1 2 3 4 5 6 9 10 RANDALL HENRI STEINMEYER, an Case No.: 23-CV-1160 JLS (DTF) individual, 11 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S Plaintiff, 12 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION v. OF THE MARCH 24, 2025 ORDER 13
14 (ECF No. 69) AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF 15 BLOOD BANKS, MARCIA 16 EISENBERG, and DIANE KILLION, 17 Defendants. 18
19 Presently before the Court are Defendant American Association of Blood Banks’s 20 (“AABB”) Motion for Reconsideration of the March 24, 2025 Order Denying its Request 21 for Fees and Costs (“Mot.,” ECF No. 69) and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 22 Support thereof (“Mem.,” ECF No. 69-1). Plaintiff Randall Steinmeyer filed an 23 Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 71) and AABB 24 filed a Reply (“Reply,” ECF No. 72). The Court took the Motion under submission without 25 oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). See ECF No. 70. Having considered 26 the Parties’ arguments and the law, the Court DENIES AABB’s Motion. 27 / / / 28 / / / 2 The Parties and this Court are intimately familiar with the facts of this matter, which 3 deal with Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant AABB took part in a discriminatory, 4 collusive effort with its partner laboratories to rig paternity tests nationwide in favor of 5 female mothers. Accordingly, the Court incorporates by reference the factual background 6 as detailed in the Court’s March 24, 2025 Order, see ECF No. 67 (“Order”) at 2–5, and will 7 only set forth here the procedural history relevant to this Motion. 8 That procedural history includes two Rule 11 Sanctions Motions filed by Plaintiff 9 during the course of this litigation. See Order at 23–24. Plaintiff filed his first Sanctions 10 Motion on July 30, 2024, taking issue with certain statements AABB made in its 11 Oppositions to a Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 41 at 6–9. The Court 12 rejected Plaintiff’s request for sanctions, noting that the statements identified by Plaintiff 13 were argumentative in nature, placing them squarely within the bounds of proper 14 representations to the Court in briefing. See ECF No. 45 at 25. 15 The same day the Court rejected his first Sanctions Motion, Plaintiff filed a second. 16 See ECF No. 46. This second Sanctions Motion, the Court recognized, “look[ed] a lot like 17 his first,” and indeed, Plaintiff again took issue with certain statements AABB made in its 18 Opposition to a Motion to Dismiss. Order at 22. As it had done with the first Sanctions 19 Motion, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s second Sanctions Motion after reiterating, for the 20 third time in this case, that “statements in briefing are argument; they do not have 21 evidentiary significance.” Id. (citation modified). 22 Pertinent here is a request for attorneys’ fees and costs that AABB had made in 23 opposing Plaintiff’s second Sanctions Motion. AABB argued that the second Sanctions 24 Motion was “plainly frivolous,” as it raised issues duplicative of the first Sanctions Motion 25 and “forc[ed] the Court to rule . . . for a third time” on identical claims. ECF No. 47 at 7-8. 26 On that basis, AABB submitted that it “should be compensated for the expenses it incurred 27 in responding to Plaintiff’s duplicative, untimely, and frivolous Second Motion.” Id. at 8. 28 Despite expressing considerable sympathy to the request, the Court exercised its discretion 1 to deny AABB’s request for fees and costs, primarily resting on the fact that Plaintiff’s 2 second Sanctions Motion was filed on the same day the Court denied the first, thereby 3 depriving Plaintiff of “the benefit of the Court’s disposition of his First Sanctions Motion” 4 by the time he filed the second. Order at 23. The Court, thus, declined to award fees and 5 costs. In the same Order, dated March 24, 2025, the Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s 6 claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 without leave to amend and ordered the 7 case closed. Id. 8 AABB then filed the instant Motion on April 21, 2025, requesting reconsideration 9 of the Court’s decision to deny awarding fees and costs incurred in opposing Plaintiff’s 10 second Sanctions Motion. See generally Mot. 12 In the Southern District of California, a party may apply for reconsideration 13 “[w]henever any motion or any application or petition for any order or other relief has been 14 made to any judge and has been refused in whole or in part.” S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(i)(1). 15 The moving party must provide an affidavit setting forth, inter alia, “what new or different 16 facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon 17 such prior application.” Id. “In resolving motions for reconsideration, courts often look to 18 the standard for relief from final judgment set forth in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 59(e) and 60(b), which apply to motions for reconsideration of final appealable orders and 20 relief from judgment.” Evanston Ins. Co. v. Venture Point, LLC, 21 No. 2:20-cv-01783-KJD-EJY, 2021 WL 5500486, at *1 (D. Nev. Nov. 23, 2021). 22 “Under Rule 59(e), a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly 23 unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered 24 evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” 25 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Sch. Dist. 26 No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d. 