Stephen R. Walters v. Derrick Bradley

Opinion

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 4, 2026; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2024-CA-1247-MR

STEPHEN R. WALTERS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE BRIAN C. MCCLOUD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CI-00376

DERRICK BRADLEY APPELLEE

OPINION

AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND MCNEILL, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: Stephen Walters appeals the Greenup Circuit Court’s order granting summary judgment to Derrick Bradley on Walters’ claims of abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Finding no error, we affirm.

Walters and Bradley are next-door neighbors with a long and fraught interpersonal history. In 2021, Walters initiated a civil suit after Bradley allegedly

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hit him with his truck and caused injuries (the motor vehicle case). Bradley denied the incident and the case was settled sometime after discovery commenced.

Before it settled, when Bradley was mowing his lawn, Walters exited his own home and “flipped him off.” Bradley admits returning the gesture but says Walters then pulled out his firearm and pointed it at Bradley. Walters denies it.

Bradley contacted his personal attorney who advised him to contact law enforcement. Bradley followed this advice and two Kentucky State Troopers arrived at the property to take statements from both men.

Walters said he did not have a gun. One officer knew this to be false from his previous dealings with Walters where the officer personally saw his firearms. Accordingly, officers perceived Walters to be dishonest during this interaction and reported that he acted “belligerent.” After Walters refused to provide a recorded statement, officers left, purportedly to further investigate. Walters later testified in deposition that he owns at least nine firearms, carries a firearm on his person every day, and always has a firearm within arm’s reach.

A few days later, on October 12, 2021, Bradley executed an affidavit which described the incident and ultimately resulted in Walters’ arrest for Second Degree Wanton Endangerment. Walters was acquitted at trial.

Walters then initiated the underlying lawsuit, alleging that by filing his affidavit in the criminal case, “Bradley acted with malice, due to the fact that he

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had previous altercations with the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff has filed a Personal Injury action[.]” He asserted claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The Greenup Circuit Court granted summary judgment for Bradley. Walters now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment under a de novo standard. Adams v. Sietsema, 533 S.W.3d 172, 177 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Shelton v. Ky. Easter Seals Soc’y, Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Ky. 2013)).

ANALYSIS

I. Abuse of Process The tort of abuse of process is “the irregular or wrongful employment of a judicial proceeding[.]” Stoll Oil Refining Company v. Pierce, 337 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Ky. 1960). Under Kentucky law, an action for abuse of process involves two elements: (1) an ulterior purpose or motive and (2) a willful act by use of legal process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Simpson v. Laytart, 962 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Ky. 1998). Both elements must be established to prevail.

We first address whether Bradley acted with an ulterior purpose or motive in engaging the legal process. Walters claims Bradley’s ulterior purpose was to “gain the upper hand in the [motor vehicle] case.” (Record at 7). He further argues “[Bradley] launched the criminal action with an improper motive,

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namely to retaliate and cause detriment to the [Walters] in response to the civil action the [Walters] had previously brought against the [Bradley].” (Appellant Brief at 13). He provides no support for the allegations.

Walters never articulated how Bradley’s initiation of the proceedings would gain for him an upper hand in the motor vehicle case. It is not lost on this Court that the parties have had an ongoing dispute far beyond the facts of record. But we are faced with only one incident—what occurred on October 7, 2021— when Walters allegedly pointed a firearm at Bradley who responded by contacting the police. If there is an ulterior purpose, it is eclipsed by the quite reasonable purpose of reporting a crime. Hunt v. Commonwealth, 304 S.W.3d 15, 38 (Ky. 2009) (pointing a gun in another person’s direction “creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person in violation of KRS 508.060”).

The second element, a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding, “usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property on the payment of money, by the use of the process as a threat or a club.” Simpson, 962 S.W.2d at 395 (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, Section 121 (4th ed. 1971)).

There is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion. Sprint Communications Co.,

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L.P. v. Leggett, 307 S.W.3d 109, 113 (Ky. 2010) (citing W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 121 (4th ed. 1971)). Bradley did not attempt to contact the county attorney’s office or ask for an update, or whether and when Walters would be arrested. Bradley did not offer to drop the charge(s) in return for a Walters’ grant or some advantage in the motor vehicle case. These actions are the type that might indicate abuse of process, but there is no evidence in the record that Bradley attempted to compel anything from Walters. Because Walters cannot establish either element of this claim, the trial court properly granted summary judgment.

