Stephens v. Child Support Services of Oklahoma

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: January 16, 2026
• Docket: 25-5063
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-5063 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 16, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court LINH TRAN STEPHENS,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 25-5063 v. (D.C. No. 4:24-CV-00216-JDR-CDL) (N.D. Okla.) CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES OF OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; CHARLES SCHWAB & CO., INC.; CIERRA FREEMAN, individually and in her official capacity as court-appointed attorney for child-support enforcement; MARY JOHNMEYER, individually and in her official capacity as legal counsel of Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.; RENEE BANKS, individually and in her official capacity as Director of Child Support Services of Oklahoma Department of Human Services; JASON HOENSHELL, individually and in his official capacity as Oklahoma FIDM Coordinator; EMMALENE STRINGER, individually and in her official capacity as attorney for Child Support Services of Oklahoma Department of Human Services,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

JOHN DOES 1-10, employees of Child Support Services of Oklahoma Department of Human Services; JOHN DOES 11-20, employees of Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.,

Defendants. Appellate Case: 25-5063 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 2

_________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before CARSON, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

After an Oklahoma court ordered Linh Tran Stephens to pay more than

$60,000 in past-due child support, Oklahoma Child Support Services (CSS) levied a

retirement account she held with Charles Schwab & Company (Schwab), and Schwab

sold investments in the account to satisfy the levy. Ms. Stephens then filed this pro

se lawsuit alleging the actions of CSS, Schwab, several of their employees, and a

court-appointed attorney had violated her constitutional rights and been unlawful in

multiple ways, including under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (RICO), the Fair Debt Collection Act (FDCA), the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), federal criminal statutes, and tort law.

The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss, ruling: (1) Eleventh

Amendment immunity bars Ms. Stephens’s claims against CSS and her claims for

damages against CSS employees in their official capacities; (2) Younger abstention

requires dismissal of her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief because they

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

2 Appellate Case: 25-5063 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 3

seek to interfere in ongoing proceedings that involve orders “uniquely in furtherance

of the Oklahoma courts’ ability to perform their judicial function,” R., vol. 2 at 235

(brackets omitted) (quoting Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am v. A-Quality Auto Sales,

Inc., 98 F.4th 1307, 1317 (10th Cir. 2024)) 1; and (3) her complaint failed to state a

claim on which relief could be granted against Schwab or any individual. The court

denied Ms. Stephens’s several pending motions as moot and entered judgment.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. We review the dismissal of

Ms. Stephens’s claims de novo. See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Anderson, 119 F.4th

732, 735 (10th Cir. 2024) (Eleventh Amendment immunity); Graff v. Aberdeen

Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 524 (10th Cir. 2023) (Younger abstention);

Timmins v. Plotkin, 157 F.4th 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 2025) (failure to state a claim).

We construe Ms. Stephens’s pro se filings liberally. See Garrett v. Selby

Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). But we do not act as

her advocate and therefore will not search the record, conduct research, or construct

arguments for her. See id. at 840–41. Ms. Stephens’s “first task” as the appellant is

“to explain to us why the district court’s decision was wrong.” Nixon v. City & Cnty.

of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015). “[A] tale of apparent injustice may

assist in that task, but it cannot substitute for legal argument.” Id.

1 Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), “a federal court must abstain from deciding a case otherwise within the scope of its jurisdiction in certain instances in which the prospect of undue interference with state proceedings counsels against federal relief.” Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 522 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). 3 Appellate Case: 25-5063 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 4

Ms. Stephens has not shown any reversible error in the district court’s rulings.

Her opening brief lists seventeen issues for review. But several of those do not relate

to the reasons her claims were dismissed. The remainder are presented in too

conclusory a fashion to show how she believes the district court erred. Moreover, her

opening brief never addresses Younger abstention or Eleventh Amendment immunity.

By not doing so, Ms. Stephens has waived her opportunity to appeal the district

court’s application of those doctrines. See Burke v. Pitts, 157 F.4th 1326, 1342–43

(10th Cir. 2025) (stating we will not consider issues that are not adequately presented

in an opening brief or are raised for the first time in a reply). Beyond that, even

construing her opening brief as contesting the conclusion that her complaint did not

plausibly state any claim against Schwab or any individual defendant, we see no

reason to reverse that ruling.

Accordingly, having reviewed the briefs, the record, and the relevant

authorities, we affirm the dismissal of Ms. Stephens’s claims for substantially the

same reasons stated by the district court. We therefore also affirm the district court’s

denial of her motions for an emergency injunction and other relief. We deny as moot

Ms. Stephens’s motion for a stay or injunction pending appeal and we deny her

motions to disqualify and sanction opposing counsel and for judicial notice.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge