State v. Zakrajsek

2018 Ohio 1885

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

CASE NO. 2018-A-0033

- vs - :

FRANK W. ZAKRAJSEK, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2013 CR 00210.

Judgment: Appeal dismissed.

Nicholas Iarocci, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, Ashtabula County Courthouse, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047-1092 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Frank W. Zakrajsek, pro se, PID: A652-380, Marion Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 57, Marion, OH 43301 (Defendant-Appellant).

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Frank W. Zakrajsek, filed a pro se appeal on March 26, 2018, from a March 12, 2018 judgment entry of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion for judicial release under R.C. 2929.20.

{¶2} Pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(2), of the Ohio Constitution, appellate courts have jurisdiction to review, affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders from

2

courts of record inferior to the court of appeals and from final orders or actions of administrative officers or agencies.

{¶3} In State v. Coffman, 91 Ohio St.3d 125, 126 (2001), the Supreme Court of Ohio expressly held that “a trial court’s denial of a motion for shock probation is never a final appealable order.” In addition, appellate courts in Ohio that have addressed the issue after Coffman have held that the same logic is applicable to a denial of a motion for judicial release since it mirrors shock probation. State v. Schrock, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2016-P- 0078, 2017-Ohio-2723, ¶ 3; State v. Woods, 141 Ohio App.3d 549, 550 (2001); State v. Williams, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-1035, 2008-Ohio-1906, at ¶ 9; State v. Mayle, 5th Dist. Morgan Nos. 07-CA-0006 and 07-CA-0007, 2008-Ohio-3761, at ¶ 13; State v. Greene, 2d Dist. Greene No. 02-CA-17, 2002-Ohio-2595, at ¶ 6. Since there is no right to judicial release, the denial of a motion for judicial release cannot affect a “substantial right” as that term is defined in R.C. 2505.02(A)(1).

{¶4} Therefore, this appeal is hereby dismissed, sua sponte, for lack of a final appealable order.

{¶5} Appeal dismissed.

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, P.J., CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., concur.