1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 STEPHEN P. JONES, Case No. 26-cv-02046-RMI
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 9 v. TO AMEND
10 CARLOS ARCE, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 5, 9 Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 15 DISCUSSION 16 1. Standard of Review 17 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 18 redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 19 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any 20 claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 21 seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 22 Pleadings submitted by pro se parties must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 23 Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 25 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While specific facts are not necessary, the 26 statement needs to give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon 27 which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Although a plaintiff need not include 1 cause of action and state conclusions; rather, a plaintiff must state factual allegations sufficient to 2 raise the entitlement to relief “above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 3 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 4 on its face.” Id. at 570. The Supreme Court has explained the standard this way: “While legal 5 conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 6 allegations . . . [and] [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 7 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft 8 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 9 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 10 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 11 the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 12 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 13 2. Legal Claims 14 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health 15 needs, and that he was the victim of a physical and sexual assault. 16 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined 17 are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 18 (1993). A mentally ill prisoner may establish unconstitutional treatment by prison officials through 19 showing that officials have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Doty v. 20 Cnty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 21 (9th Cir. 1982) (mental health care requirements analyzed as part of general health care 22 requirements). A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 23 result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Doty, 37 F.3d 24 at 546; see, e.g., Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2010) (a heightened 25 suicide risk or an attempted suicide is a serious medical need; reversing grant of summary 26 judgment where plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the decedent’s pre- 27 suicidal actions objectively evidenced a serious medical need), reinstated as modified by 658 F.3d 1 The objective component of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim does not have a 2 “categorical standard,” but rather is “contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of 3 decency.” Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hudson v. 4 McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). A prisoner “must objectively show that he was deprived of 5 something sufficiently serious . . . but what constitutes a sufficiently serious deprivation may 6 evolve as the basic mores of society change.” Id. at 1141 (internal quotations and citations 7 omitted). The core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain 8 or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7. 9 “Sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer is a violation of the 10 Eighth Amendment.” Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 11 In evaluating a prisoner’s claim of sexual harassment or abuse, courts consider whether “the 12 officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind” and if the alleged wrongdoing was 13 objectively “harmful enough” to establish a constitutional violation. Id. (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. 14 at 8.). 15 Plaintiff states that he was transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison and reported to 16 custody staff that he was in fear of his life and feeling suicidal and homicidal. He began to cut his 17 wrists, but an unidentified mental health doctor continued to clear Plaintiff to go back to the yard. 18 Custody staff refused to place him in restrictive housing for his safety. On a different day, 19 Defendant Omlansky removed Plaintiff from his cell, choked him for no reason, and hit him in the 20 torso striking his penis. Omlansky pressed his body against Plaintiff while choking him and 21 pushed against him with his penis and grinded against him. A different unidentified correctional 22 officer later told Plaintiff to drop his complaint against Omlansky and she would place him in 23 restrictive housing for his safety, but if he kept saying he was suicidal and did not drop the 24 complaint, she would not report his safety concerns. 25 Liberally construed, Plaintiff states a claim against Omlansky for the physical and sexual 26 assault. The remaining claims are dismissed with leave to amend. With respect to the failure to 27 properly treat Plaintiff’s mental health needs, he must identify the doctor or other medical staff 1 correctional officer involved. Finally, Plaintiff names the warden of the prison as a Defendant due 2 to his supervisory position.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 STEPHEN P. JONES, Case No. 26-cv-02046-RMI
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 9 v. TO AMEND
10 CARLOS ARCE, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 5, 9 Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 15 DISCUSSION 16 1. Standard of Review 17 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 18 redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 19 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any 20 claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 21 seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 22 Pleadings submitted by pro se parties must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 23 Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 25 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While specific facts are not necessary, the 26 statement needs to give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon 27 which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Although a plaintiff need not include 1 cause of action and state conclusions; rather, a plaintiff must state factual allegations sufficient to 2 raise the entitlement to relief “above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 3 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 4 on its face.” Id. at 570. The Supreme Court has explained the standard this way: “While legal 5 conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 6 allegations . . . [and] [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 7 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft 8 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 9 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 10 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 11 the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 12 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 13 2. Legal Claims 14 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health 15 needs, and that he was the victim of a physical and sexual assault. 16 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined 17 are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 18 (1993). A mentally ill prisoner may establish unconstitutional treatment by prison officials through 19 showing that officials have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Doty v. 20 Cnty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 21 (9th Cir. 1982) (mental health care requirements analyzed as part of general health care 22 requirements). A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 23 result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Doty, 37 F.3d 24 at 546; see, e.g., Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2010) (a heightened 25 suicide risk or an attempted suicide is a serious medical need; reversing grant of summary 26 judgment where plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the decedent’s pre- 27 suicidal actions objectively evidenced a serious medical need), reinstated as modified by 658 F.3d 1 The objective component of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim does not have a 2 “categorical standard,” but rather is “contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of 3 decency.” Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hudson v. 4 McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). A prisoner “must objectively show that he was deprived of 5 something sufficiently serious . . . but what constitutes a sufficiently serious deprivation may 6 evolve as the basic mores of society change.” Id. at 1141 (internal quotations and citations 7 omitted). The core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain 8 or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7. 9 “Sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer is a violation of the 10 Eighth Amendment.” Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 11 In evaluating a prisoner’s claim of sexual harassment or abuse, courts consider whether “the 12 officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind” and if the alleged wrongdoing was 13 objectively “harmful enough” to establish a constitutional violation. Id. (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. 14 at 8.). 15 Plaintiff states that he was transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison and reported to 16 custody staff that he was in fear of his life and feeling suicidal and homicidal. He began to cut his 17 wrists, but an unidentified mental health doctor continued to clear Plaintiff to go back to the yard. 18 Custody staff refused to place him in restrictive housing for his safety. On a different day, 19 Defendant Omlansky removed Plaintiff from his cell, choked him for no reason, and hit him in the 20 torso striking his penis. Omlansky pressed his body against Plaintiff while choking him and 21 pushed against him with his penis and grinded against him. A different unidentified correctional 22 officer later told Plaintiff to drop his complaint against Omlansky and she would place him in 23 restrictive housing for his safety, but if he kept saying he was suicidal and did not drop the 24 complaint, she would not report his safety concerns. 25 Liberally construed, Plaintiff states a claim against Omlansky for the physical and sexual 26 assault. The remaining claims are dismissed with leave to amend. With respect to the failure to 27 properly treat Plaintiff’s mental health needs, he must identify the doctor or other medical staff 1 correctional officer involved. Finally, Plaintiff names the warden of the prison as a Defendant due 2 to his supervisory position. The warden is not liable in his role as a supervisor, unless he was 3 specifically involved in these incidents. Plaintiff also seeks for several disciplinary findings to be 4 reversed, and good time credits restored, though he provides no specific information. To the extent 5 he seeks reversal of a disciplinary finding that resulted in the loss of good time credits, he must 6 file a habeas petition. 7 Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint to address all these issues, or he may remove all 8 claims and Defendants except Omlansky, and the case will only continue against him. 9 Plaintiff also requested the appointment of counsel. There is no constitutional right to 10 counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Although district 11 courts may “request” that counsel represent a litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis as 12 Plaintiff is here, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), that does not give the courts the power to make 13 “coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). 14 The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may ask counsel to represent an indigent 15 litigant only in “exceptional circumstances,” the determination of which requires an evaluation of 16 both (1) the likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his 17 claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 18 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). 19 Here, Plaintiff argues that his incarceration will hinder his ability to litigate the case, that 20 he is visually impaired, and that he has limited knowledge of the law. These circumstances are not 21 sufficiently “exceptional” to warrant appointment of counsel at this time. The Court determines 22 that this action does not present complex legal issues, and thus far Plaintiff has ably litigated this 23 case with well-crafted motions and a complaint, despite issues with his vision. It is too early in this 24 litigation for the Court to determine the likelihood of success on the merits. The motion is denied 25 without prejudice. 26 CONCLUSION 27 1. The motions to appoint counsel (dkts. 5, 9) are DENIED without prejudice. 1 standards set forth above. The amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of 2 || the date this order is filed, and it must include the caption and civil case number used in this order 3 and the words “AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. Because an amended complaint 4 || completely replaces the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to 5 || present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff may not incorporate 6 || material from the original Complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time 7 {| will result in dismissal of this case. 8 3. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court 9 || informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk, headered “Notice of 10 || Change of Address,” and must comply with the court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so 11 may result in dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 12 || Procedure 41(b). 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 |] Dated: April 28, 2026
16 Za BERT M. ILLMAN 17 United States Magistrate Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28