IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STAYTERRA VACATIONS, LLC (f/k/a ) GSP PRIME BUYER, LLC), PRIME ) VACATIONS, LLC, and GSP PRIME ) HOLDINGS, LLC, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. 2025-1111-KSJM ) SHAWN T. KALETA, BALI HAI JV ) LLC, TRI STAR PROPERTIES, LLC, ) TRISTAR PROPERTIES ) ACQUISITION PRIME LLC, ) TRISTAR SEASIDE TROPIC LLC, ) TRISTAR PD LLC, 791 JACARANDA ) LLC, 111 CEDAR AVE LLC, ) COCONUT BEACH RESORT LLC, ) 1015 FLEMMING ST LLC, and 171 ) MCKINLEY LLC, ) ) Defendants. )
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE VERIFIED AMENDED COMPLAINT
1. The facts are drawn from the Verified Amended Complaint (the
“Amended Complaint”).1 In September 2024, entities affiliated with private equity
firm Garnett Station Partners—Plaintiffs StayTerra Vacations, LLC (f/k/a GSP
Prime Buyer, LLC) and GSP Prime Holdings, LLC—acquired Plaintiff Prime
Vacations, LLC (with StayTerra and GSP, “Plaintiffs”), a property rental
management brand created by Defendant Shawn Kaleta. The acquisition comprised
an Equity Purchase Agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”), a Property Management
1 C.A. No. 2025-1111-KSJM, Docket (“Dkt.”) 36 (Am. Compl.). Agreement (the “Management Agreement”), a Contribution Agreement, and a Hotel
Agreement.
2. Plaintiffs allege that after the acquisition closed, Kaleta began
indirectly competing with Plaintiffs. Kaleta transferred dozens of properties, in many
cases for $10, to his ex-wife, Jen Kaleta, and his girlfriend, Kiri Stewart. Jen Kaleta
and Stewart then stopped using Plaintiffs’ property management services. Instead,
Stewart, an interior designer, formed Magnolia Cottages, LLC and Jen Kaleta
incorporated AMI Premier Properties, Inc. Magnolia Cottages and AMI Premier then
began offering property management services in Florida to the newly transferred
properties.
3. Plaintiffs also allege that Kaleta assisted Jen Kaleta and Kiri Stewart
with a shadow listing scheme. Jen Kaleta and Stewart used booking platforms to list
properties Kaleta owned. Plaintiffs listed the exact same properties but for higher
rates. Kaleta prevented double booking by blocking the properties for personal use
whenever Stewart or Jen Kaleta booked a guest. This alleged scheme allowed Jen
Kaleta and Stewart to capture revenue that Plaintiffs would have received.
4. Plaintiffs claim that Kaleta breached his obligations under the
transactional agreements. They filed this suit against Kaleta and counterparties to
some of the transactional agreements referred to as the “Hotel Defendants”2 (with
Kaleta, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs assert twelve Counts:
2 The Hotel Defendants are Bali Hai JV LLC, Anna Maria Beach Resort LLC, Tri
Star Properties, LLC, TriStar Properties Acquisition Prime LLC, Tristar Seaside
2 • Count I against Kaleta for breach of the Purchase Agreement’s non- competition covenant;
• Count II against Kaleta for breach of the Purchase Agreement’s non- solicitation covenant;
• Count III against Kaleta for breach of the Purchase Agreement’s non- interference covenant;
• Count IV against Kaleta for breach of the Management Agreement;
• Count V against Kaleta for breach of the Purchase Agreement’s and Management Agreement’s implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing;
• Count VI against Kaleta for breach of the Contribution Agreement;
• Count VII against Kaleta for tortious interference of the Management Agreement;
• Count VIII against Defendants for breach of the Hotel Agreement, alleging failure to pay hotel fees;
• Count IX against Defendants for breach of the Hotel Agreement, alleging removal of access from property management software;
• Count X against Kaleta for anticipatory breach of the Hotel Agreement;
• Count XI against Kaleta for anticipatory breach of the Management Agreement; and
• Count XII against Defendants for account stated for failure to pay hotel fees.
5. Defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Court
of Chancery Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(2) for lack
of personal jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.3
Tropic LLC, Tristar PD LLC, 791 Jacaranda LLC, 111 Cedar Ave LLC, Coconut Beach Resort LLC, 1015 Flemming St LLC, and 171 McKinley LLC. 3 Dkt. 32 (“Defs.’ Opening Br.”) at i–ii; Dkt. 29.
3 6. Rule 12(b)(1). Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is denied because Plaintiffs pled a basis for equitable jurisdiction in
Counts I through III and the court may exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
claims under the clean-up doctrine.
a. The court “can acquire subject matter jurisdiction over a cause in
only three ways, namely, if (1) one or more of the plaintiff’s claims for relief is
equitable in character, (2) the plaintiff requests relief that is equitable in
nature, or (3) subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by statute.”4 Plaintiffs
seek injunctive relief—to enforce restrictive covenants to prevent Kaleta from
interfering with Plaintiffs’ business and customers. The loss of customer
relationships and goodwill can qualify as irreparable harm warranting
injunctive relief.5
b. “Fundamentally, once a right to relief in Chancery has been
determined to exist, the powers of the Court are broad and the means flexible
to shape and adjust the precise relief to be granted so as to enforce particular
rights and liabilities legitimately connected with the subject matter of the
action.”6 Under the clean-up doctrine, “the court may also exercise ancillary
4 Candlewood Timber Gp., LLC v. Pan Am. Energy, LLC, 859 A.2d 989, 997 (Del.
2004) (internal citations omitted). 5 L & W Ins., Inc. v. Harrington, 2007 WL 2753006, at *11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 12, 2007)
(“The protection of substantial business relationships and goodwill are legitimate business interests whose impairment may give rise to irreparable harm.”). 6 Wilmont Homes, Inc. v. Weiler, 202 A.2d 576, 580 (Del. 1964) (citing 1 John N.
Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 115 (5th ed. 1941)).
4 jurisdiction over purely legal causes of action that are ‘part of the same
controversy over which the Court originally had subject matter jurisdiction in
order to avoid piecemeal litigation.’”7 If a plaintiff has adequately pled a basis
for subject matter jurisdiction, then the court applies a multi-factor analysis to
determine whether to assert ancillary jurisdiction.8 Those factors include
judicial efficiency.9
c. Defendants argue that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
because money can remedy any alleged harms. But they ignore that the
Amended Complaint seeks injunctive relief to enforce the restrictive covenants
at issue in Counts I through III.10 As discussed below, Counts I through III
state a claim. Plaintiffs have thus pled a basis for equitable jurisdiction.
Judicial efficiency warrants exercising jurisdiction over the remaining Counts
under the clean-up doctrine. This court therefore has subject matter
jurisdiction over all claims in this action.
7 Rodriguez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 4892216, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2021)
(quoting Kraft v. WisdomTree Invs. Inc., 145 A.3d 969, 974 (Del. Ch. 2016)). 8 Acierno v. Goldstein, 2004 WL 1488673, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 25, 2004) (citing Clark
v. Teeven Hldg. Co., Inc., 625 A.2d 869, 882 (Del. Ch. 1992)) (listing the factors as “whether retention of the claims will: 1) resolve a factual issue which must be determined in the proceedings; 2) avoid a multiplicity of suits; 3) promote judicial efficiency; 4) do full justice; 5) avoid great expense; 6) afford complete relief in one action; or 7) overcome insufficient modes of procedure at law”). 9 Id.
10 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 102–17.
