Stephen Roberts and Steven Roberts v. D & W Auto Sales

Court of Appeals of Texas

Stephen Roberts and Steven Roberts v. D & W Auto Sales

DecidedApril 30, 2002

Docket06-01-00132-CV

StatusPublished

This text of Stephen Roberts and Steven Roberts v. D & W Auto Sales (Stephen Roberts and Steven Roberts v. D & W Auto Sales) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Stephen Roberts and Steven Roberts v. D & W Auto Sales, (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).

Pincite

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-01-00132-CV

STEPHEN ROBERTS AND STEVEN ROBERTS, Appellants

V.

D & W AUTO SALES, Appellee

On Appeal from the 62nd Judicial District Court

Hopkins County, Texas

Trial Court No. 32,671

Before Cornelius, C.J., Grant and Ross, JJ.

Opinion by Justice Grant

O P I N I O N

Stephen Roberts (Roberts) and his son, Steven Roberts (Steven), appeal the take-nothing judgment rendered after a bench trial regarding their Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) and contract claims arising from the purchase of a 1997 Pontiac Firebird from Ray Williams, d/b/a D & W Auto Sales (Williams).

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that Williams did not make misrepresentations to Roberts or Steven concerning the automobile in question, that Williams had made full disclosure concerning the condition of the subject automobile, that the "as is" buyer's guide prevailed over any alleged oral promises concerning the car, that the issues of value and repairs of the subject automobile had been previously litigated, and that Roberts was not a consumer under the DTPA.

In 1998 Williams purchased a 1997 Pontiac Firebird vehicle from USA Auto Sales in Dallas, owned by Charles Roberts, an estranged son of Stephen Roberts, for $6,300. The vehicle was delivered to Bobby Deaton, a mechanic working for Williams, to "get [the car] running." On October 14, 1998, the Appellants negotiated for and purchased the Firebird from Williams. Roberts was an automobile dealer and a dealer in salvage automobiles. Both Williams and Deaton warned Roberts not to purchase the automobile because it had been submerged in water and had a salvage title. The purchase price was $9,000, with $6,300 down and $2,700 to be paid within a few days. Steven signed a document referred to as a buyer's guide containing an "as is" disclaimer. This document clearly stated that the vehicle had been subjected to water damage and carried a salvage title. Handwritten on the bottom of the buyer's guide was the notation, "To pay for inspection in Tyler" and beside that "$300."

After Steven received the actual certificate of title for the vehicle, he took the vehicle to Dallas to be inspected and was denied a title. Roberts testified the car cannot have a title issued in any state in the United States. Roberts and Steven initiated the current lawsuit. After the court entered judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing, the trial court filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at the request of the Appellants.

In a nonjury case, the trial court's findings of fact have the same force and dignity as a jury verdict and therefore challenged findings of fact are reviewed for the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting them by the same standards as are applied to jury findings. Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on an appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or there is no evidence to support the finding. See Zieba v. Martin, 928 S.W.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).

In reviewing for legal sufficiency, we consider only the evidence and inferences supporting the finding and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 953 S.W.2d 733, 738 (Tex. 1997). If more than a scintilla of probative evidence supports the finding, the no-evidence challenge fails. Id. In reviewing for factual sufficiency, we weigh all of the evidence in the record and overturn the finding only if it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996).

The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable only when attacked as a matter of law. See Waggoner, 932 S.W.2d at 631. The standard of review for conclusions of law is whether they are correct; they will be upheld on appeal if the judgment may be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence and need not be reversed if the controlling findings of fact will support a correct legal theory. Amerada Hess Corp. v. Wood Group Prod. Tech., 30 S.W.3d 5, 11 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

Although stated as Conclusion of Law E, the court's finding that Williams did not make misrepresentations to Roberts or Steven concerning the automobile in question is substantively a finding of fact. We shall therefore review the finding for legal and factual sufficiency.

Appellants contend Williams violated Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.46(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002), in that he made a representation (1) that the automobile was of a particular standard, quality, or grade when it was another; (2) that caused misunderstanding about the certification of the automobile; and (3) that the agreement conferred or involved rights that it did not confer. They alleged that at the time of the sale, Williams represented that the automobile in question had a roadworthy title and that such representation was false because the vehicle's Florida certificate of title would allow the car to be sold for salvage only, and it could never be titled as a roadworthy vehicle.

The court's uncontested findings of fact include that Steven knew that the subject automobile had a salvage title before purchase, that as part of the transaction Steven received a buyers guide that stated on its face that the automobile had a salvage title and was a water-damaged car, and that Steven read and understood the buyers guide he signed in connection with the purchase of the automobile. There is evidence in the record to support each of these findings of fact. Insofar as the Appellants allege Williams represented that the automobile had a roadworthy title at the time of sale, we are bound by the court's finding of fact that at the time of the sale, Steven was aware the automobile had a salvage title. Roberts testified he knew the automobile had a salvage title. He testified he understood that to mean "you buy the car; you fix it; you get it inspected by the State and get a reconditioned title for it. . . . That's the way it works most of the time." Therefore, both Roberts and Steven understood at the time of the transaction that the automobile did not have a rebuilt title.

Although the title of the automobile in question was not entered into evidence, there is evidence in the record to suggest the title was a salvage title from Florida, or a nonrebuildable title from Florida.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI