Steele-El v. Valvoline Instant Oil Change

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedMarch 23, 2020
Docket2:18-cv-12277
StatusUnknown

This text of Steele-El v. Valvoline Instant Oil Change (Steele-El v. Valvoline Instant Oil Change) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Steele-El v. Valvoline Instant Oil Change, (E.D. Mich. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ANTHONY MICHAEL STEELE-EL, Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 18-12277 Honorable Denise Page Hood VALVOLINE INSTANT OIL CHANGE, RONALD SMITH, RACHEL ELMORE, and ALEXIS KASACAVAGE, Defendant. / ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (“AFFIDAVIT OF TRUTH”) [ECF No. 39], ORDER DISMISSING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ISSUED ON NOVEMBER 21, 2019 [ECF No. 38], and ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE I. INTRODUCTION On July 20, 2018, pro se Plaintiff filed this cause of action, and his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. Plaintiff alleges that he was employed by Defendant Valvoline Instant Oil Change (“Valvoline) from August 16, 2017 until being terminated on or about January 4, 2018. Plaintiff has filed claims against Valvoline and the other Defendants (Ronald Smith, Rachel Elmore, and Alexis Kasacavage) for: (1) Breach of Contract - Federal Laws/Constitution; (2) Fraud; (3) Defamation; (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (5) Harassment. [Dkt. No. 1] Plaintiff’s Complaint also contains a paragraph alleging that he was

discriminated against in his employment pursuant to: (a) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, (b) Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 13 §§ 241, 242, and 245 of the United States Codes of Law; (c) Executive Order No. 13798 § 4 and 82 Fed. Reg. 21675; (d) the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights Articles 1 and 2; (e) the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Articles 2 and 3; and (f) the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1787 and 1836. Id. at ¶7.

On September 24, 2019, the Court granted Defendant Rachel Elmore’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 37. On November 21, 2019, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute as to Defendant Ronald Smith. ECF No. 38. On December 10, 2019, Plaintiff filed an “Affidavit of

Truth” on the docket. ECF No. 39. On December 27, 2019, a document prepared by Plaintiff titled “Notice of Appeal” was filed on the docket. ECF No. 41. II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Reconsideration In his Affidavit of Truth, Plaintiff seeks to void or vacate the Court’s order granting Defendant Elmore’s Motion to Dismiss, a request the Court finds to be a

motion for reconsideration. “A motion for rehearing or reconsideration must be filed 2 within 14 days after entry of the judgment or order.” E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(1). In order to obtain reconsideration of a particular matter, the party bringing the motion for

reconsideration must: (1) demonstrate a palpable defect by which the Court and the parties have been misled; and (2) demonstrate that “correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.” E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3). See also Graham ex

rel. Estate of Graham v. County of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 385 (6th Cir. 2004); Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Dow Chemical Co., 44 F.Supp.2d 865, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1999); Kirkpatrick v. General Electric, 969 F.Supp. 457, 459 (E.D. Mich. 1997).

A “palpable defect” is a “defect which is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or plain.” Olson v. The Home Depot, 321 F.Supp.2d 872, 874 (E.D.Mich. 2004). The movant must also demonstrate that the disposition of the case would be different if the palpable defect were cured. E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3). Brown v. Walgreens Income

Protective Plan for Store Managers, No. 10-CV-14442, 2013 WL 1040530, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 15, 2013). “[T]he court will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present the same issues ruled upon by the Court, either

expressly or by reasonable implication.” E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3). Plaintiff’s request is untimely, even if he did not receive or review the Court’s September 24, 2019 Order until November 6, 2019 (as he indicates). See ECF No. 39,

PgID 595. Both of the dates are more than 30 days prior to December 10, 2019, when 3 Plaintiff filed his Affidavit of Truth. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(1). The Court also finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated no palpable defect by which the Court and the

parties have been misled or how correcting any defect would result in a different disposition of the case as it relates to Defendant Elmore. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3). Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s request that the

Court void or vacate the Court’s order dismissing Defendant Elmore is denied. B. Discovery Plaintiff “demand[s]” a number of documents from the Court and Defendants.”

ECF No. 39, PgID 592. The Court finds no legal basis for the documents demanded, nor any reason such documents are relevant to the instant proceeding. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s “demand” is denied.

C. “Affidavit” to Recuse the Undersigned Plaintiff argues that the undersigned has “violated [his] personal liberties and has wantonly refused to provide due process and equal protection before the court .

. . .” ECF No. 39, PgID 592. Plaintiff states that “[m]y claims under International Laws were dismissed by Denise Page Hood. Therefore, I respectfully demand Denise Page Hood to recuse herself for the unethical and unlawful conduct and conflict of interest which gives Plaintiff good reason to believe that Denise Page Hood cannot

hear the above case in a fair and impartial manner.” Id. at 593. 4 Recusal in the federal courts is governed primarily by the federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455. Bell v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 997, 1004 (6th Cir. 2005). The trial judge

herself must rule on a motion to recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455. See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Discretion is confided in the district judge in the first instance to determine whether to disqualify [herself].”).

Sixth Circuit cases have noted that a recusal motion is committed to the sound discretion of the district court and the standard of review is whether the court abused its discretion. Wheeler v. The Southland Corp., 875 F.2d 1246, 1251 (6th Cir. 1989);

United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1990); Easley v. University of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351, 1356-58 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466 (6th Cir. 1991); Rhodes v. McDaniel, 945 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1991); In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1990). Section 455(a) is

the “catchall” recusal provision which states, “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Prejudice or bias sufficient to justify recusal must

be personal or extrajudicial. In re M.

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