1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 STEVEN E. ALEXANDER, Case No. 25-cv-03668-WHO (PR_
Petitioner, 5 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE; v. 6 INSTRUCTIONS TO CLERK 7 EDWARD BORLA, Dkt. Nos. 12 and 13 Respondent. 8
9 10 INTRODUCTION 11 Petitioner Steven E. Alexander seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 12 from his California state sentence, which he contends he has served. His petition for relief 13 is now before me for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules 14 Governing Section 2254 Cases. 15 The petition states a cognizable due process claim. Accordingly, on or before 16 March 2, 2026, respondent shall file an answer or a dispositive motion in response to the 17 petition (Dkt. No. 11). 18 Habeas petitions under section 2254 nearly always should be adjudicated in the 19 district of conviction, which, because Alexander was convicted in Los Angeles County, 20 would be the Central District of California. See Habeas L.R. 2254-3(b)(1); Dannenberg v. 21 Ingle, 831 F. Supp. 767, 768 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Laue v. Nelson, 279 F. Supp. 265, 266 22 (N.D. Cal. 1968). However, an exception to this general rule arises here. Because 23 Alexander challenges the execution of his sentence, the district of confinement (here, the 24 Northern District) is the preferred forum. See Habeas L.R. 2254-3(b)(2); Dunne v. 25 Henman, 875 F.2d 244, 249 (9th Cir. 1989). If respondent thinks that this habeas action 26 should be transferred to the Central District of California, he shall file within 60 days from 27 the date of this Order a motion requesting such a transfer. 1 The Clerk shall enter Edward Borla, the warden of the prison in which petitioner is 2 housed, as the sole respondent in this action. Borla is the sole proper respondent because 3 he is the custodian having day-to-day control over petitioner, the only person who can 4 produce “the body” of the petitioner. Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th 5 Cir. 1992) (quoting Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 6 The Clerk shall change the Cause of Action to 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas 7 Corpus (State). The Clerk also shall change the Nature of Suit to 530 Habeas Corpus 8 (General). 9 BACKGROUND 10 In 2012, a Los Angeles Superior Court jury convicted Alexander of first degree 11 burglary with a person present (Cal. Penal Code § 459), battery on a peace officer with 12 injury (§ 24(c)(2)), resisting an executive officer (§ 69), and second degree burglary 13 (§ 459). People v. Alexander, No. B332031, 2025 WL 1671809, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 14 13, 2025). Alexander admitted at his sentencing hearing that he had a prior conviction for 15 first degree burglary. Id. A sentence of 25 years and 4 months was imposed. Id. 16 “Thereafter, in 2023, a trial court reduced one count to a misdemeanor under Penal 17 Code 1 section 1170.18 and struck the prison priors under section 1172.75. However, the 18 trial court left intact an upper term sentence that had been originally imposed on a count 19 for first degree burglary.” Id. at *1. Alexander appealed on grounds that “the trial court 20 erred by reimposing an upper term because section 1170 now makes the middle term the 21 presumptive term in the absence of aggravating factors justifying the upper term that have 22 been found true by the jury or stipulated to by the defendant.” Id. The state appellate 23 court rejected his contentions, but remanded the case to the trial court because “Alexander 24 is entitled to a recalculation of his actual and conduct credits.” Id. 25 DISCUSSION 26 This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person 27 in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 1 § 2254(a). A district court considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall 2 “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ 3 should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person 4 detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Summary dismissal is appropriate 5 only where the allegations in the petition are vague or conclusory, palpably incredible, or 6 patently frivolous or false. See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). 7 As grounds for federal habeas relief, Alexander claims that he has served his 8 sentence and is entitled to release. (Pet., Dkt. No. 11 at 5.) When liberally construed, this 9 claim is cognizable on federal habeas review. 10 MOTIONS 11 Alexander moves for the appointment of counsel. (Dkt. No. 12.) There is no right 12 to counsel in habeas corpus actions. See Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th 13 Cir. 1986). However, under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) a district court is authorized to 14 appoint counsel to represent a habeas petitioner whenever “the court determines that the 15 interests of justice so require” and such person is financially unable to obtain 16 representation. The decision to appoint counsel is within the discretion of the district 17 court, see Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986), and should be granted 18 only when exceptional circumstances are present. See generally 1 J. Liebman & R. Hertz, 19 Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 12.3b at 383-86 (2d ed. 1994). 20 There is no doubt that not having a lawyer puts a party at a disadvantage in our 21 adversarial system of justice. Across the United States in 2024, unrepresented prisoners 22 filed nearly 8000 cases, roughly 16.25% of all new civil filings. United States Courts for 23 the Ninth Circuit, 2024 Annual Report, https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/judicial- 24 council/publications/AnnualReport2024.pdf. The high percentage of civil litigants who 25 cannot afford counsel threatens our ability to dispense equal justice to rich and poor alike, 26 as the judicial oath demands. That said, I am compelled to follow controlling precedent 27 and determine if “exceptional circumstances” exist to appoint counsel in the cases before 1 Alexander has not shown that there are exceptional circumstances warranting the 2 appointment of counsel. He has articulated his claims clearly and the issues his petition 3 presents are not complex. When the record is more fully developed, the Court will 4 consider on its own motion whether the appointment of counsel is warranted. 5 Alexander’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED as unnecessary. (Dkt. No. 6 13.) This Order to Show Cause requires respondent to respond to his claims. A motion for 7 summary judgment is unnecessary under these circumstances, and is not an appropriate 8 vehicle to use in habeas proceedings. 9 CONCLUSION 10 1. The Clerk shall serve electronically a copy of this Order upon the respondent and 11 the respondent’s attorney, the Attorney General of the State of California, at the following 12 email addresses: SFAWTParalegals@doj.ca.gov and SFAGDocketing@doj.ca.gov.
