Stephens v. Hammersley

552 P.2d 652, 1976 Alas. LEXIS 320
CourtAlaska Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 4, 1976
DocketNo. 2505
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 552 P.2d 652 (Stephens v. Hammersley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alaska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stephens v. Hammersley, 552 P.2d 652, 1976 Alas. LEXIS 320 (Ala. 1976).

Opinion

OPINION ON REHEARING

Before BOOCHEVER, C. J., and RAB-INOWITZ, CONNOR, ERWIN and BURKE JJ.

BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice.

Appellees Hammersleys have requested a rehearing of our judgment of June 14, 1976 on the grounds that this court has overlooked, misapplied or failed to consider a directly controlling statute.1

The Hammersleys contend that the language of AS 22.10.030(a), AS 34.35.005 (a) and AS 34.35.110(a) provide for a different result from that of our decision. These statutes provide:

AS 22.10.030(a). All actions in ejectment or for the recovery of the possession of, quieting title to, for the partition of, or the enforcement of liens upon, real property shall be commenced in the superior court in the judicial district in which the real property, or any part of it affected by the action, is situated.
AS 34.35.005(a). When an action is required to enforce a lien provided for in § 5-425 of this chapter, the action shall be started in the superior court in the judicial district in which the property upon which the lien attaches is located.
[653]*653AS 34.35.110(a). An action to enforce a lien created by §§ 50-120 of this chapter shall be brought in the superior court. .

The Hammersleys argued that the use of the word “shall” in the above statutes confers exclusive jurisdiction in the superior court. We do not agree.

AS 22.10.030(a) [§ 17(2), Ch. 50, SLA 1959] was enacted in 1959. AS 34.-35.005(a) [§ 26-9-3, ACLA 1949] and AS 34.35.110(a) [§ 26-1-13, ACLA 1949] were enacted in 1949.2 AS 22.15.030(a)(9), the statute conferring the district court’s jurisdiction over liens, however, was enacted in 1971 [am. §§ 1-5, Ch. 38, SLA 1971] after the qualifications for district court judges were substantially strengthened by the legislature in 1967.3 By providing for jurisdiction over lien foreclosures, the legislature showed a clear intent to expand the district court’s jurisdiction into areas which formerly were the sole province of the superior court.4

Given the change in qualifications of district court judges prior to the expansion of the court’s jurisdiction, we see no reason to construe the language the Hammersleys cite so as to limit the jurisdiction of that court in a manner not expressly required by the statutory language. The language regarding the power of the district court over lien foreclosures is qualified so as to except foreclosures where the amount of the lien is over $10,000.00 but is not in any way qualified so as to except liens on real property either expressly or by implication. In other instances, the legislature has expressly stated the limits of a district court’s jurisdiction,5 or has otherwise made jurisdictional boundaries very clear.6

[654]*654In the absence of a clear intent by the legislature to limit the jurisdiction extended by AS 22.15.030(a) (9) to liens other than on real property, we refuse to so limit the district court’s jurisdiction.

We further find that the other matters raised in the petition are without merit.

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Related

Shaw v. Nanook, Inc.
64 P.3d 131 (Alaska Supreme Court, 2003)
Stephens v. Hammersley
550 P.2d 1268 (Alaska Supreme Court, 1976)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
552 P.2d 652, 1976 Alas. LEXIS 320, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stephens-v-hammersley-alaska-1976.