5 7. Rule 12(b)(2). Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts IV, V, and VII
through XII for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied based on the forum selection
provision in the Purchase Agreement.11
a. “When a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to
Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of showing a
basis for the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant.”12 At the
pleading stage, “plaintiffs need only make a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction and ‘the record is construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.’”13 The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction, however,
is a waivable right.14 “A defendant can agree to a court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction.”15 “Where the parties to the forum selection clause have
consented freely and knowingly to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction, the clause
is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on a court.”16
11 “After Plaintiffs’ causes of action arising from the [Purchase] and Contribution
Agreement[s] have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . there are no viable claims[.]” Defs.’ Opening Br. at 32. Counts I through III and VI arise from the Purchase and Contribution Agreements. Counts IV, V, and VII through XII thus remain. 12 Ryan v. Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 265 (Del. Ch. 2007).
13 Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Cornerstone Techs., LLC v. Conrad, 2003
WL 178759, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003)). 14 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985).
15 In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. Deriv. Litig., 2019 WL 1224556, at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar.
15, 2019). 16 Nat’l Indus. Gp. (Hldg.) v. Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C., 67 A.3d 373, 381 (Del. 2013).
6 b. The Purchase Agreement contains a forum selection clause.
Through that clause, Kaleta consented to this court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over him in connection with any lawsuit “among the Parties arising
in whole or in part under or in connection with this Agreement or any other
Transaction Document . . . .”17 The Purchase Agreement defines a “Transaction
Document” as “this Agreement, the Seller Documents and the Buyer
Documents.”18 In turn, “Seller Documents” are “this Agreement and each other
agreement, document, instrument or certificate contemplated by this
Agreement to be executed by a Seller or a Company in connection with the
consummation of the Transactions . . . .”19 Section 2.8(b) states that the Hotel
and Management Agreements are closing deliverables.20 Accordingly, the two
are Seller Documents, which are Transaction Documents, that Kaleta signed
as owner. Plaintiffs have sued based on violations of the Hotel and
Management Agreements, so the claims “arise in whole or in part” under those
Transaction Documents. Therefore, the Purchase Agreement’s forum selection
applies. The court thus has personal jurisdiction over Kaleta.
c. The forum selection provision also gives the court personal
jurisdiction over the Hotel Defendants, although they did not sign the
Purchase Agreement. To bind a non-signatory entity to a forum selection
17 Am. Compl., Ex. A (Purchase Agreement) § 8.3(b).
18 Id., Ex. A at A-15.
19 Id., Ex. A at A-14.
20 Id. § 2.8(b).
7 clause, the court asks three questions: “First, is the forum selection clause
valid? Second, are the defendants third-party beneficiaries, or closely related
to, the contract? Third, does the claim arise from their standing relating to the
. . . agreement?”21
d. The first and third questions support exercising jurisdiction.
Defendants do not dispute the validity of the forum selection clause.22 And the
claim arises from the Purchase Agreement because the Hotel Agreement is a
Transaction Document under the Purchase Agreement and involves the
management of hotels. In fact, the property management business goes to the
heart of the value exchanged in the Purchase Agreement.
e. That leaves the second question. A party is closely related to a
signatory if “(1) [the party] receives a direct benefit from the agreement; or (2)
it was foreseeable that [the party] would be bound by the agreement.”23 In
Neurvana Medical, LLC v. Balt USA, LLC, this court held an affiliate did not
receive a direct benefit under a purchase agreement with a forum selection
clause.24 The court reasoned that the affiliate itself did not make the
acquisition and any profits it received would come under separate agreements
21 Neurvana Medical, LLC v. Balt USA, LLC, 2019 WL 4464268, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sep.
18, 2019) (quoting Capital Gp. Cos. v. Armour, 2004 WL 2521295, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2004)). 22 Armour, 2004 WL 2521295, at *6 (“Forum selection clauses are presumptively valid
and have been regularly enforced.”). 23 Weygandt v. Weco, LLC, 2009 WL 1351808, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 14, 2009) (internal
citations omitted). 24 2019 WL 4464268, at *4.
