Sterling Distributors, Inc. v. Patterson

236 F. Supp. 479, 15 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 461, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8431
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedDecember 18, 1964
DocketCiv. A. 63-348
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 236 F. Supp. 479 (Sterling Distributors, Inc. v. Patterson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sterling Distributors, Inc. v. Patterson, 236 F. Supp. 479, 15 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 461, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8431 (N.D. Ala. 1964).

Opinion

LYNNE, Chief Judge.

This action for recovery of a refund of income taxes for the calendar years 1959 and 1960 was submitted for judgment of the court, without the intervention of a jury, upon the pleadings, the order on pretrial hearing, the stipulation of facts filed herein, and evidence adduced upon the trial.

The facts, as stipulated by the parties and found by the court to be true, are set out in the margin. 1 Relating basical *481 ly to identified trade or business expenses claimed by plaintiff as authorized deductions in each of such years under the provisions of section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 2 and disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service, they serve merely to frame the real controversy pointed up by the testimony of live witnesses.

At the conclusion of the trial, the court announced its impression that claimed deductions in 1959 for payments to or for the benefit of licensees in the amount of $400 and for the cost of gift whiskey in the amount of $193.13, and in 1960 for salary paid to Agatha Nakos in the amount of $1500 and for payments to or for the benefit of licensees in the amount of $305.80 were properly disallowed. That impression has ripened into a firm conviction and the court holds that plaintiff is entitled to no refund on account of their disallowance.

With respect to the remaining deductions claimed in each year, matters stand differently. In substance, they represent either premiums or presents in the form *482 of free beer or rebates given to retail outlets to induce the purchase of beer distributed at wholesale by plaintiff or losses sustained by it on credit sales.

The business of wholesale distribution of beer in Jefferson County is highly competitive. Plaintiff’s competitors, handling the brands of rival manufacturers, have at all pertinent times and without exception followed the identical practices of offering inducements and extending credit. For plaintiff to have refrained from doing likewise would have resulted in a substantial loss of business. This is the uncontroverted evidence which would lead unerringly to the conclusion that such expenses were ordinary and necessary in the statutory sense 3 but for the consideration of Alabama public policy which led the Internal Revenue Service to disagree.

While neither the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 nor its predecessors contain any prohibition against deductibility of business expenses, otherwise ordinary and necessary, which violate or frustrate public policy, the courts, in the process of construing the limiting adjectives, “ordinary” and “necessary” have inevitably added such a gloss to the statute. In its latest definitive pronouncement upon the subject the Supreme Court, in Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 78 S.Ct. 507, 2 L.Ed.2d 562 (1958), announced a test of nondeductibility, which this court seeks to apply:

“[T]he test of nondeductibility always is the severity and immediacy of the frustration resulting from allowance of the deduction. The flexibility of such a standard is necessary if we are to accommodate both the congressional intent to tax only net income, and the presumption against congressional intent to encourage violation of declared public policy.” [Emphasis added.]

Too plain to admit of argument or extended discussion are the facts that plaintiff, by offering the inducements of free beer and rebates, has openly violated the provisions of title 29, section 37 of the Code of Alabama, and by extending credit has offended the provisions of title 29, section 41 of the Code of Alabama, and has also thereby committed acts in violation of pertinent regulations promulgated by the Alabama Beverage Control Board pursuant to the authority of title 29, section 6 of the Code of Alabama. All of such offenses constitute misdemeanors as provided by title 29, section 78 of the Code of Alabama.

If that were all, the court would encounter little difficulty in concluding that such deductions were properly disallowed and would be content to rely upon Dixie Machine Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1963) and United States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675 (10th Cir.1958) together with the cases cited and discussed therein. But the tale is not yet told. For the undisputed testimony of qualified and credible witnesses 4 makes it abundantly clear *483 that the Alabama Beverages Control Board, vested by the provisions of title 29, section 5 of the Code of Alabama with plenary authority to enforce such stat *484 utes and regulations has determined not to do so and to ignore them and has so directed its administrator and investigators. Thus the law upon which the Internal Revenue Service relies has become a dead letter, not expressive of current community sentiment at all. 5

It would be an apparent anachronism for this court now to hold that the expenses actually incurred by plaintiff in carrying on the trade or business violate or frustrate the public policy of the State of Alabama expressed in legislation and regulations which the State, through its authorized officers, long ago determined should not be enforced.

Judgment will accordingly be entered in conformity with this memorandum opinion.

1

. It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the respective parties that the following facts may be taken as true, subject to the right of either party to object to the materiality or relevancy thereof, or to introduce any further evidence not inconsistent therewith:

1. This is an action to recover income taxes paid by plaintiff. Jurisdiction and venuo are conferred on this Court by Title 28, United States Code, Section 1340 and Section 1391.

2. Plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Alabama with its principal place of business in the City of Birmingham, Alabama.

3. The defendant is the District Director of Internal Revenue for the District of Alabama, with whom the plaintiff filed its federal income tax returns for the calendar years 1959 and 1960, copies of which are attached to this stipulation and are identified as Exhibits A and B.

4. Por the calendar year 1959, plaintiff reported on its federal income tax return taxable income of $17,115.80 and paid the amount of income tax shown to be due thereon of $5,125.99.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
236 F. Supp. 479, 15 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 461, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8431, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sterling-distributors-inc-v-patterson-alnd-1964.