RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
| Jennifer Steele appeals from the order of protection filed September 10, 2013, in Pulaski County Circuit Court, granting a two-year protective order to John Lyon.1 On appeal, Steele argues that the trial court erred by allowing Lyon to testify when he was not listed as a witness and by not considering her argument that Lyon had other remedies outside the Domestic Abuse Act, Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-15-101 (“The Act”). She also contends that the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony and that there was insufficient evidence to support the ruling in favor of Lyon. We affirm.
The parties dated roughly eight months, but never lived together. After their relationship ended, the parties ran into each other at a parade and had an altercation. Lyon claimed that he received numerous text messages from Steele harassing and threatening him. |2He filed a petition for an order of protection under the Act on June 5, 2013, and an ex parte order was granted with a hearing set for June 27, 2013. The hearing was held, but continued until August 29, 2013. The final order of protection was entered on September 10, 2013.
On September 16, 2013, Steele filed a notice of appeal. On September 20, 2013, she filed a “Brief in Support of Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 59 and/or Rule 60” to amend the order to reflect that she did not own or carry a firearm; it was granted on October 17, 2013. Steele filed a motion to extend time for filing the record on appeal on December 11, 2013. The record was lodged with this court on January 16, 2014. Over a year later and after several other extensions, this matter is now before us again.
On appeal, Steele argues that the trial court erred in allowing Lyon to testify even though he was not listed as a witness in discovery and in admitting certain evidence during his testimony. However, Steele provides no citation to authority or convincing argument in its support. It is well established that we will not consider an argument when the appellant presents no citation to authority or convincing argument in its support, and it is not apparent without further research that the argument is well taken. See Yankaway v. State, 366 Ark. 18, 22, 233 S.W.3d 136, 139 (2006); Hollis v. State, 346 Ark. 175, 179, 55 S.W.3d 756, 759-60 (2001); Dougan v. State, 330 Ark. 827, 957 S.W.2d 182 (1997); Williams v. State, 325 Ark. 432, 930 S.W.2d 297 (1996).
Steele’s second point on appeal is that the trial court erred in ruling that the case fell within the scope of the Domestic Abuse Act. On August 29, 2013, as a preliminary motion, Steele moved for the court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. She argues that this was clearly a case in which other adequate remedies existed outside the Domestic Abuse Act in which to address Lyon’s complaint. Steele cites the general assembly’s [ointent of the statute and asserts that the legislature did not envision this Act would be used as it was under circumstances like this case presents. Steele argues that there is no pattern in the instant case of any domestic abuse nor is there a pattern of threats. She cites the following language of the statute:
The General Assembly hereby finds that this chapter is necessary to secure important governmental interests in the protection of victims of abuse and the prevention of further abuse through the removal of offenders from the household and other injunctive relief for which there is no adequate remedy in current law.
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-101.
Steele contends that Lyon used an adequate remedy by calling the police on June 2, 2013 — the day of the incident. She maintains that because Lyon advised the police as to what happened when the parties saw each other at the Conway Pride Parade, and told them that he had received a text that Steele intended to kill herself, that there was an adequate remedy other than filing an order of protection, and as such, the Domestic Abuse Act is not applicable to the instant case.
Her interpretation and application of the statutory language is inaccurate. The sentence in the statute does not mean that a petitioner who alleges domestic abuse or the threat of domestic abuse is precluded from seeking an order of protection if he or she could also seek other remedies, such as criminal charges or civil damages. Steele also contends that the statute does not apply in this case because the parties never lived together and only dated for roughly eight months. The Act’s purpose does not in any way indicate that it should be utilized only when there are no other adequate remedies or that the parties must reside together. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 9-15-103 defines “family or household member” to include anyone in a past or present dating relationship regardless of whether they live together.
This court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Claver v. Wilbur, 102 Ark. App. 53, 280 S.W.3d 570 (2008). In reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, a court will determine the meaning and effect of a statute first by construing the statute just as it reads, “giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language.” Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. Weiss, 347 Ark. 543, 550, 65 S.W.3d 867, 872-873 (2002). When the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to look further and apply the rules of statutory construction. Id. This court has previously ruled that a relationship “clearly comes within the definition of the applicable statute”, even when the parties dated for less than two months. Pablo v. Crowder, 95 Ark. App. 268, 274, 236 S.W.3d 559, 563 (2006). Here, it is clear that the,statute is applicable in this case. Lyon and Steele were in a dating relationship for eight months, and the fact that Lyon had other remedies available to him does not preclude him from seeking relief under the statute.