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). When a party seeks 27 reconsideration on the basis of “newly discovered evidence,” the court is limited to 28 consideration of evidence “which existed at the time of the judgment but was not 1 discoverable with reasonable diligence.” Sundby v. Marquee Funding Grp., Inc., 2 No. 19-cv-00390-GPC-AHG, 2021 WL 5396228, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2021) (citing 3 Fantasyland Video, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007)). In 4 other words, “[c]ases construing ‘newly discovered evidence,’ either under [Rule] 60(b)(2) 5 or Rule 59, uniformly hold that evidence of events occurring after the trial is not newly 6 discovered evidence within the meaning of the rules.” Corex Corp. v. United States, 7 638 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Washington v. United States, 214 F.2d 33, 46 8 (9th Cir. 1954)), abrogated on other grounds by, Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515 9 (9th Cir. 1989). 10 Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 11 finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 12 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Ultimately, whether to grant or deny a motion for 13 reconsideration is in the “sound discretion” of the district court. Navajo Nation v. Norris, 14 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 883). 16 AABB asks the Court to reconsider its March 24, 2025 Order to the extent it declined 17 to award fees and costs associated with its Opposition to Plaintiff’s second Sanctions 18 Motion. See Mem. at 1. In support of its Motion, AABB relies on a written 19 correspondence—sent from Plaintiff and addressed to AABB Board Members—asserting 20 several of the same theories Plaintiff advanced in his Sanctions Motions. Id. AABB 21 contends there are two aspects of this correspondence that elucidate Plaintiff’s “intent to 22 annoy and harass AABB.” Mem. at 3.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 9 10 RANDALL HENRI STEINMEYER, an Case No.: 23-CV-1160 JLS (DTF) individual, 11 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S Plaintiff, 12 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION v. OF THE MARCH 24, 2025 ORDER 13
14 (ECF No. 69) AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF 15 BLOOD BANKS, MARCIA 16 EISENBERG, and DIANE KILLION, 17 Defendants. 18
19 Presently before the Court are Defendant American Association of Blood Banks’s 20 (“AABB”) Motion for Reconsideration of the March 24, 2025 Order Denying its Request 21 for Fees and Costs (“Mot.,” ECF No. 69) and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 22 Support thereof (“Mem.,” ECF No. 69-1). Plaintiff Randall Steinmeyer filed an 23 Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 71) and AABB 24 filed a Reply (“Reply,” ECF No. 72). The Court took the Motion under submission without 25 oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). See ECF No. 70. Having considered 26 the Parties’ arguments and the law, the Court DENIES AABB’s Motion. 27 / / / 28 / / / 2 The Parties and this Court are intimately familiar with the facts of this matter, which 3 deal with Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant AABB took part in a discriminatory, 4 collusive effort with its partner laboratories to rig paternity tests nationwide in favor of 5 female mothers. Accordingly, the Court incorporates by reference the factual background 6 as detailed in the Court’s March 24, 2025 Order, see ECF No. 67 (“Order”) at 2–5, and will 7 only set forth here the procedural history relevant to this Motion. 8 That procedural history includes two Rule 11 Sanctions Motions filed by Plaintiff 9 during the course of this litigation. See Order at 23–24. Plaintiff filed his first Sanctions 10 Motion on July 30, 2024, taking issue with certain statements AABB made in its 11 Oppositions to a Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 41 at 6–9. The Court 12 rejected Plaintiff’s request for sanctions, noting that the statements identified by Plaintiff 13 were argumentative in nature, placing them squarely within the bounds of proper 14 representations to the Court in briefing. See ECF No. 45 at 25. 15 The same day the Court rejected his first Sanctions Motion, Plaintiff filed a second. 16 See ECF No. 46. This second Sanctions Motion, the Court recognized, “look[ed] a lot like 17 his first,” and indeed, Plaintiff again took issue with certain statements AABB made in its 18 Opposition to a Motion to Dismiss. Order at 22. As it had done with the first Sanctions 19 Motion, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s second Sanctions Motion after reiterating, for the 20 third time in this case, that “statements in briefing are argument; they do not have 21 evidentiary significance.” Id. (citation modified). 22 Pertinent here is a request for attorneys’ fees and costs that AABB had made in 23 opposing Plaintiff’s second Sanctions Motion. AABB argued that the second Sanctions 24 Motion was “plainly frivolous,” as it raised issues duplicative of the first Sanctions Motion 25 and “forc[ed] the Court to rule . . . for a third time” on identical claims. ECF No. 47 at 7-8. 26 On that basis, AABB submitted that it “should be compensated for the expenses it incurred 27 in responding to Plaintiff’s duplicative, untimely, and frivolous Second Motion.” Id. at 8. 28 Despite expressing considerable sympathy to the request, the Court exercised its discretion 1 to deny AABB’s request for fees and costs, primarily resting on the fact that Plaintiff’s 2 second Sanctions Motion was filed on the same day the Court denied the first, thereby 3 depriving Plaintiff of “the benefit of the Court’s disposition of his First Sanctions Motion” 4 by the time he filed the second. Order at 23. The Court, thus, declined to award fees and 5 costs. In the same Order, dated March 24, 2025, the Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s 6 claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 without leave to amend and ordered the 7 case closed. Id. 8 AABB then filed the instant Motion on April 21, 2025, requesting reconsideration 9 of the Court’s decision to deny awarding fees and costs incurred in opposing Plaintiff’s 10 second Sanctions Motion. See generally Mot. 12 In the Southern District of California, a party may apply for reconsideration 13 “[w]henever any motion or any application or petition for any order or other relief has been 14 made to any judge and has been refused in whole or in part.” S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(i)(1). 15 The moving party must provide an affidavit setting forth, inter alia, “what new or different 16 facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon 17 such prior application.” Id. “In resolving motions for reconsideration, courts often look to 18 the standard for relief from final judgment set forth in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 59(e) and 60(b), which apply to motions for reconsideration of final appealable orders and 20 relief from judgment.” Evanston Ins. Co. v. Venture Point, LLC, 21 No. 2:20-cv-01783-KJD-EJY, 2021 WL 5500486, at *1 (D. Nev. Nov. 23, 2021). 22 “Under Rule 59(e), a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly 23 unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered 24 evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” 25 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Sch. Dist. 26 No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d. 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). When a party seeks 27 reconsideration on the basis of “newly discovered evidence,” the court is limited to 28 consideration of evidence “which existed at the time of the judgment but was not 1 discoverable with reasonable diligence.” Sundby v. Marquee Funding Grp., Inc., 2 No. 19-cv-00390-GPC-AHG, 2021 WL 5396228, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2021) (citing 3 Fantasyland Video, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007)). In 4 other words, “[c]ases construing ‘newly discovered evidence,’ either under [Rule] 60(b)(2) 5 or Rule 59, uniformly hold that evidence of events occurring after the trial is not newly 6 discovered evidence within the meaning of the rules.” Corex Corp. v. United States, 7 638 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Washington v. United States, 214 F.2d 33, 46 8 (9th Cir. 1954)), abrogated on other grounds by, Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515 9 (9th Cir. 1989). 10 Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 11 finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 12 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Ultimately, whether to grant or deny a motion for 13 reconsideration is in the “sound discretion” of the district court. Navajo Nation v. Norris, 14 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 883). 16 AABB asks the Court to reconsider its March 24, 2025 Order to the extent it declined 17 to award fees and costs associated with its Opposition to Plaintiff’s second Sanctions 18 Motion. See Mem. at 1. In support of its Motion, AABB relies on a written 19 correspondence—sent from Plaintiff and addressed to AABB Board Members—asserting 20 several of the same theories Plaintiff advanced in his Sanctions Motions. Id. AABB 21 contends there are two aspects of this correspondence that elucidate Plaintiff’s “intent to 22 annoy and harass AABB.” Mem. at 3. First, AABB points out that Plaintiff, through the 23 correspondence, has now improperly communicated directly with a represented party, an 24 action that Plaintiff, a former attorney, should know is not permitted under the California 25 Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. Second, pointing to Plaintiff’s unrelenting refusal to 26 cease his assertions of unlawful conduct that have already been rejected by this Court, 27 AABB argues that the correspondence “has confirmed Plaintiff’s improper tact of using 28 this litigation to taunt, harass and annoy AABB.” Id. 1 There is no question that Plaintiff’s insistence on aggressively pressing accusations 2 against AABB for participating in a fraudulent scheme to deceive consumers out of a true 3 paternity test is cause for concern. As AABB suggests, Plaintiff’s correspondence—which 4 was received by an AABB volunteer on April 2, 2025—makes reference to the instant case 5 and continues to advance the same recycled theory that AABB is participating in a 6 fraudulent campaign of promoting sham paternity tests. See ECF No. 69-3. The 7 correspondence even takes it one step further by purporting to leverage the instant case as 8 “irrefutable evidence” of AABB’s wrongdoing, id. at 4, despite the case having concluded 9 in March of this year entirely in AABB’s favor. Taken collectively in conjunction with the 10 multiple, duplicative Sanctions Motions he filed in this case, the Court has little doubt that 11 Plaintiff’s objective is to use whatever means necessary to fan the flames in response to 12 the positive paternity test he took in 2017. 