Stephens v. City of Oklahoma City

1931 OK 423, 1 P.2d 367, 150 Okla. 199, 1931 Okla. LEXIS 335
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedJuly 7, 1931
Docket20175
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 1931 OK 423 (Stephens v. City of Oklahoma City) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stephens v. City of Oklahoma City, 1931 OK 423, 1 P.2d 367, 150 Okla. 199, 1931 Okla. LEXIS 335 (Okla. 1931).

Opinion

ANDREWS, J.

The plaintiffs in error, hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs, instituted a suit in the district court of Oklahoma county against the defendants in error, hereinafter referred to as defendants, to enjoin them from enforcing the provisions of Ordinance No. 3391 adopted by the defendant city. At the conclusion of the evidence of the plaintiffs, the trial court sustained a demurrer thereto filed by the defendants, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. Prom that judgment an appeal was taken to this court.

The record shows that the plaintiffs are residents of Oklahoma City and engaged in the milk and dairy business, and the sale and distribution of raw milk to consumers in the city of Oklahoma City. The city adopted the ordinance in question, and is attempting to enforce the provisions thereof. The plaintiffs have not paid or offered to pay the license fee provided by the ordinance, and brought this action to determine whether or not they should be compelled to pay such fee.

The plaintiffs contend that the ordinance is invalid for the reason that the fees therein provided to be charged are unreasonable, arbitrary, unjust, and discriminatory, in that the fees therein provided to be charged persons operating inspected dairies are not uniform and equal with those to be charged persons operating pasteurizing plants and farm dairies, and that there is no such reasonable difference in the situation and circumstances as to suggest the practical necessity of making such a distinction in the amount of license fees therein provided to be charged.

It is agreed that the ordinance is a regulatory one and not for the purpose of raising revenue, and that the license fees charged may not exceed the expense of issuing the license and regulating the business. Mitchell v. City of Lawton, 124 Okla. 60, 253 Pac. 999.

We are thus presented with three questions : First, is the legislative body authorized to classify the milk industry into three classes, to wit, farm dairies, inspected dairies, and pasteurizing plants? Second, are the fees provided to be charged operators of inspected dairies in excess of the expense of issuing the license and regulating that business? And third, is there an tin-reasonable, arbitrary, and unjust discrimination between the amount of fees provided to be charged operators of inspected dairies and the amount of fees provided to be charged operators of pasteurizing plants or farm dairies?

The plaintiffs assume that the legislation is intended to stamp out the sale, delivery, and consumption of raw milk through the imposition of excessive license fees upon inspected dairies, thereby preferring those operating pasteurizing plants and those engaged in the sale of milk to pasteurizing plants. This court cannot assume any such legislative intent, and there is no evidence in the record to support that theory. The ordinance appears from the record to have been enacted within the legislative authority of the municipality. Such an ordinance is presumed to be valid, and, in the absence of evidence of invalidity, it is the duty of this court to hold it valid.

If is contended that the inspected dairies, pasteurizing plants, and farm dairies are in the same class in that they are all engaged in the milk industry. Be that as it may, the record shows a necessity for classification, and we think the classification made is shown by the record to be reasonable. The expense of issuing the licenses provided for by the ordinance is shown not to be the same for inspected dairies as it is for pasteurizing plants or farm dairies. The work " incident to inspection and regulation of inspected dairies is shown to be in excess of that required for farm dairies. This court cannot say from the record in this case that the legislative body was not *201 justified in classifying the milk industry into classes consisting of inspected dairies, pasteurizing plants, and farm dairies.

No question is presented as to lack of uniformity within the classes designated, and the record shows that there is no discrimination therein.

There is nothing in the record to show that the fee provided to be charged for the operation of inspected dairies is in excess of the expense of issuing the license and regulating the business. These fees vary from $10 to $30 per year, according to the number of cows in the herd. The record shows that an inspection of those dairies is made before a license 'is issued; that the dairies are scattered over a portion of Oklahoma, extending from McLoud to El Reno, and from the Kansas line to Pauls Valley; that the dairies are scored for cleanliness and protection after careful investigation of the herd, barns, milking arrangements, facilities for cooling, storing and transporting milk, and otherwise; that monthly inspections are made after license is issued, and in warm weather semi-monthly inspections are made; that officers are employed and paid to perform the services incident to the inspection and regulation; that the total cost thereof to the city is an amount in excess of the total revenue from the licenses provided for by the ordinance; and that it is necessary for the public health and safety that there be both an inspection and regulation of dairies furnishing raw milk for sale - to and consumption by the people of the defendant city. This court is unable to say from the evidence that the maximum fee charged is in excess of the expense of the issuance of license and regulation of the business, and the record shows that the cost thereof is considerably in excess of the amounts charged.

The principal contention of the plaintiffs is that, there is an unreasonable, arbitrary, and unjust discrimination between the amount of fees provided to be charged operators of inspected dairies and the amount of fees provided to be charged operators of pasteurizing plants and farm dairies. The plaintiffs contend that the approximate amount of fees proposed to be charged inspected dairies is $2,110, that of farm dairies $500, and that of pasteurizing plants $450, and that inspected dairies are charged more than twice as much in fees as farm dairies and pasteurizing plants combined. The plaintiffs contend that it takes more work and costs the city more for inspection and regulation of farm dairies and pasteurizing plants than for inspected dairies. They contend that 60 per cent, of the milk business is controlled by the pasteurizing plants, which receive and distribute the milk from the farm dairies, and that less than half of the amount of fees are collected from them as are collected from the inspected dairies.

The record shows that milk from what is denominated in the ordinance as “farm dairies,” is not sold in the raw state to consumers, but is delivered to pasteurizing plants for treatment prior to sale to consumers.

The public health regulations and the authorities on public health agree that the process of pasteurization is such as to kill bacteria existing in milk. Milk is a food of general use; it is sensitive and easily contaminated, and bacteria develops therein rapidly. Milk is affected not only by the animal from which it comes, but by the persons handling- the same and the conditions under which it is handled. That the consuming public may be protected by the public health officials of a municipality, it is necessary that there be inspection and regulation, not only of the cattle from which the milk comes and the vessels in which it is kept, but the conditions under which it is kept.

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Bluebook (online)
1931 OK 423, 1 P.2d 367, 150 Okla. 199, 1931 Okla. LEXIS 335, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stephens-v-city-of-oklahoma-city-okla-1931.