Steele’s next argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in allowing Lyon’s Exhibit 1, a series of text messages, into evidence. A circuit court’s decision to admit evidence will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Laswell v. State, 2012 Ark. 201, 17, 404 S.W.3d 818, 828. The abuse-of-discretion standard “is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the trial court’s decision, but requires that the trial court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.” Gully v. State, 2012 Ark. 368, 423 S.W.3d 569, 578 (quoting Grant v. State, 357 Ark. 91, 93, 161 S.W.3d 785, 786 (2004)). Further, this court will not reverse a circuit court’s decision absent a showing of prejudice. Davis v. State, 350 Ark. 22, 86 S.W.3d 872 (2002).
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RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
| Jennifer Steele appeals from the order of protection filed September 10, 2013, in Pulaski County Circuit Court, granting a two-year protective order to John Lyon.1 On appeal, Steele argues that the trial court erred by allowing Lyon to testify when he was not listed as a witness and by not considering her argument that Lyon had other remedies outside the Domestic Abuse Act, Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-15-101 (“The Act”). She also contends that the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony and that there was insufficient evidence to support the ruling in favor of Lyon. We affirm.
The parties dated roughly eight months, but never lived together. After their relationship ended, the parties ran into each other at a parade and had an altercation. Lyon claimed that he received numerous text messages from Steele harassing and threatening him. |2He filed a petition for an order of protection under the Act on June 5, 2013, and an ex parte order was granted with a hearing set for June 27, 2013. The hearing was held, but continued until August 29, 2013. The final order of protection was entered on September 10, 2013.
On September 16, 2013, Steele filed a notice of appeal. On September 20, 2013, she filed a “Brief in Support of Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 59 and/or Rule 60” to amend the order to reflect that she did not own or carry a firearm; it was granted on October 17, 2013. Steele filed a motion to extend time for filing the record on appeal on December 11, 2013. The record was lodged with this court on January 16, 2014. Over a year later and after several other extensions, this matter is now before us again.
On appeal, Steele argues that the trial court erred in allowing Lyon to testify even though he was not listed as a witness in discovery and in admitting certain evidence during his testimony. However, Steele provides no citation to authority or convincing argument in its support. It is well established that we will not consider an argument when the appellant presents no citation to authority or convincing argument in its support, and it is not apparent without further research that the argument is well taken. See Yankaway v. State, 366 Ark. 18, 22, 233 S.W.3d 136, 139 (2006); Hollis v. State, 346 Ark. 175, 179, 55 S.W.3d 756, 759-60 (2001); Dougan v. State, 330 Ark. 827, 957 S.W.2d 182 (1997); Williams v. State, 325 Ark. 432, 930 S.W.2d 297 (1996).
Steele’s second point on appeal is that the trial court erred in ruling that the case fell within the scope of the Domestic Abuse Act. On August 29, 2013, as a preliminary motion, Steele moved for the court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. She argues that this was clearly a case in which other adequate remedies existed outside the Domestic Abuse Act in which to address Lyon’s complaint. Steele cites the general assembly’s [ointent of the statute and asserts that the legislature did not envision this Act would be used as it was under circumstances like this case presents. Steele argues that there is no pattern in the instant case of any domestic abuse nor is there a pattern of threats. She cites the following language of the statute:
The General Assembly hereby finds that this chapter is necessary to secure important governmental interests in the protection of victims of abuse and the prevention of further abuse through the removal of offenders from the household and other injunctive relief for which there is no adequate remedy in current law.
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-101.
Steele contends that Lyon used an adequate remedy by calling the police on June 2, 2013 — the day of the incident. She maintains that because Lyon advised the police as to what happened when the parties saw each other at the Conway Pride Parade, and told them that he had received a text that Steele intended to kill herself, that there was an adequate remedy other than filing an order of protection, and as such, the Domestic Abuse Act is not applicable to the instant case.
Her interpretation and application of the statutory language is inaccurate. The sentence in the statute does not mean that a petitioner who alleges domestic abuse or the threat of domestic abuse is precluded from seeking an order of protection if he or she could also seek other remedies, such as criminal charges or civil damages. Steele also contends that the statute does not apply in this case because the parties never lived together and only dated for roughly eight months. The Act’s purpose does not in any way indicate that it should be utilized only when there are no other adequate remedies or that the parties must reside together. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 9-15-103 defines “family or household member” to include anyone in a past or present dating relationship regardless of whether they live together.
