Steinbach v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America

65 N.E. 281, 172 N.Y. 471, 1902 N.Y. LEXIS 689

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 18, 1902
• Status: Published

Opinions

Vann, J.

By the judgments below the names of the beneficiaries in a policy of life insurance were stricken out and the name of a stranger substituted as sole beneficiary without making the former parties to the action or giving them an opportunity to be heard. This has been done upon the ground that the insurance company, which is the sole defendant, waived the objection that there was a defect of parties defendant by not taking it either by demurrer or answer as provided by section 499 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section, however, must be read in connection with section 452, which provides that “ The court may determine the controversy, as between the parties before it, where it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others, or by saving their rights; but where a complete determination of the controversy cannot be had without, the presence of other parties, the court must direct them to be brought in.”

The apparent inconsistency between these sections was the subject of controversy before the courts for a long time, but we think it was dispelled by the judgment in Osterhoudt v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Ulster (98 N. Y. 239, 243). That was an action by taxpayers to vacate audits of town accounts for illegality and fraud, and to restrain the levy of a tax for their payment. The persons in whose favor the audits were made were not parties to the action, and while the defendants omitted to raise the objection by demurrer or answer, they raised it upon the trial, where it was overruled. In reversing the judgment rendered in favor of the taxpayers we said: “ Construing sections 452 and 499 together, their meaning is that a defendant, by omitting to take the objection that there is a defect of parties by demurrer or answer, waives on his part any objection to the granting of relief on that ground, but when the granting of relief against him would prejudice the rights of others, and their rights cannot be saved by the judgment and the controversy cannot be completely •determined without their presence, the court must direct them to be made parties before proceeding to judgment. When a defendant is sued alone upon a joint contract, if he omits to set up a non-joinder of his co-contractor by demurrer or 'answer, judgment may pass against him alone, because judgment against one joint contractor will not jircjudice the other, but may relieve him from liability. The other branch of the rule would be illustrated by an equitable action brought for the cancellation of a mortgage, executed to two persons as mortgagees, in which only one. of the mortgagees was made defendant. The court could not proceed to a decree for the plaintiff without the presence of the other mortgagee. The ■distinction is between those who are necessary parties and those who are proper parties merely. When persons who are necessary parties are not joined, the court will not proceed until they are brought in. " * f Under the Code the court is bound to take the objection when a proper ease is jiresented.”

It was further held that the persons in whose favor the audits had been made were necessary parties, because they were “ primarily interested,” and the judgment was reversed because they had not been joined.

Referring to section 452 in a still later case (Mahr v. Norwich Union F. Ins. Socy., 127 N. Y. 452, 459), the court said: 4‘ While the statute does not in terms prohibit the court from determining the controversy, unless all the necessary parties are brought in, that is impliedly commanded, and is the established practice in all equitable actions.” (Citing, among other cases, Peyser v. Wendt, 87 N. Y. 323; Sherman v. Parish, 53 id. 483 ; Van Epps v. Van Dusen, 4 Paige, 64.)

A court of equity always seeks to do complete justice and to make its judgments so full and comprehensive as to quiet the controversy in all its aspects and as to all persons. Thus every one who is compelled to obey its decrees is protected, further litigation is prevented, and the unseemly spectacle of inconsistent judgments rendered by the same court is avoided.

The plaintiff insists that the rights of the personal repre sentatives of Max Felmnan are not prejudiced by the judgment appealed from, because they are not bound by it and can still recover upon the policy, notwithstanding the judgment of reformation rendered in this action. This might lead to inconsistent judgments and a double recovery, which is precisely what section 452 was designed to prevent. Moreover, the hazard of collecting a second judgment in favor of a different plaintiff against the same defendant upon the same cause of action might in some cases he an important consideration and the remoteness of the risk in this case does not affect the principle. The court cannot know how great the risk may be and hence should not permit it, even if it thinks it is remote. A complete determination of a controversy cannot be had when there are persons, not parties, whose rights must be determined, in form at least, at the same time that the rights of the parties to the action are determined. According to the policy under consideration, as it was written, the personal representatives of Mr. Felmnan are entitled to the proceeds, yet the judgment below, rendered without notice tl> them, takes the policy away from them and gives it to the plaintiff. They had a material interest in the subject-matter of the action, yet they were deprived of it without an opportunity to be heard and were cast in judgment without being sued. While they were not bound by' the judgment which does all this in form, still the determination of the controversy is necessarily incomplete because they are not hound. Such a judgment, although not binding, would affect the market value of the policy and tend to prevent a disposition thereof either absolutely or as collateral to a loan. There cannot be a complete determination as to which of two persons is the beneficiary of a life insurance policy without the presence in court of both. The personal representatives of Felmnan were necessary parties and the court should have dismissed the complaint unless within a reasonable time they were brought in, not necessarily for the protection of the defendant as it had neglected its rights, but for their own protection, as well as the seemly and orderly administration of justice. The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted., with costs to abide the event.