II. Malicious Prosecution Malicious prosecution consists of commencing an action or causing process to issue maliciously or without justification. Simpson, 962 S.W.2d at 394. Historically, the tort of malicious prosecution has not been favored in the law. Lexington Cab Co. v. Terrell, 137 S.W.2d 721 (Ky. 1940). “Public policy requires that all persons be able to freely resort to the courts for redress of a wrong, and the law should and does protect them when they commence a civil or criminal action in good faith and upon reasonable grounds.” Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Ky. 1981), abrogated on other grounds by Martin v. O’Daniel, 507 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2016). Thus, a party asserting malicious prosecution must strictly comply with the elements of a malicious prosecution action. Davis v. Brady, 291 S.W. 412 (Ky. 1927).

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Walters identifies six elements for a malicious prosecution claim as set forth in Raine, supra, but this is dated authority. In 2016, noting the strict compliance requirement, the Kentucky Supreme Court provided an unambiguous articulation. Martin, 507 S.W.3d at 7. The overarching principles remain, but the Supreme Court set forth just five factual elements a claimant must show to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim:

(1) the defendant initiated, continued, or procured a criminal or civil judicial proceeding, or an administrative disciplinary proceeding against the plaintiff;

(2) the defendant acted without probable cause;

(3) the defendant acted with malice, which, in the criminal context, means seeking to achieve a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice; and in the civil context, means seeking to achieve a purpose other than the proper adjudication of the claim upon which the underlying proceeding was based;

(4) the proceeding, except in ex parte civil actions, terminated in favor of the person against whom it was brought; and

(5) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the proceeding.

Martin, 507 S.W.3d at 11–12.

To survive summary judgment, Walters was required to present proof sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding each element. Failing even only one requires summary judgment for Bradley.

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We start by acknowledging, as Bradley did, that the first and fourth elements are satisfied. Our focus is the second element—a lack of probable cause.

To succeed at trial, Walters must show Bradley acted without probable cause. To succeed against a motion for summary judgment, he must present enough evidence to create that genuine issue regarding that material fact.

Probable cause is that which “would induce a man of ordinary prudence to believe that the person prosecuted had committed the crime charged.” Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Sharp, 140 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Ky. 1940). A finding of probable cause in a criminal action creates a rebuttable presumption that this element of a malicious prosecution claim cannot be satisfied. Davidson v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 597, 607 (Ky. App. 2006).

Walters was charged with second-degree wanton endangerment under KRS 508.070, which provides “[a] person is guilty of wanton endangerment in the second degree when he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a substantial danger of physical injury to another person.”

Following the incident, Bradley contacted his personal attorney, who advised him to contact law enforcement. Acting upon this advice, Bradley proceeded to contact law enforcement who took a statement from him. Bradley specifically said he was concerned for his own safety as well as his family’s safety. Seeking a statement from Walters, officers arrived at his home and asked if

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Walters had pointed any firearms at his neighbor. Walters told officers he did not own a gun. As stated above, the officers knew that was false.

Although Walters disputes ever pointing a gun at Bradley, his only assertion against probable cause is that the criminal case terminated in his favor. That is not enough. Martin v. O’Daniel did nothing to affect the jurisprudence regarding what proof is needed to demonstrate a lack of probable cause. It has long been so that “a majority of the jurisdictions where the question has been considered hold that an acquittal in a criminal prosecution is not prima facie evidence of want of probable cause for instituting the prosecution, and such is the rule in Kentucky.” Haseldon v. York, 112 S.W.2d 984, 986 (Ky. 1938).

Additionally, Bradley argues the advice-of-counsel defense serves as a bar to Walters’ assertion there was a lack of probable cause. It is a bar to the claim where an aggrieved party seeks the advice of an attorney, either private or a public prosecuting attorney, and presents to him fairly and accurately all the relevant facts, after which the attorney counsels the party on whether to file a complaint. Garcia v. Whitaker, 400 S.W.3d 270, 275 (Ky. 2013). Acting on advice of counsel after providing accurate information “is in actual effect another method of proving probable cause.” Id. (citation omitted).

There is no allegation much less proof that the facts Bradley relayed to counsel were not fairly and accurately described, nor is there any indication

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from Walters that this defense is otherwise inapplicable. Walters cannot make a showing that his arrest warrant contained false statements or that untrue or incomplete facts were relayed to counsel. Therefore, he failed to create a genuine issue of material fact to create a jury question on the issue he was required to prove—that Bradley lacked probable cause to initiate the proceeding. There was probable cause and the motion for summary judgment eliminated all genuine issue regarding that fact.

Walters’ remaining arguments, where regarding the other elements or otherwise, are moot.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Greenup Circuit Court’s order granting summary judgment to Appellee is AFFIRMED.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Sebastian M. Joy J. Stan Lee Catlettsburg, Kentucky Madeleine B. Loeffler Lexington, Kentucky