Stephanie Taylor v. State of Washington

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 21, 2023
• Docket: 21-36030
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 21 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEPHANIE S. TAYLOR, for minor N.F; et No. 21-36030 al., D.C. No. 2:19-cv-01869-RAJ Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. MEMORANDUM*

STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, FAR and CPS Department; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 14, 2023**

Before: SILVERMAN, SUNG, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Stephanie S. Taylor and Sandra Brown appeal pro se from the district court’s

judgment dismissing for failure to comply with a court order their action alleging

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). various federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

for an abuse of discretion. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640 (9th Cir.

2002). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs’ action

without prejudice after Taylor failed to comply with a court order to file an

amended complaint, despite the district court’s warning that noncompliance may

result in dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (a district court may dismiss an action

“[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order”);

Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 640-43 (discussing factors to be considered before

dismissing a case for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a court order; a

district court’s dismissal should not be disturbed absent “a definite and firm

conviction” of “a clear error of judgment” (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted)).

We do not consider the district court’s interlocutory ruling on the

Washington State defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d

493, 498 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that “interlocutory rulings do not merge into a

judgement of dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute whether the

failure to prosecute is purposeful or is a result of negligence or mistake”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Olympia Police

defendants because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to

2 21-36030 whether these defendants violated any of their rights. See Johns v. County of San

Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a non-lawyer may not

bring claims on behalf of others or, without a lawyer, bring suits on behalf of

minors); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that 18

U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 “provide no basis for civil liability”); see also Monell v. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (explaining that official capacity suits

require showing a “policy or custom” violating constitutional rights).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiffs’ request to appoint counsel, set forth in the opening brief, is

denied.

AFFIRMED.

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