8 unrelated to the purchase agreement.25 The court then declined to expand the
foreseeability prong.26 But it did note that Delaware courts have held entities
bound to forum selection provisions “in the controller context, where the
signatory controls the non-signatory involved in the transaction.”27 Here,
Kaleta signed the Hotel Agreement as the “Owner” and “Manager” of the Hotel
Defendants.28 Kaleta’s signature indicates Kaleta controlled the Hotel
Defendants, making it foreseeable for them to be bound under the Hotel
Agreement. The court thus has personal jurisdiction over the Hotel
Defendants. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is
denied.
8. Rule 12(b)(6). Defendants move to dismiss Counts I through VII, XI,
and XII for failure to state a claim. “[T]he governing pleading standard in Delaware
to survive a motion to dismiss is reasonable ‘conceivability.’”29 When considering a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in
the [c]omplaint as true . . . , draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,
and deny the motion unless the plaintiff could not recover under any reasonably
25 Id. (“In any event, the mere ‘contemplation’ of a benefit does not directly confer
one.”). 26 Id. at *7–8.
27 Id. at *5.
28 See Am. Compl., Ex. C.
29 Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 536
(Del. 2011).
9 conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.”30 The court, however, need not
“accept conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts or . . . draw unreasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”31
9. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts I, II, III, and VI for breach of
contract against Kaleta is denied. To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a party
must demonstrate the existence of a contract, the breach of an obligation imposed by
the contract, and harm resulting from the breach.32 Plaintiffs have adequately
alleged in Counts I through III and VI that Kaleta breached the restrictive covenants
in the Purchase Agreement and the goodwill provision in the Contribution
a. In Count I, Plaintiffs claim that Kaleta breached the non-
competition provision of the Purchase Agreement. That provision states:
“[Kaleta] shall not, directly or indirectly (through an Affiliate or otherwise) . . .
(i) own, manage or control, invest in, become an equity holder of or become
engaged or serve as an officer, director, manager, employee, agent, consultant,
advisor, contractor or representative of, any Person that engages in the
Business within the Restricted Territory[.]”33 Jen Kaleta owns AMI Premier
Properties, Inc., which provides property management services in Florida. She
30 Id. at 536 (citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002)).
31 Price v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 166 (Del. 2011), overruled on
other grounds by Ramsey v. Ga. S. Univ. Advanced Dev. Ctr., 189 A.3d 1255 (Del. 2018) (citing Clinton v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895 (Del. 2009)). 32 VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 612 (Del. 2003).
33 Purchase Agreement § 6.6(a)(i).
10 is also Kaleta’s ex-wife. Kiri Stewart owns Magnolia Cottages, LLC, which
also provides property management services in Florida. She is Kaleta’s
girlfriend. Plaintiffs allege that Kaleta transferred numerous properties to Jen
Kaleta and Stewart for $10 each and that Stewart lacks experience in property
management.34 Given his relationships to Jen Kaleta and Stewart, and
Stewart’s lack of experience in the industry, it is reasonably conceivable that
Kaleta serves as a “consultant, advisor, or contractor” for AMI Premier and
Magnolia Cottages. It is thus reasonably conceivable that Kaleta breached the
non-competition provision of the Purchase Agreement. Count I states a claim.
b. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that Kaleta breached the non-
solicitation of customers provision in the Purchase Agreement. That provision
states: “[Kaleta] shall not, directly or indirectly (through an Affiliate or
otherwise) . . . induc[e] or attempt[] to induce any Protected Person [which
includes any owner of a vacation property who has contracted with Prime for
property management services] to refrain from or cease doing business with
the Companies or reduce the level of business it does with the Companies or
Buyer . . . .”35 Plaintiffs allege that Kaleta assisted Jen Kaleta and Stewart
with a shadow listing scheme, posting virtually identical listings to Prime’s
34 Am. Compl. ¶ 15 (“Indeed, in or around August 2025, Prime’s Chief Operating
Officer, John Munn, asked Ms. Stewart why she was getting into property management given that her background is in interior design and she pointed her finger at Kaleta.”); id. ¶ 70 (stating that Stewart “is an interior designer by trade and not a real estate developer”). 35 Purchase Agreement § 6.6(a)(iii)(A)(4).
