Sterling Shaw v. Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 4, 2024
Docket23-35394
StatusUnpublished

This text of Sterling Shaw v. Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sterling Shaw v. Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sterling Shaw v. Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority, (9th Cir. 2024).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 4 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STERLING JAY SHAW, No. 23-35394

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00598-TL

v. MEMORANDUM* CENTRAL PUGET SOUND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, D.U.N.S. # 958427239,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Tana Lin, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 29, 2024**

Before: FRIEDLAND, BENNETT, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Sterling Jay Shaw appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his action alleging breach of contract arising from his employer’s

COVID-19 vaccination mandate. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.

The district court properly denied Shaw’s request for entry of default and

dismissed Shaw’s action because Shaw failed to establish federal subject matter

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (setting forth requirements for federal question

jurisdiction), § 1332(a) (setting forth requirements for diversity jurisdiction);

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (explaining

that the party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing federal

jurisdiction); see also Tuli v. Republic of Iraq (In re Tuli), 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th

Cir. 1999) (explaining that “a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its

jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties” before entering default).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

2 23-35394

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Related

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
511 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Padgett v. Wright
587 F.3d 983 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.
889 F.3d 956 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Sterling Shaw v. Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sterling-shaw-v-central-puget-sound-regional-transit-authority-ca9-2024.