Stephens v. United Services Automobile Association
This text of Stephens v. United Services Automobile Association (Stephens v. United Services Automobile Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 KAY STEPHENS, an individual, and all others similarly situated, NO. 2:20-CV-0097-TOR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION v. 10 UNITED SERVICES 11 AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, a Texas reciprocal insurance exchange, 12 and CCC INFORMATION SERVICES INC., a Delaware 13 corporation,
14 Defendant. 15
16 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 17 42). This matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. The 18 Court has reviewed the record and files herein, and is fully informed. There is no 19 reason to wait for further briefing. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s 20 Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 42) is DENIED. 1 BACKGROUND 2 This case concerns Plaintiff’s allegations, on behalf of herself and a
3 proposed class of Washington personal vehicle policyholders, that USAA 4 systemically undervalues its customers’ total vehicle loss claims by relying on 5 CCC valuation reports, which Plaintiff alleges unlawfully apply an un-itemized
6 negative vehicle condition adjustment when calculating vehicle value. ECF No. 1- 7 2 at 2-3, ¶¶ 1.1-1.5. The factual background is summarized in the Court’s prior 8 Order at ECF No. 40. 9 On April 7 and 8, 2020, Defendants USAA and CCC each filed motions to
10 stay this case and compel Plaintiff to submit to an appraisal of her vehicle. ECF 11 Nos. 24, 26. On June 2, 2020, the Court heard argument on these motions. ECF 12 No. 39. On June 4, 2020, the Court partially granted Defendant USAA’s motion,
13 denied Defendant CCC’s motion as moot, and ordered Plaintiff to submit to an 14 appraisal during the normal course of discovery. ECF No. 40. On June 19, 2020, 15 Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 42. 16 DISCUSSION
17 A. Reconsideration Standard 18 Plaintiff’s motion does not identify the legal authority under which she seeks 19 reconsideration. ECF No. 42. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs
20 reconsideration of a non-final order. An order that resolves fewer than all the 1 claims among the parties – that is, a non-final order – “may be revised at any time 2 before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights
3 and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. 4 Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005). Where reconsideration of a non- 5 final order is sought, the court has “inherent jurisdiction to modify, alter, or
6 revoke” its order. United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000). 7 As a rule, a court should be “loathe” to revisit its own decisions “in the 8 absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was 9 ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’” Christianson v. Colt
10 Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (internal citation omitted). This 11 principle is embodied in the law of the case doctrine, under which “a court is 12 generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided by
13 the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.” United States v. Alexander, 14 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 15 (9th Cir. 1993)). While the district court possesses inherent power to reconsider 16 and amend previous orders, this is an extraordinary remedy that should be used
17 sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources. 18 B. Plaintiff’s Arguments for Reconsideration 19 Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration raises three interrelated arguments:
20 (1) the Court did not adequately consider the technical meaning of “actual cash 1 value” in its prior Order; (2) the Court should have adopted the reasoning of the 2 Stanizky court in the Western District of Washington; and (3) the Court’s Order
3 violates public policy. ECF No. 42 at 2-8. As the Court already articulated at oral 4 argument and in its written Order, Plaintiff’s arguments are based on a 5 characterization of her claims that differs from Plaintiff’s claims as they are written
6 in her Complaint. 7 First, Plaintiff contends the Court “may not have recognized” the regulatory 8 definition of the term “actual cash value.” ECF No. 42 at 2. Indeed, the Court was 9 aware of the term and the prior Order is consistent with the regulatory definition.
10 Washington insurance regulations define “actual cash value” as “the fair market 11 value of the loss vehicle immediately prior to the loss.” WAC 284-30-320(1). The 12 Court found that the appraisal clause in Plaintiff’s insurance contract was
13 enforceable under her breach of contract claim because the breach of contract 14 claim, as pled in Plaintiff’s Complaint, is fundamentally a dispute over the dollar 15 amount of the actual cash value of Plaintiff’s vehicle, or the “fair market value” of 16 Plaintiff’s vehicle prior to the loss. ECF No. 40 at 6-7. The Court’s Order is not
17 inconsistent with the regulatory definition of “actual cash value.” 18 Second, Plaintiff argues this Court should have adopted the Stanizky court’s 19 rationale in denying a similar motion to compel appraisal in the Western District of
20 Washington. ECF No. 42 at 3-4. As the Court already explained at oral argument, 1 the breach of contract claim in Stanizky is fundamentally different from the one 2 pled in Plaintiff’s Complaint. The alleged breach in Stanizky is a “failure to adjust
3 and pay [plaintiffs’] total loss claims pursuant to the criteria set forth in § 391 for 4 adjustment of total loss claims.” No. 2:20-cv-0118-BJR, ECF No. 3 at 19, ¶ 6.3 5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2020). By contrast, the alleged breach in Plaintiff’s
6 Complaint is “not offering to settle and by not settling claims based on the actual 7 cash value of loss vehicles.” ECF No. 1-2 at 14, ¶ 6.3. While the Stanizky 8 complaint alleges a breach of contract over the defendant’s failure to comply with 9 regulatory requirements, the plain text of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a breach of
10 contract over Defendants’ failure to settle claims based on the actual cash value, an 11 anticipated dollar amount, of Plaintiff’s vehicle. Unlike Stanizky, Plaintiff has pled 12 a claim that makes the issue “the insurer’s valuation of the loss,” which triggers
13 application of the appraisal provision of Plaintiff’s insurance policy. ECF No. 40 14 at 6-7. Plaintiff’s present characterization of her breach of contract claim cannot 15 override the language of her own Complaint. ECF No. 42 at 3-4. Contrary to 16 Plaintiff’s assertion, this Court has not “created a conflict between federal
17 authorities interpreting Washington law” because this case is distinguishable from 18 Stanizky. 19 Finally, Plaintiff argues that compelling Plaintiff to submit to an appraisal
20 operates against the public interest and is inconsistent with Washington’s policy of 1 || protecting insureds. ECF No. 42 at 4-8. Again, Plaintiff’s concerns may be traced to the language of her own Complaint.
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Stephens v. United Services Automobile Association, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stephens-v-united-services-automobile-association-waed-2020.