11 listings on Airbnb to induce Prime’s customers to rent from them. The
Amended Complaint connects Kaleta to that practice through his relationships
with the actors, the coordinated conduct, and the identical listings. Based on
these allegations, it is reasonably conceivable that Kaleta indirectly induced
customers away from Prime in breach of the non-solicitation provision of the
Purchase Agreement. Count II states a claim.
c. In Count III, Plaintiffs allege that Kaleta breached the non-
interference provision of the Purchase Agreement. That provision states:
“[Kaleta] shall not, directly or indirectly (through an Affiliate or otherwise) . . .
intentionally interfere with, disrupt or attempt to disrupt the relationship,
contractual or otherwise, between Buyer, the Companies, or any of their
respective Affiliates and any Protected Persons[.]”36 Plaintiffs allege that each
of the vacation rental properties that terminated their relationship with Prime
to engage with AMI Premier or Magnolia Cottages was previously owned or
controlled by Kaleta, a business associate, or a close friend. It is thus
reasonably conceivable that Kaleta breached the non-interference provision of
the Purchase Agreement. Count III states a claim.
d. In Count VI, Plaintiffs claim that Kaleta breached the
Contribution Agreement, which required that Kaleta contribute his “Personal
Goodwill” to Plaintiffs. Kaleta’s Personal Goodwill includes his business and
reputation in the industry. The same allegations that make it reasonably
36 Id. § 6.6(a)(iii)(B).
12 conceivable that Kaleta breached the restrictive covenants render it
reasonably conceivable that Kaleta has failed to contribute his Personal
Goodwill to Plaintiffs. Count VI states a claim.
10. Counts IV, V, VII, XI, and XII, which are a mix of contract and tort
claims, fail for a variety of reasons.
a. In Count IV, Plaintiffs claim that by transferring properties
subject to the Management Agreement without Plaintiffs’ consent, Kaleta
breached the Management Agreement. The relevant provisions are
Sections 3(b), 19, and 20 of the Management Agreement. Section 3(b) permits
the transfer of property to a third-party if the third party agrees to either
“enter into a Property Rental and Management Agreement . . . on substantially
the same terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement and for a term no
less than one (1) year” or “represents that it does not intend to utilize the
services of any third-party property management company.”37 Section 20 also
governs the sale of properties. It requires that the owner “notify [the] Agent
in writing no later than thirty days after signing a listing contract.”38 Plaintiffs
concede that the plain language of Sections 3(b) and 20 allow Kaleta to sell
properties, as he did, subject to conditions, which he met. Yet Plaintiffs argue
that Section 19 qualifies these provisions. Section 19 states that termination
37 Am. Compl., Ex. B (Management Agreement) § 3(b).
38 Id. § 20.
13 of the Management Agreement may occur with mutual consent.39 Plaintiffs
argue that a transfer or sale is an effective termination, which thus requires
their consent under Section 19. But Plaintiffs’ argument finds no support in
the plain language of the agreement. A transfer or sale is a legally distinct
concept from a termination. Sections 3(b) and 20 govern transfers and sales.
