Stephens v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Stephens v. State

307 S.E.2d 9, 167 Ga. App. 417, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2507

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJune 21, 1983

Docket66023

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 307 S.E.2d 9 (Stephens v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Stephens v. State, 307 S.E.2d 9, 167 Ga. App. 417, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2507 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).

Pincite

Opinions

Pope, Judge.

This is an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion to suppress. The sole issue is whether the affidavit upon which the issuance of the search warrant was based can pass constitutional muster.

“The state has the burden of showing that probable cause existed and that the facts establishing probable cause were presented to the magistrate prior to the issuance of the warrant.” Reddish v. State, 161 Ga. App. 170 (288 SE2d 266) (1982). When, as here, the issuance of a search warrant is based solely upon the affirmations of probable cause in an affidavit, “the facts recited in the affidavit are determinative of the question.” Lewis v. State, 126 Ga. App. 123, 127 (190 SE2d 123) (1972). Additionally, when, as also here, the affirmation of the existence of probable cause is based upon information supplied to the affiant by an unnamed informant, the affidavit must set forth sufficient facts from which the magistrate or judge can independently determine the reliability of both the information and the informant. This, of course, is the venerable Aguilar-Spinelli test. State v. Jackson, 166 Ga. App. 671 (1) (305 SE2d 417) (1983); Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 696 (266 SE2d 338) (1980).

The affidavit at issue here states that the “affiant received information from a confidential and reliable informant. . . from a second confidential and reliable informant... [and] through a third confidential and reliable informant. ...” The only language in the affidavit bearing upon the reliability of the informants is: “Affiant’s informants #1, #2, and #3, have all proven their reliability by affiant’s verification of information through personal investigation. Informant #3’s information has led to the arrest of [defendant’s [418]*418alleged accomplice]. ...” For obvious reasons, the latter statement has no probative value whatsoever. The former statement is also deficient. It clearly provides no facts upon which the judge could have independently determined the reliability of the informants. There being no facts in the affidavit upon which a finding of reliability of the informants could be based, the information purportedly provided by those informants is entitled to no weight. See State v. Jackson, supra, and cases cited therein.

Decided June 21, 1983 Rehearing denied July 12, 1983 Daniel F. Byrne, Ansell T. Maund III, for appellants. Arthur E. Mallory III, District Attorney, for appellee.

Without this information, the affidavit does not support a finding of probable cause. The state has thus failed to satisfy its burden (Reddish v. State, supra) and it necessarily follows that the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion to suppress the fruits of the search.

Judgment reversed.

Quillian, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Pope, Judge.

This is an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion to suppress. The sole issue is whether the affidavit upon which the issuance of the search warrant was based can pass constitutional muster.

“The state has the burden of showing that probable cause existed and that the facts establishing probable cause were presented to the magistrate prior to the issuance of the warrant.” Reddish v. State, 161 Ga. App. 170 (288 SE2d 266) (1982). When, as here, the issuance of a search warrant is based solely upon the affirmations of probable cause in an affidavit, “the facts recited in the affidavit are determinative of the question.” Lewis v. State, 126 Ga. App. 123, 127 (190 SE2d 123) (1972). Additionally, when, as also here, the affirmation of the existence of probable cause is based upon information supplied to the affiant by an unnamed informant, the affidavit must set forth sufficient facts from which the magistrate or judge can independently determine the reliability of both the information and the informant. This, of course, is the venerable Aguilar-Spinelli test. State v. Jackson, 166 Ga. App. 671 (1) (305 SE2d 417) (1983); Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 696 (266 SE2d 338) (1980).

The affidavit at issue here states that the “affiant received information from a confidential and reliable informant. . . from a second confidential and reliable informant... [and] through a third confidential and reliable informant. ...” The only language in the affidavit bearing upon the reliability of the informants is: “Affiant’s informants #1, #2, and #3, have all proven their reliability by affiant’s verification of information through personal investigation. Informant #3’s information has led to the arrest of [defendant’s [418]*418alleged accomplice]. ...” For obvious reasons, the latter statement has no probative value whatsoever. The former statement is also deficient. It clearly provides no facts upon which the judge could have independently determined the reliability of the informants. There being no facts in the affidavit upon which a finding of reliability of the informants could be based, the information purportedly provided by those informants is entitled to no weight. See State v. Jackson, supra, and cases cited therein.

Decided June 21, 1983 Rehearing denied July 12, 1983 Daniel F. Byrne, Ansell T. Maund III, for appellants. Arthur E. Mallory III, District Attorney, for appellee.

Without this information, the affidavit does not support a finding of probable cause. The state has thus failed to satisfy its burden (Reddish v. State, supra) and it necessarily follows that the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion to suppress the fruits of the search.

Judgment reversed.

Quillian, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

307 S.E.2d 9, 167 Ga. App. 417, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2507, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stephens-v-state-gactapp-1983.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack