Stephens v. Bongart

189 A. 131, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 1937 N.J. Misc. LEXIS 1
CourtEssex County Family Court
DecidedJanuary 5, 1937
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 189 A. 131 (Stephens v. Bongart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Essex County Family Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stephens v. Bongart, 189 A. 131, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 1937 N.J. Misc. LEXIS 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1937).

Opinion

Siegler, Judge.

Helen Stephens, attendance officer of the school district of the town of West Orange in the county of Essex, filed her complaint against Gertrude R. Bongart and Benno Bongart, the defendants in this action, charging that they reside within the school district of the town of West Orange, and being the parents and having custody and control of William Bongart, aged twelve, and Robert Bongart, aged eleven, their children, have, since the 5th day of April, 1936, failed to cause their said children regularly to attend the public schools of the school district of the said town of West Orange; further charging said defendants having neither caused said children to attend a day school in which there is given instruction equivalent to that provided in the public schools for children of similar grades and attainments, nor have they received equivalent instruction elsewhere than at school, contrary to the provisions of [81]*81an act of the legislature of the State of New Jersey entitled, “An act to establish a thorough and efficient system of free public schools and to provide for the maintenance, support and management thereof,” approved October 19th, one thousand nine hundred and three, and the amendments thereof and supplements thereto.

The act upon which these proceedings are based, chapter 307 of the laws of 1931 (N. J. Stat. Annual 1931, § 185-165c), reads as follows:

“Every parent, guardian or other person having custody and control of a child between the ages of seven and sixteen years shall cause such child regularly to attend the public schools of such district or to attend a day school in which there is given instruction equivalent to that provided in the public schools for children of similar grades and attainments or to receive equivalent instruction elsewhere than at school unless such child is above the age of fourteen years. * * * Such regular attendance shall be during all the days and hours that the public schools are in session in said school district, unless it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the board of education of said school district that the mental condition of such child is such that he or she cannot benefit from instruction in the school or that the bodily condition of the child is such as to prevent his or her attendance at school; * * *.”

The legislature has conferred power and authority upon this court to hear and determine issues condemned by the aforesaid legislation by chapter 34 of the laws of 1919, pages 69-70, approved April 7th, 1919. Cum. Supp. Comp. Stat. 1911-1924, p. 3219, § 185-165v.

The first point raised by the defendants is that the statute under which these proceedings are brought; to wit, chapter 307 of the Jaws of 1931, is invalid because it invades the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution. The problem for determination is whether the statute, as construed and applied, unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to the defendants by the fourteenth amendment: “No State shall * * * deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” This statute is a [82]*82legitimate exercise of the police power of the state. The object of the legislation was to create an enlightened American citizenship in sympathy with our principles and ideals, and to prevent children reared in America from remaining ignorant and illiterate. If it is within the police power of the state to regulate wages, to legislate respecting housing conditions in crowded cities, to prohibit dark rooms in tenement houses, to compel landlords to place windows in their tenements which will enable their tenants to enjoy the sunshine, it is within the police power of the state to compel every resident of New Jersey so to educate his children that the light of American ideals will permeate the life of our future citizens. Police power itself is an attribute of sovereignty. It exists without any reservation in the constitution. It is founded on the right of the state to protect its citizens, provide for their welfare and progress, and to insure the good of society. It corresponds to the right of self-preservation in the individual. Its application varies with the exigencies of the situation and with the progress of mankind. It is the foundation of our social system, and upon it depends the securing of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of existence, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property. It extends to the protection of life, health, comfort, and welfare of persons, the protection of property, and to the welfare of the state itself. All natural persons within the jurisdiction hold their property and pursue their various callings subject to the police power. It is inherent in the various states of the union, as well as in the federal government. It extends to regulation of education; for the very existence of our government, as well as its progress and development, depend upon the intelligence of our citizenry. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539; Muller v. Oregon, 208 Id. 412; Holden v. Hardy, 169 Id. 366; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 Id. 11.

The defendants rely upon the authority of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Pierce v. Hill Military Academy, 268 Id. 510, for support of their contention that the legislation under considera[83]*83tion is unconstitutional. The issue in the Pierce case, supra, was not that involved here. There the court was considering property rights of the appellees; the right to engage in the business of conducting a school for the instruction of children; but throughout the whole case the question of the right of the state to require children to attend school was not challenged; this right appeared to be conceded.

The court states, in that case, (at p. 534) :

“Ho question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; io require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.” (Italics mine.)

In Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, the court was concerned with a prohibition against teaching the German language to children under fourteen unless they had completed eighth grade work, and did not touch the question of the power of the state to compel education. It dealt with the right of the teacher to practice his profession, which was regarded as a property right. The question had no relation to the power of the state to compel education of the children and the duty of the parent to see to it that the children received education. The United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice McBejmolds (at p. 402), said:

“The power of the state to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instruction in English, is not questioned. Hor has challenge been made of the state’s power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports. These matters are not within the present controversy.”

See 24 R. C. L.

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Bluebook (online)
189 A. 131, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 1937 N.J. Misc. LEXIS 1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stephens-v-bongart-njfamctessex-1937.