Steinbeiser, C. v. Wertz, J.

2024 Pa. Super. 102, 316 A.3d 1016
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 20, 2024
Docket823 WDA 2023
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2024 Pa. Super. 102 (Steinbeiser, C. v. Wertz, J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Steinbeiser, C. v. Wertz, J., 2024 Pa. Super. 102, 316 A.3d 1016 (Pa. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

J-S13045-24

2024 PA Super 102

CLETUS STEINBEISER AND ALBERT : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF F. STEINBEISER, ADULT : PENNSYLVANIA INDIVIDUALS : : v. : : JAMES AND CHRISTINE WERTZ, : HUSBAND AND WIFE : : Appellants : No. 823 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 19, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Civil Division at No(s): 2020 GH 1660

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: May 20, 2024

Following a non-jury trial in this property dispute between neighbors,

James and Christine Wertz appeal from the judgment entered in favor of

Cletus and Albert Steinbeiser, granting the Steinbeisers a prescriptive

easement through the Wertzes’ property. The Wertzes claim the Unenclosed

Woodlands Act, 68 P.S. § 411, bars the Steinbeisers from acquiring such an

easement, as a matter of law. Because the Wertzes failed to raise this Act as

an affirmative defense in their Answer & New Matter, that defense is waived,

and we affirm.

Our decision rests on procedural grounds, so we only briefly discuss the

facts of the case. The Wertzes and Steinbeisers are adjoining neighbors. The

Steinbeiser Brothers have lived at the property for their entire lives and

acquired ownership of it from their parents. They and their family have ____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S13045-24

adversely, openly, notoriously, and continuously used Horsemanship Lane,

which runs from their home, through the Wertzes property, to a public

highway, for nearly a century. The Wertzes never expressly gave permission

for the Steinbeisers to use the lane. The prior owners of the Wertzes property

fenced in the land, including both sides of Horseman Lane. No one has

maintained the fencing in over 50 years.

Around 2019, a dispute arose between the Wertzes and the

Steinbeisers, which caused the Wertzes to obstruct the Steinbeisers’ access

to the lane. The Steinbeisers sued and brought a cause of action for quiet

title, seeking a prescriptive easement on Horsemanship Lane.1

The Wertzes filed an Answer & New Matter raising counterclaims for

Ejectment and Trespass. However, they included no affirmative defenses in

their New Matter. The case proceeded to a bench trial.

At the close of the Steinbeisers’ case-in-chief, the Wertzes moved for

compulsory nonsuit on the grounds that the Unenclosed Woodlands Act (“the

Act”) prohibited the Steinbeisers from obtaining a prescriptive easement, as

a matter of law. The Steinbeisers opposed the nonsuit, in part, because the

Act constituted an affirmative defense that the Wertzes did not raise in their

New Matter. Thus, the Steinbeisers contended the Wertzes had waived the

affirmative defense under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1030.

____________________________________________

1 The Steinbeisers have another route of ingress and egress to their property,

so they did not assert an easement by necessity.

-2- J-S13045-24

The trial court recognized that this “was the first time the issue was

raised . . . .” Trial Court Opinion, 5/5/23, at 11. While the trial court did not

“condone the tactic of waiting until trial to raise a statutory defense,” it

declined to find the Wertzes had “waived the right to argue the applicability

of the Unenclosed Woodlands Act.” Id. In the trial court’s view, the Act was

not “an affirmative defense . . . .” Id.

Nevertheless, the court denied the compulsory nonsuit and returned a

non-jury decision in favor of the Steinbeisers, because it found that the old,

dilapidated fence enclosed the Wertzes’ woodlands. Thus, it ruled the Act did

not prohibit the Steinbeisers from acquiring a prescriptive easement.

The court denied the Wertzes’ motion for post-trial relief. This timely

appeal followed.

The Wertzes ask, “Whether the trial court erred by concluding the [Act]

did not apply because of the remnants of a long-abandoned fence?” Wertzes’

Brief at 5. They contend the dilapidated condition of the fencing entitles them

to judgment, as a matter of law, because it has decayed to the point that their

woodlands have reverted to an unenclosed state.

Before reaching the merits of the Wertzes’ claim, we must first decide

whether they properly preserved it for appellate review. According to the trial

court, the Unenclosed Woodlands Act is not an affirmative defense to the

Steinbeisers’ cause of action and, therefore, the Wertzes did not need to raise

it in their New Matter. As we explain below, the trial court’s waiver analysis

was erroneous.

-3- J-S13045-24

“The issue of waiver presents a question of law, and, as such, our

standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Trigg v.

Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 260, 269 (Pa. 2020).

The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide that, with the

exception of the defenses of assumption of the risk, comparative negligence,

and contributory negligence, “all affirmative defenses . . . shall be pleaded in

a responsive pleading under the heading ‘New Matter’.” Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a)

(emphasis added). While the Rule lists several affirmative defenses, such as

duress, estoppel, laches, and the statute of limitations, it clearly states that

the list is not exhaustive. See id.

This Court has repeatedly held that defendants must plead affirmative

defenses regardless of whether they explicitly appear in Rule 1030; otherwise,

the defense is waived. For example, the defense of rescission is not among

the affirmative defenses listed in Pa.R.C.P. 1030. Even so, this Court has held

“that rescission is an affirmative defense, which must be raised by the

defendant under the heading new matter in its responsive pleading.”

Falcione v. Cornell School Dist., 557 A.2d 425, 428 (Pa. Super. 1989). If

a defendant’s new matter “is silent as to this defense, he cannot avail himself

of its protection.” Id.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has defined “affirmative defense”

as “a defendant’s assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the

plaintiff’s . . . claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true.”

Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 55 A.3d 1088, 1095 (Pa. 2012).

-4- J-S13045-24

The Rules of Civil Procedure require a defendant to plead those facts

and arguments which give the plaintiff notice of the defenses and an

opportunity to reply to them during the pleadings stage. This ensures that

the issues in the dispute are sharpened early on in the litigation. See Fox v.

Byrne, 525 A.2d 428, 430 (Pa. Super. 1987). If there is no factual dispute

as an affirmative defense, the trial court may more expediently resolve the

case, as a matter of law, and avoid an unnecessary trial. See id. Properly

pleading all affirmative defenses plays a vital role in the flow and disposition

of civil matters.

Here, the Steinbeisers brought a cause of action seeking quiet title to a

prescriptive easement. Therefore, they needed to plead and prove adverse,

open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use of Horsemanship Lane for

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Related

Steinbeiser, C. v. Wertz, J.
2024 Pa. Super. 102 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2024)

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