13 But while the Court remains sympathetic to AABB’s predicament, this Motion for 14 Reconsideration is not the proper mechanism for vindicating AABB’s interests in putting 15 an end to Plaintiff’s mischief. Other than mechanically reciting the legal standard, AABB 16 does not otherwise engage with the text of Rule 60(b) in its Motion, frustrating the Court’s 17 efforts to analyze its request. Based on clues dispersed throughout the Motion, however, 18 the Court construes AABB’s argument in favor of reconsideration to rest solely on the 19 “newly discovered evidence” prong of Rule 60(b)(2) due to the representation that the 20 Motion is based on Plaintiff’s post-judgment actions. See Mem. at 1. Indeed, AABB 21 makes it a point of emphasis that its Motion is based exclusively on Plaintiff’s April 2, 22 2025 correspondence, a piece of evidence that did not exist until over a week after the 23 Court issued its final Order dismissing this case and rejecting AABB’s request for fees and 24 costs. Id. at 1 (“[This Motion] is based on Plaintiff’s subsequent conduct after the issuance 25 of the Order . . . .” (emphasis in original)). 26 Yet post-judgment conduct cannot support a request for reconsideration under Rule 27 60(b)(2). In the Ninth Circuit, the April 2, 2025 correspondence “is not ‘newly discovered 28 evidence’ under Rule 60(b)(2) because [the correspondence] was not in existence at the 1 time of the judgment.” Fantasyland Video, 505 F.3d at 1005 (citing Corex Corp., 638 F.2d 2 at 121). Plaintiff’s post-judgment conduct may very well be probative of his subjective 3 intention to badger AABB into submission, but, “by definition, [it] cannot constitute 4 ‘newly discovered evidence’ sufficient to support a successful Rule 60(b)(2) motion.” 5 Sundby, 2021 WL 5396228, at *3. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the finality 6 interests associated with putting a case to bed when its moment for adjudication has passed. 7 See Washington, 214 F.2d at 46 (“The policy of law in having an end to litigation, would 8 in most cases prevent the reopening of a case because of after-occurring events.”). 9 Though its Motion relies entirely on Plaintiff’s April 2, 2025 correspondence, 10 AABB tacitly purports to advance an alternative argument under Rule 60(b)(6) as well. 11 See Mem. at 2. Under Rule 60(b)(6), the Court “may relieve a party or its legal 12 representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any other reason that 13 justifies relief.” This so-called catch-all provision “applies only when the reason for 14 granting relief is not covered by any of the other bases set forth in Rule 60.” Sundby, 15 2021 WL 5396228, at *2 (citing Delay v. Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007)). 16 Even when a distinct basis other than those provided for in Rules 60(b)(1) through (b)(5) 17 is proffered, Rule 60(b)(6) “has been used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent 18 manifest injustice.” Fantasyland Video, 505 F.3d at 1005 (quoting United States v. Alpine 19 Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)). 20 In this instance, AABB has not articulated any sound justification for applying Rule 21 60(b)(6). The only colorable basis upon which AABB has sought reconsideration is 22 Plaintiff’s post-judgment conduct, but that basis fits neatly within Rule 60(b)(2)’s “newly 23 discovered evidence” prong. The Court thus concludes that Rule 60(b)(6) is inapposite 24 because Rule 60(b)(2) is directly applicable. See BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 25 605 U.S. ---, 145 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2025) (“Thus, we have repeatedly held that relief 26 under Rule 60(b)(6) is available ‘only when Rules 60(b)(1) through (b)(5) are 27 inapplicable.’”). Accordingly, AABB has not identified any “extraordinary 28 circumstances” that stood in the way of its request for fees and costs when opposing 1 Plaintiff's second Sanctions Motion.! Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of the Interior, 2 F.3d 1144, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 3 || at 1049). 5 In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES AABB’s Motion for Reconsideration 6 || (ECF No. 69). g Dated: August 21, 2025 tt 9 on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 [1 AABB also cites to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) in its Motion, but the Court’s analysis remains 74 unchanged under this alternative authority. See Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994) (“In addition, a denial of a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is construed 25 one denying relief under Rule 60(b)....”). Similarly, AABB’s citation to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) is inapposite. See Ng v. United States, No. 12-1381-JAHCWVG), 2014 WL 12026063, 26 || at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 12, 2014) (“Rule 54(b) allows a court to reverse interlocutory orders before final judgment is entered.”); Moore v. Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc., No. 15-cv-1186-CAB (MDD), 27 2018 WL 3862007, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2018) (concluding that Rule 54(b) was inapplicable because 28 the Rule only applies to orders or decisions “that adjudicate[] fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties”).