Stennis v. Stennis

109 So. 3d 1107, 2013 WL 1114094, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 111
CourtCourt of Appeals of Mississippi
DecidedMarch 19, 2013
DocketNo. 2011-CA-01604-COA
StatusPublished

This text of 109 So. 3d 1107 (Stennis v. Stennis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stennis v. Stennis, 109 So. 3d 1107, 2013 WL 1114094, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 111 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

ROBERTS, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Pamela Anne Little Stennis (Pam) claims the Harrison County Chancery Court erred when it distributed the proceeds of the sale of the home that she and her brother, Thomas L. Stennis III (Todd), owned as joint tenants. Pam also claims the chancellor should have awarded her a setoff for rent during the time that Todd was the sole occupant of the house after he “constructively evicted” her. Pam also claims the chancellor should have awarded her a setoff for one-half of the insurance proceeds related to damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. This case centers on the partition of a 4,823 square foot house in Gulfport, Mississippi. Pam and Todd’s father, Thomas Stennis II, died in 1991. Pam and Todd’s mother, Patsy Stennis, died in 1995. Patsy deeded the house jointly to Pam and Todd. There was no mortgage on the house.

¶ 3. Todd lived in the house consistently after his and Pam’s mother died. When Pam and Todd acquired the title to the house in 1997, Pam was living in New York City. Todd had exclusive use of the house. Even so, Pam paid one-half of the household expenses other than utilities.

¶ 4. In 2002, Pam moved to Gulfport. She and Todd both lived in the house. She continued to pay one-half of the expenses, and she also began to pay one-half of the utilities. In September 2002, Todd took out a $190,000 mortgage on the home. Sixty percent of the borrowed money went toward renovations. Todd used the remaining forty percent of the borrowed money for his own personal use, such as the restoration of a car. The monthly mortgage payment was $1,600. $960 of each mortgage payment was for the home renovations, so Pam paid one-half of that figure each month. Stated differently, Pam paid $480 of the monthly mortgage payment and Todd paid the remainder, since almost one-half of the mortgage payment was attributable to money that did not benefit the house.

¶ 5. From the time that Pam moved into the house until early 2004, Pam and Todd’s relationship became increasingly strained [1109]*1109and hostile. One volatile argument ensued after Pam moved some of her furniture into the house and rearranged some of the furniture and artwork in the common areas of the house. Additionally, Pam testified that Todd refused to allow her to park her car in either of the spaces in the two-car garage. According to Pam, Todd reacted violently when she moved a desk in one of the rooms. In April 2004, Pam moved out. She stopped contributing to the house expenses in May 2004.

¶ 6. Todd married his wife, Vanessa, in July 2004. Vanessa and her dog moved into the house with Todd. Pam testified that she tried to return to the house in August or September 2004, but she was not welcome at the house. According to Todd, Pam was welcome to return to the house, but her dog could not come with her. Todd also told Pam that she would have to resume paying her share of the house expenses. Pam never moved back into the house. In December 2004, Pam filed her complaint.

¶ 7. Todd responded and argued that the house should be sold by a commissioner’s sale on the courthouse steps. Todd also filed a counterclaim for Pam’s share of the house expenses. In response, Pam argued that the house should be sold on the open real-estate market to maximize the proceeds of the sale. Pam further argued that she was entitled to one-half of the rental value of the house after she moved out in early 2004.

¶ 8. The house was damaged when Hurricane Katrina made landfall in August 2005. The proceedings were delayed based on the damage Hurricane Katrina caused both to the home and the Gulf Coast in general. Pam later claimed that she was entitled to one-half of the insurance proceeds from the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina.

¶ 9. In October 2009, the chancellor entered an order that the house would be listed on the open real-estate market for one hundred twenty days. If the house did not sell within that time, a special commissioner was to sell it by auction. The order also notes that Pam and Todd had yet to divide the personal property within the house.

¶ 10. The house did not sell within the time provided in the chancellor’s order. Consequently, the special commissioner auctioned the home. Todd bought the house for $404,000. Meanwhile, Pam and Todd divided the personal property within the house.

¶ 11. The chancellor distributed the proceeds of the sale after paying off the remaining balance of the 2003 mortgage. The chancellor held that Todd was not obligated to pay Pam one-half of the rental value of the home after Pam moved out in April 2004. However, the chancellor also held that Pam was obligated to pay Todd one-half of the house expenses from the time that she moved out. Pam’s share of those expenses totaled approximately $73,400. Ultimately, Pam received approximately $76,700 from the proceeds of the sale, and Todd received approximately $48,600. Finally, the chancellor held that Pam was not entitled to one-half of the insurance proceeds from the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina except any insurance proceeds that might be disbursed on outstanding claims after March 9, 2010. Pam appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12. “The standard of review for property partition cases is whether this Court finds manifest error in the decision of the chancellor[;] only then will this Court reverse the findings of the chancellor.” Georgian v. Harrington, 990 So.2d [1110]*1110813, 815 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2008) (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. RENT

¶ 13. Pam sought to recover rent from Todd. Specifically, Pam sought one-half of the rental value of the house from the time she moved out in April 2004 until Todd purchased the home in March 2010. Initially, the chancellor held that Pam was not entitled to rent because she never requested such relief in her pleadings.

¶ 14. After Pam filed a motion for reconsideration, the chancellor held that Pam was not entitled to rent from Todd because Pam could have returned to the house after she moved out in April 2004, but she chose not to do so. The chancellor also noted that Pam had failed to prove that Todd “constructively evicted” her from the house. Finally, the chancellor noted that he had requested information regarding the rental value of the house, but he had never received that information. Consequently, the chancellor denied Pam’s motion for reconsideration.

¶ 15. Pam argues that the chancellor erred when he held that she was not entitled to rent because she did not request rent in her pleadings. However, based on the chancellor’s reasoning in his order denying Pam’s motion for reconsideration, it is clear that the chancellor based his decision on the evidence rather than the absence of a request for rent in Pam’s pleadings.

¶ 16. Pam argued that Todd had “constructively evicted” her from the house. Pam claimed that Todd mistreated her and that he was hostile toward her. As the chancellor noted, “[c]onstructive eviction is normally found in the context of landlord/tenant cases.” A more appropriate legal term for Pam’s allegation is that Todd had committed “ouster.” “An ouster is the wrongful dispossession or exclusion by one tenant in common of his cotenants from the common property of which they are entitled to possession.... It does not necessarily imply an act accompanied by force.” Cheeks v. Herrington,

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Related

Cheeks v. Herrington
523 So. 2d 1033 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1988)
Georgian v. Harrington
990 So. 2d 813 (Court of Appeals of Mississippi, 2008)
Hammers v. Hammers
890 So. 2d 944 (Court of Appeals of Mississippi, 2004)
Robberson v. Burton
790 So. 2d 226 (Court of Appeals of Mississippi, 2001)

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Bluebook (online)
109 So. 3d 1107, 2013 WL 1114094, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 111, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stennis-v-stennis-missctapp-2013.