Steinfeldt v. Pierce

Wisconsin Supreme Court

Steinfeldt v. Pierce

85 N.W.2d 754, 2 Wis. 2d 138, 67 A.L.R. 2d 186, 1957 Wisc. LEXIS 406

CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

DecidedNovember 5, 1957

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 85 N.W.2d 754 (Steinfeldt v. Pierce) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Steinfeldt v. Pierce, 85 N.W.2d 754, 2 Wis. 2d 138, 67 A.L.R. 2d 186, 1957 Wisc. LEXIS 406 (Wis. 1957).

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Opinions

Martin, C. J.

When the trial court reduced the damages awarded by the jury in the first trial, it gave to the defend[140]*140ants the option of permitting the entry of judgment on the verdict as so amended “or, by default of exercise of such option within twenty days from the filing of this decision, to thereby request a new trial. ... A new trial will concern damages only.”

The damages not disturbed by the court’s decision were $1,000 for damage to plaintiffs automobile, $50 for bandages, drugs, and rental of crutches, and $227.50 for doctor and hospital bills. An. interlocutory judgment for the plaintiff was entered on these amounts with costs on September 28, 1956. Thereafter the new trial was had on damages, in which the jury assessed $2,500 for plaintiff’s pain and suffering and temporary disability and $6,000 for permanent injury. Judgment was entered thereon on February 6, 1957.

Appellant asks this court to review the evidence and the findings on liability made by the jury in the first trial. This we cannot do. If appellant wanted to preserve its right to appeal on the issues of negligence, it should not have exercised its option to have a new trial on the issue of damages only. In accepting the new trial on damages, it accepted the findings on liability, and waived its right to appeal on those issues.

Any other view would render the new trial on damages a nullity. Suppose we accepted this appeal and held that plaintiff was at least as negligent as the appellant’s insured. What purpose would the new trial, already held, on damages have served? It would be just an idle gesture, a waste of time and money. The purpose of an option is to terminate litigation. See Corcoran v. Horran (1882), 55 Wis. 120, 12 N. W. 468; Baker v. Madison (1885), 62 Wis. 137, 22 N. W. 141, 22 N. W. 583; Baxter v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (1899), 104 Wis. 307, 80 N. W. 644; Heimlich v. Tabor (1905), 123 Wis. 565, 102 N. W. 10; Campbell v. Sutliff (1927), 193 Wis. 370, 214 N. W. 374. The litigation [141]*141as to negligence has been terminated by appellant’s acceptance of a new trial on damages only.

Appellant cannot be permitted to take a new trial on damages only, — accepting the findings of the jury on negligence, — and now, being satisfied with the damages fixed on the new trial, appeal on the issues of liability. The only issue on which the appellant is now in a position to appeal is the issue of the damages awarded on the new trial, and no contention is made that they are excessive.

By the Court.- — Appeal dismissed.

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Martin, C. J.

When the trial court reduced the damages awarded by the jury in the first trial, it gave to the defend[140]*140ants the option of permitting the entry of judgment on the verdict as so amended “or, by default of exercise of such option within twenty days from the filing of this decision, to thereby request a new trial. ... A new trial will concern damages only.”

The damages not disturbed by the court’s decision were $1,000 for damage to plaintiffs automobile, $50 for bandages, drugs, and rental of crutches, and $227.50 for doctor and hospital bills. An. interlocutory judgment for the plaintiff was entered on these amounts with costs on September 28, 1956. Thereafter the new trial was had on damages, in which the jury assessed $2,500 for plaintiff’s pain and suffering and temporary disability and $6,000 for permanent injury. Judgment was entered thereon on February 6, 1957.

Appellant asks this court to review the evidence and the findings on liability made by the jury in the first trial. This we cannot do. If appellant wanted to preserve its right to appeal on the issues of negligence, it should not have exercised its option to have a new trial on the issue of damages only. In accepting the new trial on damages, it accepted the findings on liability, and waived its right to appeal on those issues.

Any other view would render the new trial on damages a nullity. Suppose we accepted this appeal and held that plaintiff was at least as negligent as the appellant’s insured. What purpose would the new trial, already held, on damages have served? It would be just an idle gesture, a waste of time and money. The purpose of an option is to terminate litigation. See Corcoran v. Horran (1882), 55 Wis. 120, 12 N. W. 468; Baker v. Madison (1885), 62 Wis. 137, 22 N. W. 141, 22 N. W. 583; Baxter v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (1899), 104 Wis. 307, 80 N. W. 644; Heimlich v. Tabor (1905), 123 Wis. 565, 102 N. W. 10; Campbell v. Sutliff (1927), 193 Wis. 370, 214 N. W. 374. The litigation [141]*141as to negligence has been terminated by appellant’s acceptance of a new trial on damages only.

Appellant cannot be permitted to take a new trial on damages only, — accepting the findings of the jury on negligence, — and now, being satisfied with the damages fixed on the new trial, appeal on the issues of liability. The only issue on which the appellant is now in a position to appeal is the issue of the damages awarded on the new trial, and no contention is made that they are excessive.

By the Court.- — Appeal dismissed.

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Bluebook (online)

85 N.W.2d 754, 2 Wis. 2d 138, 67 A.L.R. 2d 186, 1957 Wisc. LEXIS 406, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/steinfeldt-v-pierce-wis-1957.

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