This court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Claver v. Wilbur, 102 Ark. App. 53, 280 S.W.3d 570 (2008). In reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, a court will determine the meaning and effect of a statute first by construing the statute just as it reads, “giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language.” Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. Weiss, 347 Ark. 543, 550, 65 S.W.3d 867, 872-873 (2002). When the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to look further and apply the rules of statutory construction. Id. This court has previously ruled that a relationship “clearly comes within the definition of the applicable statute”, even when the parties dated for less than two months. Pablo v. Crowder, 95 Ark. App. 268, 274, 236 S.W.3d 559, 563 (2006). Here, it is clear that the,statute is applicable in this case. Lyon and Steele were in a dating relationship for eight months, and the fact that Lyon had other remedies available to him does not preclude him from seeking relief under the statute.
Steele’s next argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in allowing Lyon’s Exhibit 1, a series of text messages, into evidence. A circuit court’s decision to admit evidence will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Laswell v. State, 2012 Ark. 201, 17, 404 S.W.3d 818, 828. The abuse-of-discretion standard “is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the trial court’s decision, but requires that the trial court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.” Gully v. State, 2012 Ark. 368, 423 S.W.3d 569, 578 (quoting Grant v. State, 357 Ark. 91, 93, 161 S.W.3d 785, 786 (2004)). Further, this court will not reverse a circuit court’s decision absent a showing of prejudice. Davis v. State, 350 Ark. 22, 86 S.W.3d 872 (2002).
Steele argues that the text messages should not have been admitted into evidence because: (1) the text messages did not have names on the documents, (2) the text messages |Bwere not a complete record of the communication between the parties, (3) the text messages were not the originals and were taken from a source that was not provided during discovery. We hold that the trial court did not err by allowing the exhibit into evidence because it had been properly authenticated. Further, Arkansas Rule of Evidence 1001(3) defines “original” as the writing or recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. If data are stored in a computer or similar device, an “original” includes any printout or other output readable by sight that accurately reflects the data. Ark. R. Evid. 1001(3). As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing screenshots of the text messages taken from the phone to be admitted as evidence.
Steele next argues that the trial court erred in allowing testimony by forcing her to read text messages into the record that she could not authenticate. This point on appeal fails for the same reason her first argument on appeal does. Steele does not cite any applicable statutory or case law to support her argument. We have long held that we will not consider an argument when the appellant presents no applicable authority or convincing arguments in its support. See Polston v. State, 360 Ark. 317, 201 S.W.3d 406 (2005); Hathcock v. State, 357 Ark. 563, 182 S.W.3d 152 (2004); Stivers v. State, 354 Ark. 140, 118 S.W.3d 558 (2003). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision on this point.
Steele’s fifth and final point on appeal is that the trial court erred in ruling in favor of Lyon because there was insufficient evidence to support the ruling. Our standard of review following a bench trial is whether the circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Newton v. Tidd, 94 Ark. App. 368, 231 S.W.3d 84 (2006). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the previewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Simmons v. Dixon, 96 Ark. App. 260, 240 S.W.3d 608 (2006). The appellate court gives due deference to the superior position of the trial court to view and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Robinson v. Ford-Robinson, 362 Ark. 232, 236, 208 S.W.3d 140, 141 (2005).
At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from both sides, and it was well within the lower court’s discretion to weigh the credibility of each witness. Lyon testified that Steele sent forty-six text messages in one day and acted erratically. Lyon’s witness, Christina Harrison, confirmed Lyon’s belief that Steele was following him around at the Conway Pride Parade and testified that Steele was suicidal and had threatened to kill Lyon. Steele admitted that she “ran her mouth” to Lyon at the parade. When Steele raised her arm to adjust her sunglasses, Lyon told her not to hit the woman standing next to him, and grabbed her arm. Steele then hit Lyon.
Lyon also testified that he continued to receive harassing text messages and offensive comments from Steele even after he had asked her to stop contacting him. Steele threatened to come to his apartment, and Lyon feared for his safety.
From the testimony presented at the hearing, the trial court could reasonably find that Steele committed domestic abuse under the statute by inflicting fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault. There was'sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that an order of protection should be entered against Steele, and as such the circuit court’s decision was not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
Gladwin, C.J., agrees. Harrison, J., concurs.