Section 19 governs terminations. Had the parties wished to subject transfers
and sales permitted by Sections 3(b) and 20 to the consent requirement of
Section 19, they could have done so.
b. In Count V, which is pled in the alternative, Plaintiffs claim that
Defendants’ conduct at issue in Counts I through III breached the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing implied in the Purchase Agreement and
Management Agreement. Delaware law governs the Purchase Agreement.40
To plead an implied covenant claim under Delaware law, a plaintiff must
identify both a gap in the contract and an implied provision that would fill that
gap, which the parties would have agreed upon at the time of bargaining.41
Plaintiffs make no effort to do so. Florida law governs the Management
39 Id. § 19.
40 Purchase Agreement § 8.3(a) (“The interpretation and construction of this Agreement or any other Transaction Document, and all matters relating hereto (including the validity or enforcement of this Agreement), shall be governed by the laws of the State of Delaware . . . .”). 41 See Roma Landmark Theaters, LLC v. Cohen Exhibition Co. LLC, 2020 WL 5816759, at *10 (Del. Ch. Sep. 30, 2020) (dismissing implied covenant claim because the claimant “neither alleges . . . nor argues in its brief that there is a contractual gap or unanticipated development in the Purchase Agreement”).
14 Agreement. Under Florida law, a claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing requires that an express provision of the contract
be breached.42 As discussed above, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for breach of
the Management Agreement. Count V thus fails to state a claim.
c. In Count VII, Plaintiffs claim that Kaleta, a party to the
Management Agreement, interfered with the Management Agreement. Under
both Florida and Delaware law, a party to a contract cannot tortiously interfere
with it.43 Count VII thus fails to state a claim.
d. In Count XI, Plaintiffs claim that Kaleta anticipatorily breached
the Management Agreement. Florida law governs this analysis.44 Under
Florida law, anticipatory breach requires words or conduct demonstrating a
42 See, e.g., Grant v. Centerstate Bank, 2021 WL 9594009, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 6,
2021) (“To maintain a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an express provision of the contract must have been breached.”); Karp v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 WL 1121256, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2013) (explaining that under Florida law an implied covenant “claim cannot be maintained in the absence of a breach of an express term of a contract” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 43 Ethyl Corp. v. Balter, 386 So. 2d 1220, 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (explaining
that “a cause of action for interference does not exist against one who is himself a party to the contract allegedly interfered with”). In briefing, Defendants cited Delaware law for this proposition. Defs.’ Opening Br. at 55 (“It is axiomatic under Delaware law that a party cannot tortiously interfere with a contract to which it is a party.” (citing Tenneco Automotive, Inc. v. El Paso Corp., 2007 WL 92621, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 8, 2007))). 44 The Management Agreement states that Florida law governs all matters related to
the agreement, including interpretation, construction, validity, and enforcement. Management Agreement § 29. In Florida, “an anticipatory repudiation creates a cause of action for breach of contract[.]” Twenty-Four Collection, Inc. v. M. Weinbaum Const., Inc., 427 So. 2d 1110, 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The claim thus falls within the choice-of-law provision because anticipatory breach is in effect a breach and Florida law governs breaches of the Management Agreement.
15 clear intent to refuse future performance.45 To support this claim, Plaintiffs
rely on Kaleta’s statement that he intended to continue transferring
properties. But as explained above, the Management Agreement permits
transfers under certain conditions. Exercising a contractual right is not a
refusal to perform. Because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts supporting a
repudiation of the Management Agreement, Count XI fails to state a claim.
e. In Count XII, Plaintiffs request an “Account Stated” for fees paid
under the Hotel Agreement. This request for an accounting is an equitable
remedy, typically awarded for breach of fiduciary duties. Plaintiffs seek an
accounting for breach of contract. They give no basis for seeking that relief
and expressly abandoned the claim.46 Count XII fails to state a claim.
11. Counts I, II, III, VI, VIII, IX, and X state a claim. Counts IV, V, VII, XI,
and XII are dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
/s/ Kathaleen St. J. McCormick Chancellor May 27, 2026
45 Alvarez v. Rendon, 953 So. 2d 702, 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
46 Dkt. 43 at 25:9–12 (TRANSCRIPT) (“About an hour before the hearing, counsel for
plaintiffs emailed me and said, you know, we didn’t respond to [Count XII] in our brief. That’s because we have abandoned that claim.”).