Stauffer v. Trump

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 19, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-05698
StatusUnknown

This text of Stauffer v. Trump (Stauffer v. Trump) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stauffer v. Trump, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK HOWARD RICHARD STAUFFER, 24-CV-5698 (LTS) Plaintiff, 24-CV-5701 (LTS) -against- 24-CV-5703 (LTS) DONALD J. TRUMP, FORMER US PRESIDENT, 24-CV-5704 (LTS) REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH Defendant. LEAVE TO REPLEAD LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings these four actions against Defendant Donald J. Trump, invoking the Court’s diversity and federal question jurisdiction. Because the complaints all bring related claims against the same Defendant, the Court considers these actions together in this order. By orders dated July 30 and August 12, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s requests to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the four complaints and grants Plaintiff leave to replead his claims in a single amended complaint in the action under docket number 24-CV-5698. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Howard Stauffer brings these four actions against former President Donald Trump. In each of the complaints, Plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen of New York, and Defendant Trump is domiciled in and a citizen of Florida. Plaintiff contends that President Trump’s actions have caused him “massive personal, commercial, and financial loss.” ECF 1:24- CV-5698, 1 at 4. In each of the actions, Plaintiff seeks one billion dollars, plus “an additional forty million dollars for public, personal, and intra-family humiliation.” (Id.)

In the actions under docket numbers 24-CV-5698 and 24-CV-5701, Plaintiff alleges that former President Donald Trump violated the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1124, “to obtain High Office and massive financial gains in excess of three billion dollars (recent sale of [T]ruth [S]ocial, social media company, but not limited to).” ECF 1:24-CV-5698, 1 at 4; ECF 1:24-CV- 5701, 1 at 4. In the action under docket number 24-CV-5703, Plaintiff alleges that former President Donald Trump violated the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 501, 506, by “using copyrighted material.” ECF 1:24-CV-5703, 1 at 4. He further alleges that Defendant Trump engaged in wire fraud and theft of trade secrets, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1831-32. Id. at 3. He states that Defendant did so in order “to obtain High Office and massive financial gains in excess of three billion dollars (recent sale of [T]ruth [S]ocial, social media company, but not limited to).” Id. at 4. In the action under docket number 24-CV-5704, Plaintiff alleges that former President

Donald Trump violated NY Civil Rights Law 50 and 51, “the Right of Publicity,” and U.S. Civil Rights. He contends that Defendant Trump “violated NY state civil rights law 50 and 51 to obtain high office and massive financial gains in excess of three billion dollars (recent sale of [T]ruth [S]ocial, social media company, but not limited to).” ECF 1:24-CV-5704, 1 at 4. DISCUSSION A. Violations of Criminal Law Plaintiff attempts to bring claims against Defendant Trump based on alleged violations of federal criminal laws against wire fraud and theft of trade secrets. Plaintiff cannot initiate the criminal prosecution of an individual because “the decision to prosecute is solely within the discretion of the prosecutor.” Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 87 (1981). A court order directing prosecuting attorneys to initiate a criminal proceeding is unavailable, because

prosecutors possess discretionary authority to bring criminal actions, and they are “immune from control or interference by citizen or court.” Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1972). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for violations of criminal laws, such as laws against wire fraud or theft, are dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). These should not be reasserted in any amended complaint that Plaintiff may file. B. Short and Plain Statement Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court need not accept,

however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated various federal and state laws, causing him harm.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Leeke v. Timmerman
454 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Lucille Qualls Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corporation
972 F.2d 36 (Second Circuit, 1992)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Pike v. Freeman
266 F.3d 78 (Second Circuit, 2001)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Stauffer v. Trump, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stauffer-v-trump-nysd-2024.