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 STEVEN E. ALEXANDER, Case No. 25-cv-03668-WHO (PR_
Petitioner, 5 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE; v. 6 INSTRUCTIONS TO CLERK 7 EDWARD BORLA, Dkt. Nos. 12 and 13 Respondent. 8
9 10 INTRODUCTION 11 Petitioner Steven E. Alexander seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 12 from his California state sentence, which he contends he has served. His petition for relief 13 is now before me for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules 14 Governing Section 2254 Cases. 15 The petition states a cognizable due process claim. Accordingly, on or before 16 March 2, 2026, respondent shall file an answer or a dispositive motion in response to the 17 petition (Dkt. No. 11). 18 Habeas petitions under section 2254 nearly always should be adjudicated in the 19 district of conviction, which, because Alexander was convicted in Los Angeles County, 20 would be the Central District of California. See Habeas L.R. 2254-3(b)(1); Dannenberg v. 21 Ingle, 831 F. Supp. 767, 768 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Laue v. Nelson, 279 F. Supp. 265, 266 22 (N.D. Cal. 1968). However, an exception to this general rule arises here. Because 23 Alexander challenges the execution of his sentence, the district of confinement (here, the 24 Northern District) is the preferred forum. See Habeas L.R. 2254-3(b)(2); Dunne v. 25 Henman, 875 F.2d 244, 249 (9th Cir. 1989). If respondent thinks that this habeas action 26 should be transferred to the Central District of California, he shall file within 60 days from 27 the date of this Order a motion requesting such a transfer. 1 The Clerk shall enter Edward Borla, the warden of the prison in which petitioner is 2 housed, as the sole respondent in this action. Borla is the sole proper respondent because 3 he is the custodian having day-to-day control over petitioner, the only person who can 4 produce “the body” of the petitioner. Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th 5 Cir. 1992) (quoting Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 6 The Clerk shall change the Cause of Action to 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas 7 Corpus (State). The Clerk also shall change the Nature of Suit to 530 Habeas Corpus 8 (General). 9 BACKGROUND 10 In 2012, a Los Angeles Superior Court jury convicted Alexander of first degree 11 burglary with a person present (Cal. Penal Code § 459), battery on a peace officer with 12 injury (§ 24(c)(2)), resisting an executive officer (§ 69), and second degree burglary 13 (§ 459). People v. Alexander, No. B332031, 2025 WL 1671809, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 14 13, 2025). Alexander admitted at his sentencing hearing that he had a prior conviction for 15 first degree burglary. Id. A sentence of 25 years and 4 months was imposed. Id. 16 “Thereafter, in 2023, a trial court reduced one count to a misdemeanor under Penal 17 Code 1 section 1170.18 and struck the prison priors under section 1172.75. However, the 18 trial court left intact an upper term sentence that had been originally imposed on a count 19 for first degree burglary.” Id. at *1. Alexander appealed on grounds that “the trial court 20 erred by reimposing an upper term because section 1170 now makes the middle term the 21 presumptive term in the absence of aggravating factors justifying the upper term that have 22 been found true by the jury or stipulated to by the defendant.” Id. The state appellate 23 court rejected his contentions, but remanded the case to the trial court because “Alexander 24 is entitled to a recalculation of his actual and conduct credits.” Id. 25 DISCUSSION 26 This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person 27 in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 1 § 2254(a). A district court considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall 2 “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ 3 should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person 4 detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Summary dismissal is appropriate 5 only where the allegations in the petition are vague or conclusory, palpably incredible, or 6 patently frivolous or false. See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). 7 As grounds for federal habeas relief, Alexander claims that he has served his 8 sentence and is entitled to release. (Pet., Dkt. No. 11 at 5.) When liberally construed, this 9 claim is cognizable on federal habeas review. 