defense. See Nicholas, 227 F.3d at 144–45.

* * *

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment.