Staten v. State

946 N.E.2d 80, 2011 Ind. App. LEXIS 674, 2011 WL 1465555

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 18, 2011
• Docket: 87A04-1005-CR-393
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

BRADFORD, Judge.

Appellani/Defendant Gregory Staten appeals following his conviction for Class A misdemeanor Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated Endangering a Person.¹ We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sometime after midnight on August 25, 2008, Indiana State Trooper Joshua Greer observed a vehicle, which he later determined was being driven by Staten, driving on the Boonville Junior High School access road between State Road 61 and Yankee-town Road. While driving approximately 100 yards behind Staten, Trooper Greer saw Staten drive left of center and drive through a 3-way stop sign without stopping or slowing down. After seeing Staten commit these potential traffic violations, Trooper Greer initiated a traffic stop.

Upon approaching Staten’s vehicle, Trooper Greer could smell a strong odor of alcoholic beverage through Staten’s open driver’s side window. Trooper Greer identified himself as an Indiana State Trooper and asked for Staten’s driver’s license and vehicle registration. Staten retrieved his wallet. While going through his wallet, Staten passed his driver’s license several times before handing Trooper Greer his bank debit card. Trooper Greer gave Staten back his debit card, told Staten he needed Staten’s driver’s license, and pointed to Staten’s driver’s license which he saw in Staten’s wallet. Eventually, Staten gave Trooper Greer his driver’s license and told Trooper Greer that he had been drinking at the Duck Inn.

Trooper Greer asked Staten if he was willing to perform field sobriety tests, and Staten agreed. Staten attempted to perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus test and the one-leg-stand test. Staten failed both tests. After administering a portable breath test, Trooper Greer read Staten the Indiana Implied Consent. Staten agreed to take the chemical test, and Trooper Greer transported Staten to the Chandler Police Department where the test was subsequently administered by Chandler Police Officer Eric Morris. The results of the chemical test indicated that Staten registered a blood alcohol content (“BAC”) of 0.15 percent.

On August 25, 2008, the State charged Staten with Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a BAC of 0.15 or more, Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated, Class C infraction failing to obey a stop sign, and Class C infraction driving on the wrong side of the road. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Staten guilty of the three operating while intoxicated charges and the failing to obey stop sign infraction. On May 28, 2010, the trial court sentenced Staten to concurrent terms of one year for the Class A misdemeanor operating while intoxicated convictions and a concurrent term of thirty-days for the Class C misdemeanor operating while intoxicated, all of which was suspended to probation. The trial court also imposed a $5 fine for the Class C traffic infraction. On June 15, 2010, the trial court, on its own motion, issued a corrected judgment and sentencing order that vacated the convictions of and sentences for Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a BAC of .15 or more and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The trial court ordered that the conviction and one-year suspended sentence for Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person and that the $5 fine for the Class C traffic infraction remain. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Initially, we note that to the extent that Staten challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to supporting the trial court’s determination that he committed a Class C traffic infraction by failing to obey a stop sign, the State concedes that, as charged, the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that Staten committed the Class C infraction. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s finding that Staten committed the Class C traffic infraction as well as the related $5 fine.

I. Admission of Evidence

[1] Staten contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting his blood alcohol test results obtained from the chemical blood test following the traffic stop. Specifically, Staten argues that, despite his consent to submit to a chemical test, the blood alcohol test results obtained from the chemical blood test were inadmissible because the traffic stop was illegal. The admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the sound discretion of the trial court and, on appeal, we review the admission of evidence only for an abuse of discretion. Datzek v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1149, 1154 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs “ ‘where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind.2001)).

Staten argues that the traffic stop was illegal because Trooper Greer had a mistaken belief that he committed a traffic violation when he drove through the three-way stop sign without stopping or slowing down. Staten’s argument regarding the legality of the traffic stop is based on Indiana Code section 9-21-8-32 (2008), which provides in relevant part that “[a] person who drives a vehicle shall stop at an intersection where a stop sign is erected at one (1) or more entrances to a through highway that are not part of the through highway and proceed cautiously, yielding to vehicles that are not required to stop.” In making this claim, Staten argues that the stop was illegal because he did not drive through a stop sign that was at an entrance to a through highway.

The State concedes that Staten did not violate Indiana Code section 9-21-8-32, but argues that the traffic stop was legal because, pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-21-4-11 (2008), the Indiana Department of Transportation had designated the intersection in question as a “stop intersection” and had erected a 3-way stop sign at the intersection. The State further argues that since Staten failed to stop at the posted stop sign, Staten violated Indiana Code section 9-21-4-18 (2008), which provides that “[a] person who drives a vehicle must obey the markings or signs posted under this chapter.”²

It is well-established that police officers may stop a vehicle when they observe minor traffic violations. State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind.2006); Jackson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied; Smith v. State, 713 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. A traffic violation, however minor, creates probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 340. A stop is lawful if there is an objectively justifiable reason for it, and the stop may be justified on less than probable cause. Jackson, 785 N.E.2d at 619; Smith, 713 N.E.2d at 342. If there is an objectively justifiable reason for the stop, “then the stop is valid whether or not the police officer would have otherwise made the stop but for ulterior suspicions or motives.” Jackson, 785 N.E.2d at 619; Smith, 713 N.E.2d at 342.

Here, the record clearly demonstrates that Staten disobeyed the posted stop sign. Trooper Greer testified that he initiated a traffic stop on the access road that connects State Road 61 to Yankeetown Road in Boonville after observing Staten drive his vehicle through the three-way stop sign without stopping or slowing down. In light of Trooper Greer’s testimony, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to determine that Staten committed a traffic violation by disobeying a posted three-way stop sign in violation of Indiana Code section 9-21-4-18,³ thereby giving Trooper Greer the legal right to stop his vehicle. See Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 340 (providing that police officers may stop a vehicle when they observe minor traffic violations). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the blood alcohol test results obtained from the chemical blood test following the traffic stop.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Staten also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering another person conviction.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.” McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind.2005) (emphasis added). It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904 (Ind.2005). To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it “most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.” Id. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind.2000) (emphasis added). It is therefore not necessary that the evidence “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 58, 55 (Ind.1995). “[T]he evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.” Pickens v. State, 751 N.E.2d 381, 334 (Ind.Ct.App.2001).

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind.2007).

Staten does not dispute that he was intoxicated at the time of the traffic stop, but argues that the State did not prove the element of endangerment. To prove endangerment, the State must prove that the defendant was operating the vehicle in a condition or manner that could have endangered any person, including the public, the police, or the defendant. Outlaw v. State, 918 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). However,

the endangerment clause does not require that the State prove a person other that the defendant was actually in the path of the defendant’s vehicle or in the same area in order to obtain a conviction. [State v.] Krohn, 521 N.E.2d [374,] 377 [ (Ind.Ct.App.1988) ]. An officer does not have to wait until the defendant crosses the centerline and adds another victim to the statistics of those who have died in drunk driving accidents. Id. Thus, it is sufficient that the defendant’s condition renders driving unsafe. Id.

Staley v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied.

Here, Staten’s intoxication clearly resulted in unsafe driving practices. Trooper Greer testified that while driving approximately 100 yards behind Staten, he saw Staten drive his vehicle left of center line and through a 3-way stop sign without stopping or slowing down. We conclude that Trooper Greer’s testimony regarding Staten’s unlawful and unsafe driving is sufficient to prove that he was operating a vehicle in a manner that could endanger the public, the police, or himself. See id. (providing that the evidence was sufficient to prove endangerment when officer testified that he observed the defendant driving unlawfully, i.e., over the posted speed limit); compare with Outlaw, 918 N.E.2d at 382 (providing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of endangerment when it failed to present any evidence of erratic or unlawful driving).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted Staten’s blood alcohol test results and that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Staten’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

KIRSCH, J., concurs. CRONE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.

1 . Ind.Code § 9-30-5-2(b) (2008).

2 . Indiana Code section 9-21-4-19 provides that "[a] person who violates section ... 18 of this chapter commits a Class C infraction.”

3 . The fact that either the Trooper or the prosecutor charged Staten with disobeying a stop sign under Indiana Code section 9-21-8-32 is irrelevant and the traffic stop was valid because Staten's act of "disobeying” a posted stop sign is a traffic violation under Indiana Code section 9-21-4-18. See Peck v. State, 712 N.E.2d 951, 951 (Ind. 1999) (holding that the traffic stop of the defendant was justified despite the fact that defendant did not violate Indiana Code section 9-21-8-24 as charged by the State, but did violate Indiana Code section 9-21-8-25 by failing to use a turn signal when turning); State v. Gets, 779 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the traffic stop was unjustified under Indiana Code section 9-21-8-24 and holding that the traffic stop of the defendant was justified because the defendant violated Indiana Code section 9-21-8-25 by failing to use his turn signal), trans. denied.