10 MOTIONS 11 Alexander moves for the appointment of counsel. (Dkt. No. 12.) There is no right 12 to counsel in habeas corpus actions. See Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th 13 Cir. 1986). However, under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) a district court is authorized to 14 appoint counsel to represent a habeas petitioner whenever “the court determines that the 15 interests of justice so require” and such person is financially unable to obtain 16 representation. The decision to appoint counsel is within the discretion of the district 17 court, see Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986), and should be granted 18 only when exceptional circumstances are present. See generally 1 J. Liebman & R. Hertz, 19 Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 12.3b at 383-86 (2d ed. 1994). 20 There is no doubt that not having a lawyer puts a party at a disadvantage in our 21 adversarial system of justice. Across the United States in 2024, unrepresented prisoners 22 filed nearly 8000 cases, roughly 16.25% of all new civil filings. United States Courts for 23 the Ninth Circuit, 2024 Annual Report, https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/judicial- 24 council/publications/AnnualReport2024.pdf. The high percentage of civil litigants who 25 cannot afford counsel threatens our ability to dispense equal justice to rich and poor alike, 26 as the judicial oath demands. That said, I am compelled to follow controlling precedent 27 and determine if “exceptional circumstances” exist to appoint counsel in the cases before 1 Alexander has not shown that there are exceptional circumstances warranting the 2 appointment of counsel. He has articulated his claims clearly and the issues his petition 3 presents are not complex. When the record is more fully developed, the Court will 4 consider on its own motion whether the appointment of counsel is warranted. 5 Alexander’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED as unnecessary. (Dkt. No. 6 13.) This Order to Show Cause requires respondent to respond to his claims. A motion for 7 summary judgment is unnecessary under these circumstances, and is not an appropriate 8 vehicle to use in habeas proceedings. 9 CONCLUSION 10 1. The Clerk shall serve electronically a copy of this Order upon the respondent and 11 the respondent’s attorney, the Attorney General of the State of California, at the following 12 email addresses: SFAWTParalegals@doj.ca.gov and SFAGDocketing@doj.ca.gov. The 13 petition (Dkt. No. 11) and the exhibits thereto are available via the Electronic Case Filing 14 System for the Northern District of California. The Clerk shall serve by mail a copy of this 15 Order on petitioner. 16 2. On or before March 2, 2026, respondent shall file with the Court and serve on 17 petitioner, an answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 18 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted based on 19 petitioner’s cognizable claims. Respondent shall file with the answer and serve on 20 petitioner a copy of all portions of the state trial record that previously have been 21 transcribed and that are relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition. 22 3. If petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he shall do so by filing a traverse 23 with the Court and serving it on respondent’s counsel within thirty (30) days of the date the 24 answer is filed. 25 4. In lieu of an answer, respondent may file, on or before March 2, 2026, a motion 26 to dismiss on procedural grounds, as set forth in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 27 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. If respondent files such a motion, petitioner 1 || opposition within thirty (30) days of the date the motion is filed, and respondent shall file 2 || with the Court and serve on petitioner a reply within fifteen (15) days of the date any 3 || opposition is filed. 4 5. Petitioner is reminded that all communications with the Court must be served on 5 || respondent by mailing a true copy of the document to respondent’s counsel. 6 6. It is petitioner’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Petitioner must keep the 7 || Court and respondent informed of any change of address and must comply with the 8 || Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this 9 || action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 10 7. Upon a showing of good cause, requests for a reasonable extension of time will 11 || be granted provided they are filed on or before the deadline they seek to extend. 2 8. If respondent thinks this action should be transferred to the Central District of 5 13 || California, he shall file within 60 days from the date of this Order a motion for transfer. S 14 9. The Clerk shall enter Edward Borla as the sole respondent in this action and 3 15 || terminate all others. a 16 10. The Clerk shall change the Cause of Action to 28:2254 Petition for Writ of
17 || Habeas Corpus (State). The Clerk also shall change the Nature of Suit to 530 Habeas 18 || Corpus (General). 19 11. Alexander’s motion for counsel and his motion for summary judgment are 20 || DENIED. (Dkt. Nos. 12 and 13.) 21 12. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: November 7, 2025 “WQe 24 i LLIAM H. ORRICK 5 United States District Judge 26 27 28